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INTRODUCTION
"Oh, how beautiful! What is she?"' I cannot tell you how many
times curious strangers have asked me that question when I have been
out in public with my daughter. I know that if I answer, "She's my
daughter," which is true, they will only clarify their question by saying
something profound, like, "Yes, but what is she?"
My beautiful daughter, now ten years old, has long, straight black
hair, big dark eyes and chocolate-colored skin. She looks rather ex-
otic, and people have asked if she is East Indian or Native American,
or if she was born in South America. The truth is that she is my hus-
band's biological daughter from his first marriage, and both she and
her brother share their birth mother's dark complexion.
Gail, the children's biological mother, described herself as Black,2
although one of her ancestors was apparently a Native American, and,
given this country's notorious history with slavery, she almost cer-
tainly had one or more ancestors of European descent as well.3 My
husband, with his wavy black hair and deeply tanned skin, is proud of
his European heritage, although I can never remember to which coun-
tries he has traced his illustrious ancestors.
1. When I began this project, I hoped to write an Article which would provide an objective,
analytic framework for evaluating how the incorporation of racial classifications into legal rules
affects individuals and society. This required a blending of the dispassionate, objective analysis
typical of law review articles with the emotional and human context often completely absent
from such writings. In many ways, because of the necessity of blending such different ap-
proaches, this has been a very difficult piece to write. One of my colleagues described an early
draft as being almost schizophrenic because the analytic segments seemed so distinct from the
more personal perspective offered in certain portions of the Article.
I finally decided to accept that parts of this Article would have a very personal, emotional
tone. These sections are intended to help provide a human framework for the analysis which is,
in the end, the main focus of this Article.
2. I speak of Gail in the past tense not out of any disrespect for her or her relationship with
the children, but because she died before I had a chance to know her. William (my son) was
four, and Carlissa was two when she died.
For those who might wonder why I say the children are "mine" when we share no genetic or
biological link, I legally adopted them about six months after marrying their father.
3. This mixed ancestry is not at all unusual. By 1918, the Bureau of the Census estimated that
75% of all Blacks in this country were racially mixed, and current estimates are that 20% of all
genes of American "Blacks" are "White." Ernest E. Kilker, Black and White in America: The
Culture and Politics of Racial Classification, 7 INT'L J. OF POL., CULTURE & Soc'Y 229, 231
(1993). One source estimates that between three-fourths and four-fifths of all "Blacks" in the
United States have at least some White ancestry. CARL DEGLER, NEITHER BLACK NOR WHITE:
SLAVERY AND RACE RELATIONS IN BRAZIL AND THE UNITED STATES 185 (1986). Degler also
suggests that hundreds of thousands or even millions of those identified as "White" have some
"Black" ancestors. Id.
In addition, some anthropologists have estimated that "as many as one-fourth of all Blacks in
America have some Indian ancestry...." KATHY RUSSELL ET AL., THE COLOR COMPLEX--ThF
POLITICS OF SKIN COLOR AMONG AFRICAN AMERICANS 12 (1992).
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So what is my daughter? If there was an official inquiry, it is likely
that my daughter would be identified as "Black," under the infamous
but well-entrenched "one drop" rule.4 Even a very small percentage
of Black genes, assuming that genes can properly be identified by
commonly accepted racial designations, means that an individual is to
be considered Black,5 ignoring any other ancestry or genetic heritage.
Of course, I am not limited to the party line when responding to
casual inquiries from strangers. I can provide all sorts of answers in
response to their questions. For example, I can say: "Her birth
mother was Black; her father is White ' 6 or "She's biracial ' 7 or "She's
multi-racial" or, as one of my colleagues once suggested, "It's none of
your business." Of course I could also answer that she is Black, as-
suming that if the facts of her ancestry were known this is how most
4. The infamous "one drop" rule posits that "[a]ny trace of African ancestry makes one
Black." Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 6
(1991). For a more complete exposition of the one drop rule, see F. JAMES DAVIS, WHO IS
BLACK? ONE NATION'S DEFINITION (1991).
The "one drop" rule has been ascribed to various sources. For example, one commentator
traces the origins of the "one drop" rule to legislators in the upper South who wanted to ensure
that "any person with even a drop of Black blood would have the same legal status as a pure
African." RUSSELL ET AL., supra note 3, at 14. Other sources place the origin of the rule in
Louisiana. VIRGINIA R. DOMINOUEZ, WHITE BY DEFINITION: SOCIAL CLASSIFICATION IN CRE-
OLE LOUISIANA (1986); accord Kilker, supra note 3, at 230.
Regardless of the origins of the rule, in modem American society it does seem true that any
known Black ancestry will lead to the societal designation of an individual as Black. This
designation, of course, completely ignores any White or other racial heritage which an individual
might in fact possess.
5. For example, in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 541 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the plaintiff was classified as colored despite being identified as
having seven-eighths Caucasian ancestry and one-eighth African ancestry.
6. After significant reflection, I have decided to utilize and capitalize the terms "White" and
"Black" throughout this Article, and to use these words in the sense that they are probably
generally understood. I capitalize the words to emphasize the special considerations inherent in
identifying individuals as "White" or "Black."
First, people are neither white nor black, and these labels probably have more political ramifi-
cations than any biological or social considerations should warrant. In addition, many people
have a mixed "racial" background, and using only these two alternatives tends to ignore the
existence of bi- or multi-racial individuals.
However, in order to communicate, the words used must have a generally understood mean-
ing. Therefore, except when otherwise noted, "White" will refer to a person who is of exclu-
sively European descent, regardless of how dark or pale they are; "Black" will refer to
individuals who have one or more African ancestors and who retain some identification with
such ancestors, either because of appearance or because they were raised as members of a
"Black" family, regardless of appearance.
This classification scheme is contrary to the answer I ultimately give my children about their
racial identity, but if I chose instead to refer to those of mixed ancestral heritage as "Multi-
racial," I would constantly need to speak of "Blacks or Multi-racial individuals," and this alter-
native seemed unnecessarily cumbersome.
7. These first two choices both ignore the American Indian ancestors from which Carlissa
presumably inherited her heavy, straight black hair.
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members of our society would categorize her. Regardless of all of
these options, when faced with questions from strangers, my real di-
lemma is what I should say when it is my daughter who asks the
question.
Even the casual reader will probably have noticed that all of this
discussion has focused on my daughter, rather than my son, whom I
have mentioned so far only in passing. My son has the same birth
parents as my daughter, but strangers seldom, if ever, ask me about
his race unless he is in the company of his sister. My son, who has the
same chocolate-colored skin and dark eyes as his sister, has the kinky
black hair and slightly broader nose which apparently identify him as
Black in the minds of most observers. 8 Despite the fact that strangers
are comfortable with his racial identification, my son also asks about
who and what he is.
The problem of racial identification in my home is compounded by
a number a factors. For example, my skin is incredibly pale-I do not
tan; I turn a bright and uncomfortable red if I stay out in the sun too
long without some sort of protection from ultraviolet rays. Further-
more, my hair is a light brown, and my eyes are a blue-green. I look
nothing like my adopted children, a fact upon which even my chil-
dren's classmates have felt free to remark. Both children are well
aware of this dissimilarity in appearance.
Adding to the children's natural curiosity about differences in our
appearances and backgrounds, and greatly compounding the problem
of racial identification in our family, the children's maternal grand-
mother, who became particularly close to them after her daughter's
untimely death, at one point tried to inculcate in them a belief that
they are "Black," not "White," and that neither I nor my husband will
ever be able to understand that or help them learn about their true
racial "identity."
Many of these views are also subscribed to by very influential forces
in our society. For example, the National Association of Black Social
Workers has opposed transracial adoptions on the grounds that White
families are incapable of properly raising Black children in our racist
8. Yet another colleague asked me if I think the reason more strangers have asked me about
my daughter's racial background than about my son's heritage is gender related. I believe that it
is the presence of superficial physical characteristics such as the texture of their hair and the
shape of their noses which makes more people assume that they know "what" my son is, even if
he is in my company, while they are far less sure of their racial characterization of my daughter.
If gender does play a role in the questions, I am unaware of it.
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society.9 This view has been incorporated into adoption policies in
most states.
One of the most significant problems with such views is the impact
they are likely to have on Black children, or children identified as
Black, who are being raised in White or mixed-race homes. For exam-
ple, after my daughter's grandmother started telling her that I would
never really love or understand her because she and her brother are
"Black" while I am "White," my daughter went through a phase of
hating her skin color. She tried coloring it with finger paints, magic
markers, and once with my face powder. Her self-portraits showed a
little girl with pink skin and long yellow hair. Even her pre-school
teachers commented on this with concern during parent-teacher
conferences.
My son, always more restrained about his feelings, also has been
troubled about his racial identity. For example, he once asked me
how he could be "Black" when his father was "White." At other
times, he also expressed concern that none of his friends wanted to
believe we were his "real" parents because we are so different from
him in appearance.
Neither I nor my husband is comfortable with any racial identifica-
tion or classification for our children which does not allow them to
accept and appreciate their "White" heritage as much as their "Black"
identity. We therefore decided to tell them they were "multi-racial"
when they asked, although we also agreed that we would tell them
that other people may be inclined to identify them as "Black," just as
their grandmother does. Since that decision, our son has apparently
settled on describing himself as "Brown," which is factually accurate,
even if it has no widely accepted meaning in the context of racial clas-
sifications, and is often used informally to describe a Latino back-
ground (which my son does not have). My daughter accepts or at
least understands that she is different in appearance from me and her
father, and she tells her friends that she is "Black and White." This
satisfies our children now, while they are young, but I wonder and
worry about whether these answers will continue to satisfy them as
they grow up in our society, which seems to have a tremendous and, to
my mind, illogical and destructive fixation on racial classifications.
Moreover, I worry about their role in a society where many people
will insist on identifying them by race, and almost certainly not by the
racial identity that they have currently chosen for themselves.
9. See infra part II.
[Vol. 46:1
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For example, when one applies for financial aid to go to college, the
applicant is asked to identify his or her race by choosing between a
number of little boxes. The same choices await anyone who applies
for a bank loan to buy a car or a home, and often when he or she
applies for a job. When it comes time to complete census information,
the little boxes with arbitrary classifications are there in black and
white. According to the Office of Management and Budget Statistical
Directive 15, one can be "American Indian or Alaskan Native,"
"Asian or Pacific Islander," "Black," "White," or one can choose the
ethnic classification "Of Hispanic Origin." One cannot be more than
one of these choices. This means that, unless things change, my son
will one day find out that he cannot be "Brown," and my daughter will
learn that she cannot be both "Black and White," at least not in the
eyes of the law. They can, of course, choose to be "Other," but that
choice raises a host of issues too. Does choosing to be "Other" mean
they are disavowing a connection with their Black and White roots?
Moreover, the choice of "Other" seems to suggest a degree of differ-
ence and isolation which I hope my children never have to feel.
However, if the only drawback to racial classifications was that my
children would have to choose, under certain circumstances, among
racial classifications that do not perfectly fit their self-images, I would
not mind, at least not very much. Certainly I would not care enough
to write an article addressing the issue. What does disturb me is that
these racial classifications are used for a multitude of purposes, and
reflect an official acceptance of the notion that racial identification is
important enough to justify extensive data collection efforts and, in
certain situations, differential treatment based on those classifications.
These notions are immensely troubling.
It is axiomatic that the question of race permeates our society.
President Clinton, in a speech delivered at the National Archives on
July 19, 1995, reaffirmed his belief that "the evidence suggests, indeed
screams, that... [t]he job of ending discrimination in this country is
not over." 10 Citing the facts that this country permitted slavery for
centuries prior to the passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments to the Constitution, and that another century
passed before civil rights legislation was enacted, he concluded that
the persistence of discrimination was not surprising.'1 As a result,
President Clinton reiterated his support for affirmative action pro-
grams designed to end discrimination, over the objections of Republi-
10. Excerpts From Clinton Talk on Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1995, at B10.
11. Id.
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cans and some conservative Democrats. 12 In sharp contrast to the
President's position, Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole renewed his
pledge to "get the Federal Government out of the group-preference
business."'1 3 The political debate over our country's race relations
problems has become a national fixation. Affirmative action in partic-
ular has been called "the country's hottest political issue.' 14
Even outside the political arena, the division between Blacks and
Whites has been commented upon repeatedly in the popular press.' 5
Dozens of articles in magazines and newspapers discussed the growing
divide between the races as illustrated by attitudes towards O.J. Simp-
son, Lewis Farrakhan and his "Million Man March," and various other
social issues. 16
In addition to the ongoing political debate and popular commentary
on issues relating to race, the jurisprudential ramifications of racial
classifications have recently been subjected to review. During the
summer of 1995, the Supreme Court rendered two major decisions
which are expected to have a major impact on racial classifications
and probably on race relations.17
One of the two decisions was Miller v. Johnson,18 in which the
Court struck down a congressional redistricting plan that Georgia had
implemented following the 1990 Census. The plan, Georgia's third at-
tempt to comply with the Voting Rights Act of 1965, called for the
creation of three districts with a majority of Black voters, and was
invalidated by the Court under strict scrutiny on the grounds that race
12. Todd S. Purdum, President Shows Fervent Support for Goals of Affirmative Action, N.Y.
TIMES, July 20, 1995, at Al, B10.
13. Id.
14. Kenneth Jost, After Adarand, 81 A.B.A. J. 70, 70 (Sept. 1995).
15. See, e.g., Joe Chidley & Anne Gregor, The Simpson Jury Faces the Race Factor,
MACLEAN'S, Oct. 9, 1995, at 69; Jerelyn Eddings et al., The Autumn of Discontent, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Oct. 16, 1995, at 49; Jerelyn Eddings et al., The Covert Color War, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Oct. 23, 1995, at 40; Bob Levin, The Real America, in Black and White,
MACLEAN'S, Oct. 16, 1995, at 47; Lance Morrow, The Museum of Slavery?, TIME, Aug. 14, 1995,
at 74; Ruth Shalit, Race in the Newsroom, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 2, 1995, at 20.
16. See, e.g., Where Do We Go from Here? NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 6, 1995 (five articles devoted
to the Million Man March and Louis Farrakhan.); After the Cheers: The Justice System & Black
America-Unreasonable Doubt? Simpson, Race & America, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 23, 1995 (ten
articles devoted to the questions raised by the O.J. Simpson trial and the racial divisions revealed
by the verdict and reactions to it). For lengthier commentary on the growing separation of and
division between the races, see ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPA-
RATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL (1992) and LEE SIOELMAN & SUSAN WELCH, BLACK AMERICANS'
VIEWS OF RACIAL INEOUALITY (1991).
17. See Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.
Ct. 2097 (1995).
18. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
[Vol. 46:1
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had been an improper motivating factor in establishing district
boundaries. 19
The other Supreme Court decision was Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena,20 a case which involved a challenge to a governmentally im-
posed affirmative action program. In Adarand, the United States
Supreme Court generally decried the use of racial classifications by
federal, state, or local governments unless the race-based program in
question can withstand the rigors of strict scrutiny.2' The Court spe-
cifically noted, however, that the case is not to be viewed as prohibit-
ing all race-based preferences 22 and it actually provides a limited
reaffirmation of benign affirmative action programs.
Our society is based to a significant extent on the notion that race
matters and that the distinction between being Black and White is
particularly significant. We have myriad rules and programs which de-
pend and rely on racial classifications.23 Our preoccupation with race
goes far beyond government programs and rules and, to some extent,
permeates virtually every aspect of our lives.
I object to racial classifications partially because such classifications
are generally arbitrary, rather than being based on any intrinsic differ-
ences among individuals. Despite substantial efforts to document a
biological or genetic basis for racial classifications, the evidence shows
that there is very little genetic variation between members of different
races.2 4 The principal alternate justifications for racial classifications,
the notions of social reality and ethnic heritage, are also insufficient to
support the idea that there are intrinsic and important differences be-
tween individuals of different races. 25 Moreover, the idea that social
19. Id. at 2494. Georgia had previously proposed two alternate plans which would have in-
creased the number of minority-controlled districts from one to two. Although the Justice De-
partment refused to approve either of these proposals, the Supreme Court found that any plan
which served to ameliorate past discrimination would automatically comply with the Voting
Rights Act. Id. For a more detailed discussion of Miller, see infra part III.
20. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
21. Id. at 2117. The Court stated that governments may not utilize race-based programs un-
less they "serve a compelling governmental interest, and [are] ... narrowly tailored to further
that interest." Id. For a more detailed discussion of Adarand, see infra part IV.
22. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117.
23. For example, adoption agencies are permitted, and sometimes required, to set guidelines
for placement which include a consideration of race. The boundaries to congressional districts
are established on the basis of residents' race. Educational and employment opportunities are
allocated based upon the race of applicants. These three examples illustrate how race impacts
the personal, political and professional aspects of our lives.
24. See infra part I.
25. Clearly, Blacks and Whites are subject to different experiences and pressures in our soci-
ety. It is not surprising that these different experiences tend to produce different beliefs and
attitudes.
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reality requires us to recognize the concept of "race" seems to me an
example of circular reasoning. Our society uses and relies upon rigid
and artificial racial classifications, which reinforce certain social be-
haviors and attitudes, which in turn support the use of those same
racial classifications, which in turn support the behaviors, ad
infinitum.
This Article attacks the use of racial classifications by governmental
agencies, and advocates the abolition of "official" racial classifications
on the grounds that programs drawn along such broad lines cannot be
narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests. After examining
the notion of race, and discussing the extent to which such labels are
intrinsically meaningful, this Article focuses on three specific para-
digms in which the effects of programs which result in differential
treatment for members of different races are examined and analyzed.
The first paradigm is that of transracial adoption, where treatment of
adoptable children is based upon their race.26 The second paradigm
covered in this Article is that of congressional redistricting along ra-
cial lines.27 The final paradigm which illustrates problems caused by
the official sanction of differential treatment based on race is affirma-
tive action in hiring and education. 28
These three examples are chosen not only because of the intrinsic
importance of each of these issues, but because each affects a different
part of our lives. The transracial adoption debate focuses on how race
can play a fundamental role in governing and limiting the personal
lives of those involved. The decision to proscribe which families can
adopt which children affects the development of the family and the
development of healthy, productive members of society. Congres-
What is lacking is any logical basis for the disparate treatment which triggers the differences in
outlook of Blacks and Whites. The decision to treat Blacks and Whites differently is not based
on any fundamental, inherent differences between individuals of different races. Rather, the
differences in the way we treat and regard individuals seem to be a result of arbitrary and essen-
tially erroneous assumptions about what it means to be a member of a particular racial group.
The differences in attitudes, beliefs and values which result are artificial (in the sense that socie-
tal pressures create the differences) rather than being necessitated because of inherent differ-
ences between the groups (as would be the case if society were merely recognizing innate
differences between those of different races). For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see
part I.B.
26. See infra part II.
27. See infra part III.
28. See infra part IV. Interestingly enough, although I picked these topics and began writing
this Article long before I read Professor Twila Perry's recent article on the transracial adoption
debate, she also selects these three issues as topics which might illustrate what she describes as a
"colorblind individualist" approach to race-conscious decisions. Twila L. Perry, The Transracial
Adoption Controversy: An Analysis of Discourse and Subordination, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 33, 43 n.34 (1993-94) [hereinafter Perry, Discourse and Subordination].
[Vol. 46:1
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sional redistricting provides an example of how race relates to the
political process in this country and to our involvement in that essen-
tial process. A consideration of the political process and how race
affects that process is critical because it is generally conceded that
political powerlessness is one of the great barriers to racial equality in
this country.29 Finally, the affirmative action debate impacts the ques-
tion of how our resources should be allocated in connection with the
professional and economic progress of those involved. Rules which
allocate educational and employment opportunities on the basis of
race have a tremendous impact on the economic position of affected
individuals. This Article therefore picks three seemingly diverse top-
ics, each of which involves rules that use racial classifications as a basis
for differential treatment, to illustrate how the question of race per-
meates our society.
This Article suggests that in each of these three paradigms, the use
of racial classifications as a basis for differential treatment has created
more problems than it has solved. By legitimizing the use of race as a
"proper" basis for differential treatment, such programs serve to rein-
force the notion that race is intrinsically important. This in turn oper-
ates to increase the perception of differences among the races, which
aggravates the racial tensions plaguing this country. So long as we
continue to accept the notion that race is a legitimate basis for differ-
entiating between individuals, the goal of a color-blind society is
unobtainable.
I do not suggest that the history of our country and our society is
not replete with examples of discrimination or that it is inappropriate
to provide some form of redress for the actual victims of past discrimi-
nation. My concern is that the "solutions" we have embraced, which
generally involve grouping individuals by race and then treating mem-
bers of different groups differently based on such classifications, are
actually part of the problem and are no solution at all.
I. THE LEGITIMACY OF RACIAL CLASSIFICATIONS: WHAT DOES IT
MEAN TO IDENTIFY SOMEONE AS BLACK?
Essentially two justifications have been offered in defense of racial
classifications. The first of these is the biological justification. This
position is based on the belief that there are genetic differences be-
tween certain groups of people, which are reflected in the various ra-
cial classifications. Alternatively, notions of social reality and
29. See generally LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS
IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1
ethnicity have been advanced as a justification for classifying persons
and treating them differently on the basis of race. Both of these justi-
fications will be examined in turn.
A. The Biological Basis for Racial Classifications
Conventional sociological usage suggests that "race" refers to "a
group that is socially defined but on the basis of physical criteria. '30
Separate races should therefore be identifiable by discrete physical
attributes that are possessed by one race and one race only.31 The
problem is that there is no set of physical characteristics shared by and
unique to members of any racial group. 32 Genetic variation is gener-
ally more attributable to geographic separation than any clear division
along "racial" lines. 33 Interestingly, geneticists have pointed out that
there is more genetic variation within the human population identified
as "Black" than there is between populations identified as "Black"
and "White. '34
On the other hand, the typical man or woman on the street proba-
bly has a fairly well-established view of how to ascertain an individ-
ual's race based on personal characteristics. The characteristic that
would probably be offered most often in support of racial classifica-
30. PIERRE L. VAN DEN BERGHE, RACE AND RACISM: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 9
(1967) (emphasis omitted). This approach has clearly found its way into American jurispru-
dence. See, e.g., Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, 18 U.S.C. § 1093 (1988)
(explaining that "the term 'racial group' means a set of individuals whose identity as such is
distinctive in terms of physical characteristics or biological descent.").
31. See Hudgins v. Wright, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 134 (Sup. Ct. App. 1806), quoted in PAUL
FINKELMAN, THE LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE, A CASEBOOK 22-24 (1986) ("Nature has
stampt upon the African and his descendants two characteristic marks, beside the difference of
complexion ... a flat nose and wooly head of hair.").
32. This position has apparently been acknowledged by the Supreme Court. "The particular
traits which have generally been chosen to characterize races have been criticized as having little
biological significance." Saint Francis College v. AI-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610 n.4 (1987). Hav-
ing said this, however, the Court went on to conclude that § 1981 "'at a minimum' reaches dis-
crimination against an individual 'because he or she is genetically part of an ethnically and
physiognomically distinctive subgrouping of homo sapiens."' Id. at 613 (quoting AI-Khazraji v.
Saint Francis College, 784 F.2d 505, 517 (3d Cir. 1986).
33. See Masatoshi Nei & Arun Roychoudhury, Genetic Relationship and Evolution of Human
Races, 14 EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY 1, 38 (1982); John Tooby & Leda Cosmides, On the Univer-
sality of Human Nature and the Uniqueness of the Individual: The Role of Genetics and Adapta-
tion, 58 J. PERSONALITY 17, 35 (1990).
34. Nei & Roychoudhury, supra note 33, at 11; see also Charles Petit, Scientists Call Race
Insignificant: They Say Differences Are Mostly Superficial, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 20, 1995, at Al
(reporting that the American Association for the Advancement of Science has adopted this
position).
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tions is skin color,35 but facial features (ranging from the epicanthic
fold to a broad or flattened nose or full lips) would probably also be
mentioned, as would hair texture. 36 Characteristics in addition to ap-
pearance might be considered in establishing racial identity.37 For ex-
ample, given the prominence of a recent and very well publicized
book purporting to demonstrate that Blacks are less intelligent (on
average) than Whites,38 this might also be mentioned by a number of
people asked to comment on racial classification. However, because
intelligence is not readily apparent to the casual observer and may not
be ascertainable even by conventional testing methods, most racial
classifications are likely to be made on the basis of readily observable
physical traits.
Despite the fact that most people in this country probably have rel-
atively well-defined internalized guidelines by which they make judg-
ments about the racial identification of themselves and others, these
guidelines clearly do not always make racial identification easy or ac-
curate. From my perspective, my children provide an obvious exam-
ple. Strangers appear to be generally unable to identify the race of my
daughter, as evidenced by the number of inquiries about her racial
background. On the other hand, my son, who shares precisely the
same ancestors as my daughter, is often identified as "Black,"
although in fact he shares a mixed racial heritage. In addition,
although I am well aware of the genetic make-up of my children, I
have a difficult time ascribing a "race" to them because the commonly
35. The preeminence of this characteristic is readily apparent. Most obviously, racial classifi-
cations tend to be made along color lines, such as the division between "Black" and "White,"
and identification of Native Americans as "Red," and Asians as "Yellow."
As recently stated in the popular press, "[t]o most Americans race is a plain as the color of the
nose on your face." Sharon Begley, Three is Not Enough-Surprising New Lessons from the
Controversial Science of Race, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 13, 1995, at 67.
36. These very characteristics have been judicially recognized as the proper test of race. See
Hudgins v. Wright, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 134, 139 (Sup. Ct. App. 1806), quoted in FrNKELMAN,
supra note 31, at 22-24.
37. The physical characteristics identified in the text are relatively immutable and clearly in-
herited. It is true that they can be changed with plastic surgery, or even less drastic methods
such as chemical processing to straighten hair or lighten skin tone, but absent such artificial
intervention, these characteristics are a matter of genetics.
By way of contrast, racial identification might also be made at least partially on the basis of
clothing, accessories, hairstyle or the like. These kinds of considerations, however, clearly are
not biologically based and so would lend little credence to the notion that race is genetically
determined. Moreover, because these attributes are so very easy to change, it is unlikely that
these would be identified as a reliable way to determine the race of particular individuals.
38. RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLGENCE AND
CLASS STRucTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994). "The average black and white differ in 1Q at
every level of socioeconomic status .... Attempts to explain the difference in terms of test bias
have failed." Id. at 269.
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accepted dichotomy of Black or White seems to be inadequate to de-
scribe their "racial" identity.
Yet the inadequacy of popular racial classification schemes is not
the only problem with relying on the notion that race is somehow de-
pendent on discrete physical characteristics. Even if general agree-
ment existed on which characteristics identify which races, and even if
it were possible to make reliable judgments about "race" based on
those characteristics, there is another fundamental problem with the
way in which "race" has been defined in this country. If immutable
physical characteristics do indeed define the parameters of the various
races, then one would expect racial classifications to remain relatively
constant. In fact, nothing could be further from the truth.
Race seems to be a particularly amorphous and fluid concept. No-
where is this demonstrated more convincingly than in the racial classi-
fications utilized by the Census Bureau in its data collection efforts.39
In the 1890 Census, eight separate racial classifications were recog-
nized: White, Black, Mulatto, Quadroon, Octoroon, Chinese, Japa-
nese and Indian. The classification of Black was reserved for those
persons having three-fourths or more "black" blood; Mulatto de-
scribed persons having from three-eighths to five-eighths black blood;
Quadroon referred to those having one-fourth black blood; and Octo-
roon meant those persons having one-eighth or any trace of black
blood. The 1900 Census dropped Mulatto, Quadroon and Octoroon
from the list, reducing the number of racial classifications to five.
"Mulatto" reappeared in the 1910 and 1920 Census, along with the
possibility of a person being classified as "Other." "Mulatto" disap-
peared, apparently for good, with the 1930 Census, which also added
Mexican, Filipino, Hindu and Korean to the list of available racial
classifications. "Mexican" was deleted for the 1940 Census, and
Hindu and Korean were removed for the 1950 Census, which also re-
classified "Indian" as "American Indian." The 1960 Census added
Hawaiian, Part Hawaiian, Aleut and Eskimo. In 1970, the categories
of Part Hawaiian, Aleut and Eskimo were deleted and "Negro" be-
came "Negro or Black." In 1980 and 1990, a number of additional
categories (including Guamanian, Samoan, Korean and Vietnamese)
were added, and Eskimo and Aleut were reinstated as possible racial
classifications. In fact, in the 1980 and 1990 Census, there were fifteen
options for determining the race of a respondent, although nine of
39. This and all of the following information about racial classifications on the Census comes
from Sharon Lee, Racial Classifications in the US Census: 1890-1990, 16 ETHNIC AND RACIAL
STUDIES 75, 77-79 (1993) (citing U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 22 YEARS OF U.S. CENSUS TAK-
ING: POPULATION AND HOUSING QUESTIONS, 1790-1990, 36 (1989)).
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those classifications were grouped under the heading of "Asian or Pa-
cific Islander."
The pressures to change the Census to reflect "new" understandings
of racial classifications continue today. There is substantial pressure
on the Office or Management and Budget and the U.S. Census Bu-
reau to make changes to the existing classifications to recognize differ-
ent racial groupings.4 0
One would think that if there were in fact discrete physical charac-
teristics which positively identified an individual as being a member of
one race and not another, then it would be easy or at least possible for
people to accurately identify the racial heritage of individuals and it
would not have been necessary to make such extensive modifications
to the racial categories included in the Census. In reality, the Census
has continually readjusted the list of available racial classifications
precisely because there is no set of discrete characteristics which set
people of different "races" apart.
Historically the notion that the "races" were separate and distinct
because of biological and genetic differences was generally assumed to
reflect reality.41 For example, the entire culture of slavery was predi-
cated on the widespread acceptance of the now discredited idea that
the Black race was genetically and inevitably inferior to the White
race. This belief would have been entirely untenable without the un-
derlying notion that there were biological differences between the
Black and White races.
Over time, however, substantial data has been accumulated which
suggests that biological differences among the races simply do not ex-
ist. Biologist Richard Lewontin made a strong case against genetic
determinants of race in 1972.42 His conclusion, based on analyzing
seventeen genetic markers in 168 separate populations, was that there
40. See Daniel Seligman, Talking Back to the f.Q. Test, Guess Who's in Love: With Lefties,
More Casino Wars, and Other Matters, FORTUNE, Oct. 16, 1995, at 246 (commenting particularly
on the move to have Hawaiians reclassified as Native Americans, and to add a "Multiracial"
category).
41. See generally WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATITUDES To-
WARDS THE NEGRO 1550-1812, at 482-511 (1968) (discussing the notion of natural racial hierar-
chies in post-revolutionary America); RONALD T. TAKAKI, IRON CAGES: RACE AND CULTURE
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (Knopf 1979) (evaluating the definition of Blacks and Indi-
ans used by white colonists as a justification for slavery); Barbara J. Fields, Slavery, Race and
Ideology in the United States of America, 181 NEW LEFT REV. 95, 101-09 (1990) (giving an histor-
ical account of American racial ideology).
42. Richard Lewontin, The Apportionment of Human Diversity, 6 EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY
381, 397 (1972); see also L.L. Cavalli-Sforza, The Genetics of Human Populations, 231 Sci. AM.
80, 80 (Sept. 1972) (noting that genetic determinants can lead to unreliable results due to genetic
differences within the same race); Nei & Roychoudhury, supra note 33, at 41 (concluding that
genetic variation is generally more attributable to geographic location than to racial bounds).
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is more of a genetic difference among the members of any one race
than between members of different races.43
The lack of biological support for the notion that human beings can
be meaningfully classified along "racial" lines has produced a wide-
spread change in attitudes in the academic community. For example,
textbooks of physical anthropology are being rewritten to delete any
mention of race as a valid technique for measuring or describing
human variation.44 Although human variation indisputably exists,
most modern scientists now concede that notions of racial classifica-
tion do little to explain such variation and that current definitions of
race are certainly inadequate to classify children of mixed-race
unions.45
Unfortunately, racial classifications continue despite the lack of evi-
dentiary support for the idea that biological differences exist among
members of different races. Other explanations purporting to justify
differing racial classifications have been adopted by those desperate to
perpetuate the belief that there are meaningful differences among
human populations based on race. Many of those who feel the need
to perpetuate the idea that race matters now suggest that race is a
valid social construct derived from culture and/or ethnicity. On closer
examination, however, the idea that racial classifications are meaning-
ful because of social differences such as cultural or ethnic backgrounds
also appears to be fundamentally flawed.
B. Societal Norms: Ethnicity and Culture as a Basis for
Racial Classification
A large number of commentators have favored a social rather than
biological basis for race.46 For example, W.E.B. DuBois suggested
43. Lewontin, supra note 42, at 397.
44. See, e.g., Alice Littlefield et al., Redefining Race: The Potential Demise of a Concept in
Physical Anthropology, 23 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 641 (1982).
45. See Begley, supra note 35, at 67 (citing anthropologist Alan Goodman, Dean of Natural
Science at Hampshire College).
46. See, e.g., ASHLEY MONTAGU, THE CONCEPT OF RACE 19-20 (1964) (criticizing the use of
the word "race" to distinguish population groups "which happen to differ from other popula-
tions in the frequency of one or more genes"); THOMAS SOWELL, RACE AND CULTURE: A
WORLD VIEW XiV (1994) ("Race is a biological concept, but it is a social reality"); Kevin Brown,
Do African-Americans Need Immersion Schools?: The Paradoxes Created by Legal Conceptual-
ization of Race and Public Education, 78 IOWA L. REV. 813, 824 (1993) (characterizing race as
one of the most important social classification in use today) [hereinafter Brown, Immersion
Schools]; Kilker, supra note 3, at 230 (stating that the biological concept of race is a dubious
one); Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion,
Fabrication and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 13 (1994) (tracing the notion that there
are three races (Caucasoid, Negroid and Mongoloid) to Medieval Europe, which had no expo-
sure to persons from anywhere other than Europe, Africa and the Near East).
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that instead of relying on biological or physical characteristics as in-
dicators of race, the proper inquiry is to examine common history,
traditions, and geography as the source of racial identification.47
Michael Omi and Howard Winant, after tracing how the construction
of racial identity has changed over time, argued that race should be
viewed "as an unstable and 'decentered' complex of social meanings
constantly being transformed by political struggle. ' 48 Henry Louis
Gates has argued that "one must learn to be 'black' in this society,
precisely because 'blackness' is a socially produced category." 49 These
commentators recognize race as a valid construct, but justify the con-
cept as being derived from social, cultural and ethnic differences
rather than being based on biology.
If race is to be regarded as important because of such social consid-
erations, the question becomes whether cultural or ethnic differences
really provide a basis for classifying individuals. There is substantial
evidence that such differences cannot justify the way persons are clas-
sified or account for the importance attached to race.
Ethnic differences, for example, do not support the racial classifica-
tions which this country has used. If race was truly akin to ethnicity,
one would expect that racial and ethnic groups would have been
treated similarly. This is certainly not the case. While one can draw
parallels between the treatment of certain ethnic minorities in the
past, particularly those of Jewish ancestry and the Irish, 50 and the
treatment of certain widely recognized racial minorities, it is hard to
equate the burdens placed on members of European ethnic groups
with the genocidal attacks against Native Americans or the slavery
and ensuing oppression of Blacks. Moreover, the history of America
has generally been one of integration of ethnic minorities, as sug-
gested by the well known "melting pot" metaphor used to describe
47. W.E.B. DuBois, DUSK OF DAWN: AN ESSAY TOWARD AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A RACE
CONCEPT 116-17 (1975).
48. MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM
THE 1960s TO THE 1980s 68 (1986) (italics omitted).
49. HENRY LOUIS GATES, JR., LOOSE CANONS: NOTES ON THE CULTURE WARS 101 (1992).
50. Others have drawn parallels between Blacks and other groups which were subjected to
particularly virulent prejudice. See Jeff Jacoby, Race Doesn't Matter, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 16,
1995, at A13 ("If the Irish, the Jews, and the Chinese were able to overcome legal discrimination
and societal exclusion without affirmative action, black Americans can, too. To claim otherwise
is racist."); see also Bill Ong Hing, Beyond the Rhetoric of Assimilation and Cultural Pluralism:
Addressing the Tension of Separatism and Conflict in an Immigration-Driven Multiracial Society,
81 CAL. L. REV. 863, 899 (1993) ("The biggest difference between today's Asian, Latino, and
Haitian immigrants and Irish, Italian, and Southern and Eastern European immigrants of de-
cades past is race. Certainly, all of these groups faced hostilities, discrimination, and even vio-
lence, but eventually the Irish and Europeans became part of the mainstream.").
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American culture and society.51 Despite the traditional integration of
ethnic minorities into American culture, members of certain racial
minorities, particularly Blacks, have not been incorporated into
"mainstream" American life. Blacks continue to face the results of
invidious and even overt discrimination and hostility because of their
race and because they are seen as "different" from and "inferior" to
the White majority.52 Americans of Irish, Scandinavian, German or
other European descent are not generally subject to such treatment.
In addition, to suggest that race can be viewed as an aspect of
ethnicity does not explain why those of varied ethnic backgrounds are
so often labeled and treated as members of the same race. For exam-
ple, individuals of Chinese and Japanese descent do not share a com-
mon ethnic background, yet members of both groups are treated as
being "Asian. '53 Moreover, individuals are labeled "Black" regard-
less of their tribal or national affiliations or those of their African an-
cestors, or even if they cannot identify any such ancestors or
background. 54
The reality is that racial identification in this country does not de-
pend on cultural or ethnic background, or even current cultural pref-
erences of the individuals so classified.5 5 Consider, for example, the
51. Jim Chen, Unloving, 80 IOWA L. REV. 145, 149-54 (1994) (describing America as a creole
republic where the views and culture of all participants blend together to enrich all our lives).
52. Numerous commentators have discussed the negative stereotypes associated with being
"Black." See, e.g., MICHAEL J. CASSIDY, LEGACY OF FEAR: AMERICAN RACE RELATIONS TO
1900, at 32-63 (1985); GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND: THE
DEBATE ON AFRO-AMERICAN CHARACTER AND DESTINY 1817-1914, at 53-58, 275-82, 325-32
(1971) (discussing various negative stereotypes that Whites have of Blacks); DRAKE ST. CLAIR,
BLACK FOLK HERE AND THERE: AN ESSAY IN HISTORY AND ANTHROPOLOGY 28-30 (1987)
(tracing negative stereotypes through history); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER
OF JIM CROW 56-95 (1955); Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating
Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DuKE L.J. 431, 468 (noting that our racial stereotypes are often
unconscious). While many of the stereotypes are far from new, recent evidence suggests that a
depressing number of individuals retain certain basic negative assumptions about what it means
to be Black. See Lynne Duke, Whites' Racial Stereotypes Persist; Most Retain Negative Beliefs
About Minorities, Survey Finds, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 1991, at Al. The National Opinion Re-
search Center at the University of Chicago conducted a nationwide survey on attitudes towards
Blacks. Of survey respondents, 62% characterized African-Americans as "more likely to be
lazy" and 53% responded that African-Americans are "less intelligent." Id. A 1990 survey by
the same organization reported similar results. Id.; accord Gotanda, supra note 4, at 27 ("The
moment of racial recognition is thus characterized by an unconscious assertion of the racial hier-
archy .... ").
53. See, e.g., Chen, supra note 51, at 150-51.
54. It would not be uncommon for American Blacks to be unable to trace their ancestors back
to any specific tribe or location in Africa. Slave owners systematically attempted to eradicate
any such tribal or ethnic affiliations in order to create a cohesive work force.
55. See Kimberld Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1358 (1988) ("The most signif-
1996] HOW RACE MATTERS AND WHY IT SHOULDN'T 19
notion that one must "learn" to be Black. It is axiomatic that not
every Black individual learns the same about what it means to be
Black. No one seriously contends that only individuals who accept a
particular set of beliefs, attitudes, or values can be "Black." More-
over, the notion that one must "learn" to be Black cannot be literally
true. First, this would mean that children who have not yet had the
chance to learn are not yet Black. Surely, the falsity of this premise is
obvious to everyone. Second, it would mean that individuals who
grew up in other countries, exposed to other cultures, would not be
"Black" in the same sense that American Blacks are "Black." Yet the
notion of race is painted in broad strokes, and it is as easy to identify a
dark-skinned adult from Ethiopia as Black as it is to label a dark-
skinned child from the Bronx.
Of course, "learning" to be Black in this country consists of more
than learning to "walk the walk and talk the talk." Undoubtedly,
"learning" to be Black also encompasses the experience of learning to
deal with being identified as Black in our society. In turn, this in-
cludes learning to deal with a multiplicity of racial attitudes, and
learning about prevailing Black attitudes, even if one chooses not to
adopt them. However, learning to be Black (or more accurately,
learning what it means to be Black) is independent of being identified
as Black, and refers more to the notion that anyone who is Black in
this country will have to learn to deal with what that racial identity
means in a social sense. The underlying identification of individuals as
Black does not depend on their having learned the same things about
what it is to be Black or sharing the same cultural or ethnic back-
grounds. By way of example, Jesse Jackson and Justice Clarence
Thomas are both identified as "Black," but they are miles apart in
attitudes and beliefs. One does not conclude that Justice Thomas is
really a member of some other race merely because he does not share
the attitudes which tend to be identified as Black.
Even those Blacks who are denigrated as "oreos" (Black on the
outside, White on the inside) are clearly identified as being Black.56
icant aspect of Black oppression seems to be what is believed about Black Americans, not what
Black Americans believe.") (emphasis omitted).
56. Blacks who act too White are apt, for example, to be called "oreo," meaning that while
they are Black on the outside, they act "White," and can therefore be considered White on the
inside. Chen, supra note 51, at 155-56; Monica J. Evans, Stealing Away: Black Women, Outlaw
Culture and the Rhetoric of Rights, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 263, 282 (1993); Judith G.
Greenberg & Robert V. Ward, Teaching Race and the Law Through Narrative, 30 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 323, 342 (1995); Gary Pellet, Notes Toward a Postmodern Nationalism, 1992 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1095, 1099; Aaron Wildavsky, "Help, Ma, I'm Being Controlled by Inanimate Objects," 65
S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 243 (1991); see also Carolyn Edgar, Black and Blue, 2 RECONSTRUCTION 13,
16 (1994) (describing how the author was called an oreo when she was seen in the company of
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They are merely criticized for having chosen to adopt "White" atti-
tudes which would be acceptable, or at least unremarkable, if the indi-
vidual possessing those beliefs was White. The combination of being
Black while identifying with White culture is what leads to the criti-
cism. 5 7 Moreover, Blacks who "pass" for White are still assumed to
be "really" Black, as if the underlying race of the individual has some
intrinsic importance apart from the way in which the individual in
question is living his or her life, and even apart from the way in which
other persons characterize that individual.58
The truth is that racial classifications seem little more than an ex-
cuse to differentiate human beings according to their skin color.59 The
importance of the color line can be determined simply by looking at
the recognized races. There is the "White" race, which apparently is
based on an exclusively European ancestry;60 the "Black" race, which
requires at least one African ancestor;61 the "Red" race which identi-
fies Native Americans; the "Yellow" race which encompasses all those
Whites); Catharine Pierce Wells, Clarence Thomas: The Invisible Man, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 117,
148 (1993) (explaining how Justice Thomas was labeled an oreo because of his conservative
views).
57. Stephen L. Carter, a professor of law at Yale University, writes that "[Blacks who ostra-
cize other Blacks] really do believe that there is an important sense in which people of color who
hold the wrong views have no right to call themselves people of color. They really do believe
that the dissenters are traitors, Uncle Toms, merely biologically black, not bona fide representa-
tives of their people." STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY
131 (1991). Note, however, the underlying assumption that even those "people of color" who
hold the "wrong" beliefs are "biologically" Black.
58. For a discussion of "passing for White," see RUSSELL ET AL., supra note 3, at 73.
59. "The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color-line,-the relation of
the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea."
W.E.B. DuBois, Tim SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 16 (Vintage Books 1990) (1903).
This fixation on skin color is not at all unique to modern America. See, e.g., COLOR AND
RACE (John Hope Franklin ed. 1968) (including chapters dealing with skin color and human
relations, the perception of skin color in Japan, India, Northern Africa, South Africa Britain,
Central American and the West Indies). It is nonetheless troubling that so many people seem to
assume that skin color, and perhaps a few other superficial physical characteristics such as hair
texture and shape of one's eyes, translate readily into meaningful differences between groups.
Even within the context of a single racial classification, subtle variations in shade can result in
litigation, scholarly analysis and popular comment. See, e.g., Walker v. Secretary of Treasury,
713 F. Supp. 403 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (dealing with a claim of illegal discrimination under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by a darker skinned Black employee against a lighter skinned
Black supervisor); RUSSELL ET AL., supra note 3, at 24-40 (discussing how shades of skin color
affect power and privilege); SCHOOL DAZE (Forty Acres and a Mule Filmworks 1988) (popular
film by Black Director Spike Lee).
60. Presumably, any child resulting from the union of a member of the White race and a
member of any other racial category would be classified according to the race of the non-White
parent. See generally Ruth G. McRoy & Edith Freeman, Racial Identity Issues Among Mixed-
Race Children, 8 Soc. WORK EDUC. 164, 165 (1986) (discussing the confusion experienced by
one biracial child as he tried to determine his identity).
61. See supra note 4 (discussing the "one drop" rule).
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of Asian descent, except presumably those with at least one African
ancestor;62 and perhaps the "Brown" or Hispanic race. Of course
these racial labels are purely fictitious, at least in the sense that there
are no white,63 black, red, or yellow people walking around. Virtually
everyone seems to be some shade of brown, admittedly ranging from
the very pale to very dark, and everything in between. Some individu-
als are pinker than others, and some have more olive skin tones. Yet
in gross terms, skin color is the single biggest factor in racial
classifications.
Logically, this superficial physical characteristic is not one that
should be important.64 One does not, for example, make broad gener-
alizations about people based on such superficial characteristics as
hair or eye color, shoe size, left- or right-handedness or height. Yet
skin color matters to such an extent that it is used to classify individu-
als, and thereafter they are treated differently based upon that classifi-
cation. In fact, this country is very used to using racial classifications
that are generally based on skin color. It is hard to appreciate the
impact of this mindset on our society.
For example, because we are so used to thinking about Blacks as a
group, it is easy to make broad generalizations about the group as a
whole based upon the conduct of a few of the group's members.65 The
negative stereotypes which are applied to Blacks as a group mean that
Blacks are raised in a different America from the one that White
Americans experience. 66 The process of being regarded with suspi-
cion and hostility engenders, or at least encourages, certain attitudes
62. Under the "one drop" rule, anyone with so much as a single Black ancestor would be
classified as Black. See supra note 4 (discussing the "one drop" rule and its application).
63. One could make the argument that individuals completely lacking in skin pigmentation,
albinos, are truly white, but this is not the basis upon which the racial classification of "White" is
made.
64. At least one commentator has also questioned the rationality of classifying people on the
basis of skin color. See, e.g., Brown, Immersion Schools, supra note 46, at 825 ("Throughout
history, religious, biological, and culturally deficient explanations have provided the justification
for racial attitudes and beliefs.").
65. See, e.g., DINESH D'SOUZA, THE END OF RACISM: PRINCIPLES FOR A MULTIRACIAL SOCI-
ETY 245-87 (1995) (explaining how behaviors which might be viewed as racist, such as taxi-driv-
ers refusing to pick up young Black men, or storekeepers refusing to admit young Blacks into
their stores, can be explained as a reaction to fear). "[E]veryone knows that young blacks are
convicted of a high percentage of violent crimes, and since most Americans are highly risk-
averse to crime, they have good reason to take precautions and exercise prudence." Id. at 261.
66. Professor Brown, in discussing the arguments which support immersion schools for Afri-
can-American students, has evaluated what it is to be Black in America today. Brown, Immer-
sion Schools, supra note 46, at 825 nn.39-40, 825-30. In this context, he discusses the
overwhelmingly negative stereotypes associated with being Black and some prevalent White atti-
tudes about Blacks. Id. Professor Brown concludes that racism, however camouflaged, contin-
ues to exist, and that such attitudes place tremendous pressures on young Blacks growing up in
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and beliefs, 67 and the resulting shared views reinforce the notion that
it is meaningful to think about Blacks as a group. After we classify
individuals by race, and after we treat them differently on the basis of
that classification, race does become important in a social sense.68
The problem is obviously how to break this cycle. If we want to
deconstruct the notion of race, and thereby defuse existing racial ten-
sions, we need to consider whether recognizing that race itself is not a
valid basis for differentiating between individuals might be a step in
the right direction. Frankly, unless rules which impact differentially
on individuals based on their race have the effect of minimizing the
things which create essentially artificial differences between the
"races," it is hard to justify those rules merely on the basis of the fact
that the experience of the average Black in this country is different
from that of the average White.
The remainder of this Article will address three specific examples of
how race has been incorporated into American jurisprudence. In each
of the three examples chosen (transracial adoption,69 congressional re-
districting,70 and affirmative action, 71) race has been used as a basis
for treating individuals differently under the law. Legal acceptance of
the notion that race matters, and matters to such an extent that indi-
viduals should be treated differently based upon that classification, le-
our society. Id. at 880-81. He comments that Blacks are set apart from others precisely because
of the "negative connotations attached to their blackness." Id. at 830.
Admittedly, most of the discrimination which persists today is far less blatant than the overt
discrimination of the past. In general, it is no longer socially acceptable to hold openly racist
views. However, this does not mean that there are no vestiges of racist behavior in this country.
Id. at 824-30.
67. For example, Professor Brown takes the position that "Black" culture or identity is a func-
tion of the negative stereotypes and pressures inflicted on Blacks by the dominant culture in our
society. Brown, Immersion Schools, supra note 46, at 831-34.
68. This is far different from concluding that race matters because of cultural and ethnic dif-
ferences. Normally, in order to use culture or ethnicity as a basis for differentiating between
groups, one would expect to identify groups having a distinct and unique set of historical values,
beliefs, traditions, attitudes, preferences and the like, perhaps derived from ethnicity or ancestral
heritage. Yet when it comes to the idea that Blacks must be identified as a separate group
because they have a separate culture, much of what has been said really comes down to an
assertion that the process of growing up Black in our racist society produces a certain outlook
which is inevitably different from the outlook of those who have not been subject to such racist
pressures.
At least one scholar of color has commented on the intense pressures created by our preoccu-
pation with racial classification. See MARIAN WRlirHT EDELMAN, THE MEASURE OF OUR SUC-
CEss: A LETTER TO MY CHILDREN AND YOURS 28 (1992) ("It is utterly exhausting being black
in America-physically, mentally and emotionally .... [T]here is no respite or escape from your
badge of color.").
69. See infra part II.
70. See infra part III.
71. See infra part IV.
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gitimizes the notion that race is an intrinsically important
characteristic. In each case, substantial evidence exists that policies
involving differential treatment are unlikely to help us overcome the
problems faced by racial minorities in this country and may even
make the problems worse.
II. USE OF RACIAL CLASSIFICATIONS IN ADOPTION
An examination of the rules applicable to transracial adoptions
helps illustrate how counterproductive the official sanction of differ-
ential treatment based on race can be, even when the rules in question
are well intended. In particular, this section of the Article will focus
on the special rules that apply to adoption of Black infants and chil-
dren by White couples or families. The different rules applicable to
the adoption of White and Black children were imposed with the best
intentions, primarily at the urging of Black adults who were appar-
ently trying to protect the rights and interests of Black children.
Nonetheless, the facts suggest that the differential policies put in place
in order to protect Black children have actually done more harm than
good, both for the children in question and for society at large.
A. Introduction to Transracial Adoptions
Historically, when adoption was suspect and adoptees often stigma-
tized, adoptions were usually arranged with the goal of finding chil-
dren who would physically resemble their adoptive parents.72
However, for some time there have been isolated instances of White
families adopting Black children. 73 This is somewhat surprising given
the systematic exclusion of Black children and infants from the adop-
tion system in the United States prior to the advent of the civil rights
movement. Adoption agencies were traditionally run for the benefit
of White, middle-class families, and Black children were not wanted
or accepted into that system.74
72. The goal of adoptions was to mimic biology. The traditional "notion (was) that the
adopted child, by physical appearance alone, could have been the birth child of the adoptive
parents. The adoptive parents were supposed to be people who, by appearance and age, could
have conceived the infant." Sanford N. Katz, Rewriting the Adoption Story, FAM. ADvoc., Sum-
mer 1982, at 9.
73. According to one source, "[i]nstances of whites adopting black children have been re-
ported as early as 1948 in Minnesota, 1952 in New York, 1954 in Georgia, and 1955 in Califor-
nia." DAWN DAY, THE ADOPTION OF BLACK CHILDREN: COUNTERACTING INSTITUTIONAL
DISCRIMINATION 89 (1980) (citing JOYCE A. LADNER, MIXED FAMILIES 59, 149, 155, 159 (1977),
and noting that the Georgia adoption was informal since Georgia prohibited interracial adop-
tions until the late 1960s).
74. See Zanita E. Fenton, In a World Not Their Own: The Adoption of Black Children, 10
HARV. BLACKLETrER J. 39, 39-40 (1993).
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The first efforts at organizing transracial adoptions in a systematic
fashion in the United States can probably be traced to the efforts of
the Minority Adoption Recruitment of Children's Homes (MARCH)
formed in 1955. 75 In the United States, the number of transracial
adoptions increased dramatically following the organization of such
groups. For example, surveys indicate that, in reporting agencies, the
number of transracial adoptions rose from 587 placements in 1968 to
1,743 in 1970.76
A number of theories have been advanced to explain the increase in
transracial adoptions at this time. One factor which played a major
role in the increase in transracial placements was that there were rela-
tively few adoptable White children, especially infants, while many
more Black children were in need of adoptive homes.77 The increas-
ing awareness of the deficiencies of the foster-care system and the
need for stable home environments also resulted in decreased barriers
to transracial placements, especially since there were not enough
Black families seeking to adopt.78 In addition, changing attitudes to-
wards racial integration also played an essential role in transracial
adoptions.79 The increase in transracial adoptions was accompanied,
however, by an increasing level of opposition to the practice.
B. The NABSW and the Theory of "Cultural Genocide"
While the "Black Power" movement of the 1960's provided much of
the theoretical basis for opposition to transracial adoption, the Na-
75. Allen C. Platt Il1, Note, Adopting a Compromise in the Transracial Adoption Battle: A
Proposed Model Statute, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 475, 479 (1994) (citing THE NATIONAL ASSOCIA-
TION OF BLACK SOCIAL WORKERS, PRESERVING BLACK FAMILIES: RESEARCH AND ACTION BE-
YOND THE RHETORIC 31-32 (Feb. 1986) (unpublished report available from the National
Association of Black Social Workers (NABSW))). In 1960, the Open Door Society, a group with
the same basic agenda, was formed in Canada. Id. These groups urged transracial adoption as a
solution to the problem of adoptable Black children waiting in institutions or foster care for
permanent placement. Id. By 1969, there were nearly fifty similar organizations operating in the
United States. Id.
76. OPPORTUNITY: DIVISION OF BOYS AND GIRLS AID SOCIETY OF OREGON, reprinted in
RITA J. SIMON & HOWARD ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION 32 (1977) [hereinafter SIMON &
ALTSTEIN (1977)]. Another source noted that the number of transracial adoptions tripled be-
tween 1968 and 1971. Twila L. Perry, Race and Child Placement: The Best Interests Test and the
Cost of Discretion, 29 J. FAM. L. 51, 109 n.199 (1991) (citing R. McRoY & L. ZURCHER, TRANS-
RACIAL AND INRACIAL ADOPTEES: THE ADOLESCENT YEARS 8 (1983)).
77. See Margaret Howard, Transracial Adoption: Analysis of the Best Interests Standard, 59
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 503, 509 (1984) (citing the dramatic decline in the number of healthy
White infants as one reason for the increase in transracial placements).
78. These factors are also considered by Professor Howard. Id. at 505-14.
79. See Jacqueline Macaulay & Stewart Macaulay, Adoption for Black Children: A Case
Study of Expert Discretion, I RES. L. & Soc. 265, 277-78 (1978).
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tional Association of Black Social Workers (NABSW)80 led the
charge against such placements. The NABSW was not only the first
group to mount organized opposition to adoption of Black children by
White families, it has continued to be the most vocal and influential
opponent of the practice.
The NABSW first publicly announced its opposition to transracial
adoptions at its 1972 annual meeting. The 1972 position paper of the
organization stated, in part, that "Black children in white homes are
cut off from the healthy development of themselves as Black peo-
ple. ' 81 The paper also argued that only a Black family can transmit
the background and knowledge essential for a Black child's survival in
a racist society.82 The paper concluded pessimistically that "[o]ur so-
ciety is distinctly Black or white and characterized by white racism at
every level. We repudiate the fallacious and fantasied reasoning of
some that whites adopting Black children will alter that basic charac-
ter. '83 The paper set off a nationwide debate over the social and cul-
tural ramifications of Whites adopting Blacks and quickly resulted in a
drastic curtailment of the number of transracial placements.84
Over time, the NABSW has clarified its reasoning in opposing
transracial adoption. Essentially, the NABSW has three separate ob-
jections to the practice. The first objection is that White families are
unable to provide Black children with social survival skills necessary
for Blacks to understand and cope with a racist society.85 The second
argument is that Black children will be deprived of their racial and
cultural identity if they are reared in White homes.86 The third argu-
ment is that the only reason White families have been allowed to
80. JOYCE LADNER, MIXED FAMILIES 73-82 (1977).
81. NATIONAL ASS'N OF BLACK SOCIAL WORKERS, POSITION PAPER (Summer 1973), quoted
in SIMON & ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION 50 (1977).
82. Id.
83. NATIONAL ASS'N OF BLACK SOCIAL WORKERS, POsIToN PAPER (Summer 1973), quoted
in Ruth Colker, Race, Sexual Orientation, Gender, and Disability, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 24 (1995).
84. LADNER, supra note 80, at 75.
The impact that the NABSW had on transracial adoption has been noted by numerous com-
mentators. One individual wrote that the NABSW "condemned transracial adoption in terms so
militant that transracial adoption fell by 39 percent in a single year." Howard, supra note 77, at
517. The NABSW's position against transracial adoption clearly contributed significantly to the
decline of the practice. James S. Bowen, Cultural Convergences and Divergences: The Nexus
Between Putative Afro-American Family Values and the Best Interests of the Child, 26 J. FAM. L.
487, 502 (1987-88) (citing Silverman & Feigelman, The Adjustment of Black Children Adopted by
White Families, Soc. CASEWORK: J. CONTEMP. SOC. WORK 529 (Nov. 1981)). The incidence of
transracial adoption declined from a high of 2,574 placements in 1971 to 1,070 in 1976, the last
year for which such statistics are available. RITA J. SIMON & HOWARD ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL
ADOPnON: A FOLLOW-UP 96 (1981).
85. See infra part II.D.1 (discussing this objection in detail).
86. See infra part II.D.2 (discussing this objection in detail).
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adopt Black children is that discriminatory barriers exist which have
prevented Black families from adopting Black children.8 7
If the position of the NABSW controlled the adoption process, pre-
sumably transracial adoptions would be absolutely prohibited. Not
surprisingly, the absolutist position advanced by the NABSW has not
itself been codified into law. The barriers which exist are often infor-
mal and are specifically designed not to look like outright bans on
transracial adoption.88 These barriers, however informal, too often
delay and even thwart transracial adoptions on no more than the basis
of the child's race.8 9 For the children involved, this delay is often trau-
matic, albeit less so than an outright ban on transracial adoptions
would be.90
Although many prospective adoptive parents might wish to con-
sider the race or appearance of potential adoptees, that is far different
from agency policies which institutionalize different treatment. The
Supreme Court, in its landmark decision in Palmore v. Sidoti,91 ex-
plained that while the Constitution cannot control the fact that racial
prejudice exists, "neither can it tolerate" such biases. 92 Chief Justice
Burger stated in the Court's opinion that "private biases may be
outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly,
give them effect. '93
Of course, the NABSW would argue that there are compelling state
interests94 which justify the differential treatment of children waiting
for adoption based on their race. The NABSW's arguments as to why
87. See infra part II.D.3 (discussing this objection in detail).
88. See infra part II.C (discussing the state of debate over transracial adoption).
89. See infra notes 183-90 and accompanying text (noting that transracial adoption laws give
undue weight to racial classifications).
Although it is technically impermissible to make race the sole determinant of adoptability, the
fact that it is permissible to consider race often results in race being overemphasized as a factor.
For a compelling discussion of cases illustrating this position, see Kim Forde-Mazrui, Black Iden-
tity and Child Placement. The Best Interests of Black and Biracial Children, 92 MICH. L. REV.
925, 939-42 (1994).
90. Even in situations where race is not given undue consideration under current standards,
the fact that race can be considered means that adoption can be delayed for "reasonable" peri-
ods of time in order to attempt to locate suitable adoptive families of the "correct" race. Eliza-
beth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race Matching in Adoption,
139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163, 1201 (1991); see infra notes 127-29 and accompanying text (discussing
detrimental effects of delaying adoptive placements).
91. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
92. Id. at 433.
93. Id.
94. A unanimous Supreme Court in Palmore concluded in the context of a custody fight that
decisions based on racial classifications "are subject to the most exacting scrutiny" and "must be
justified by a compelling state interest" in order to be held constitutional. Id. at 432.
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transracial adoptions are not in the best interests of Black children
may be viewed as an attempt to document such an interest.
C. The State of the Debate over Transracial Adoption
There is a tremendous body of literature on transracial adoption. 95
In general terms, most commentators are critical of the existing barri-
95. Legal scholars have been particularly prolific. One of the most outspoken opponents of
current barriers to transracial adoption is Professor Elizabeth Bartholet of Harvard. See, e.g.,
Elizabeth Bartholet, Race Separatism in the Family: More on the Transracial Adoption Debate, 2
DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 99 (1995) (responding to the various arguments which have been
made in opposition to transracial adoption); Bartholet, supra note 90, at 1163 (discussing and
criticizing the unique role which race plays in the adoption context). Other law professors have
also criticized barriers to transracial adoption. See Susan J. Grossman, A Child of a Different
Color: Race as a Factor in Adoption and Custody Proceedings, 17 BuFF. L. REV. 303, 335-41
(1967-68) (maintaining that race-based adoption statutes are unconstitutional); Howard, supra
note 77, at 545-49 (arguing that intervention and placement decisions involving black children
should always be driven by a "child-centered" analysis rather than being based upon race); Joan
Mahoney, The Black Baby Doll: Transracial Adoption and Cultural Preservation, 59 U. Mo.
KAN. Crrv L. REV. 487, 491-94 (1991) (arguing that presumptions against transracial adoption
are not justified, although recognizing that race may be an important consideration in the adop-
tion context); see also Shari O'Brien, Race in Adoption Proceedings: The Pernicious Factor, 21
TULSA L.J. 485, 491-93 (1986) (hypothesizing that allowing race to be a controlling factor in
adoption decisions hinders rather than promotes well-being of the children to be adopted);
Myriam Zreczny, Note, Race-Conscious Child Placement: Deviating from a Policy Against Ra-
cial Classifications, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1121, 1142-49 (1994) (objecting to policies which util-
ize race as a basis for making placement decisions when race is not viewed as relevant in other
contexts).
The critics of such policies have included some scholars of color. See, e.g., Chen, supra note
51, at 153-54 (describing placement decisions which turn upon the race of those involved as
antithetical to the ideal of a Creole republic); Forde-Mazrui, supra note 89 (suggesting that trans-
racial adoption may be in the best interests of Black and particularly biracial children).
On the other hand, current race-matching policies also have some very vocal supporters.
Chief among these is Professor Twila Perry. See Perry, Discourse and Subordination, supra note
28 (identifying and discussing two distinct perspectives in the adoption debate, the colorblind
individualist perspective and the color and community consciousness perspective); Perry, supra
note 76 (suggesting that best interests analysis as applied to transracial adoptions may be reason-
able in theory but problematic in practice); accord Bowen, supra note 84, at 504-06 (noting that
the conflict of values between the dominant (White) culture in America and Black subculture
makes the question of transracial adoptions particularly troublesome); Ruth-Arlene W. Howe,
Redefining the Transracial Adoption Controversy, 2 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 131, 152-61
(1995) (arguing that race cannot be ignored and that the debate over transracial adoption is
really a debate over White adult's rights to adopt rather than Black children's need to be
adopted); see also Fenton, supra note 74, at 46-48 (criticizing the current child welfare system as
poorly equipped to meet the special needs of Black children and the Black community).
Other scholars suggest a compromise which would allow some race-matching, but in the con-
text of the best interests of the children involved. See Jane Patterson Auld, Racial Matching vs.
Transracial Adoption: Proposing a Compromise in the Best Interests of Minority Children, 27
FAM. L.Q. 447 (1993) (proposing limiting racial matching to initial placement of children into
foster homes); Eileen M. Blackwood, Note, Race as a Factor in Custody and Adoption Disputes:
Palmore v. Sidoti, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 209, 222-24 (1985) (suggesting that race can be an appro-
priate consideration in making placement decisions); see also Rebecca L. Koch, Note, Transracial
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ers to transracial adoption.96 Some scholars have, however, taken the
position that there are real and important reasons for race-matching
in adoption.97 Although a complete review of all that has been writ-
ten on the transracial adoption debate is not necessary to an under-
standing of the positions taken in this Article, it is important to
provide a basis for placing the discussion in context.
Professor Twila Perry has suggested that there are two distinct ways
in which to approach the question of whether transracial adoption is
in the best interests of all of those concerned; she suggests that there is
a "colorblind individualist perspective" and an alternative view which
encompasses "color and community consciousness. ' 98 Professor
Perry associates the former view primarily with White scholars and
Adoption in Light of the Foster Care Crisis: A Horse of a Different Color, 10 N.Y.L. ScH. J.
HUM. RTS. 147 (1992) (urging a compromise approach in light of the increasing demands being
placed on the foster care system).
The transracial adoption controversy has been particularly popular topic among student com-
mentators. See Jo Beth Eubanks, Comment, Transracial Adoption in Texas: Should the Best
Interests Standard Be Color-Blind?, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1225 (1993) (arguing against the consid-
eration of race in adoption); Timothy P. Glynn, Note, The Role of Race in Adoption Proceed-
ings: A Constitutional Critique of the Minnesota Preference Statute, 77 MINN. L. REV. 925 (1993)
(analyzing Minnesota's racial preference statutes); Julie C. Lythcott-Haims, Note, Where Do
Mixed Babies Belong? Racial Classification in America and Its Implications for Transracial
Adoption, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531 (1994) (discussing the particular problems of multi-
racial children and how the transracial adoption debate affects them); Angela T. McCormick,
Note, Transracial Adoption: A Critical View of the Courts' Present Standards, 28 J. FAM. L. 303
(1989-90) (criticizing the ability of the judiciary to fairly apply the standard that race should be a
relevant but not decisive consideration); Michelle M. Mini, Note, Breaking Down the Barriers to
Transracial Adoptions: Can the Multiethnic Placement Act Meet this Challenge? 22 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 897 (1994) (criticizing current barriers to transracial adoption and the Multiethnic Place-
ment Act as a mechanism for overcoming those barriers).
96. The writings of Professor Bartholet exemplify this position. See Bartholet, supra note 95,
at 103-04; Bartholet, supra note 90, at 1183-1200. Professor Bartholet is not the only scholar
taking this position, however. In fact, some Black scholars have rejected the notion that policies
opposing transracial adoption best serve the interests of those involved. See WILLIAM E. CROSS,
JR., SHADES OF BLACK-DIVERSITY IN AFRICAN AMERICAN IDENTITY 108-13 (1991) ("Being
middle class, bicultural, and mildly estranged are consequences one should gladly exchange for
the pathology, poverty, and lack of hope similar children might experience if left in nonperma-
nent-care arrangements."); Forde-Mazrui, supra note 89, at 967 (advocating race-neutral place-
ment policies).
97. Among those taking this position, Professor Twila Perry's work is notable. See Perry,
Discourse and Subordination, supra note 28; see also Bowen, supra note 84. Bowen is concerned
about and seems generally opposed to transracial adoption. Id. at 506-08. He argues that its
benefits have not been proven. Id. at 507. However, he agrees that any placement for hard-to-
adopt Black children is preferable to languishing in the foster care system. Id. at 511.
It is, however, those who write from the psychosocial and psychological perspective rather
than law professors and legal scholars who seem most concerned with transracial adoption. See,
e.g., Amuzie Chimezie, Transracial Adoption of Black Children, 20 Soc. WORK 296, 297 (1975)
(stating that satisfaction of psychological needs is often more important than satisfaction of phys-
ical needs).
98. Perry, Discourse and Subordination, supra note 28, at 43.
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the latter with minority scholars, although she is careful not to suggest
that all White scholars or minority scholars fit within this frame-
work.99 Indeed, some scholars of color have been quite critical of ex-
isting race-matching practices. 100
In general terms, those who accept the "colorblind individualist per-
spective" oppose the use of racial classifications in the adoption con-
text. This position is colorblind because its adherents see barriers to
transracial adoption as a step back towards a more segregated soci-
ety.10 1 It is individualistic because it focuses on the best interests of
the individual children in question who are waiting for adoptive
homes. 02
In equally broad terms, those who write from the "color and com-
munity consciousness" perspective consider what it means to be Black
in our society and conclude that the necessity of developing healthy
values, attitudes, and self-awareness in Black children justifies at least
some attempt at race-matching. 10 3 In addition, this position considers
the interests of the Black community rather than focusing solely on
the interests of the child who is waiting to be adopted. 1°4
The best way to analyze these conflicting approaches may be to ex-
amine the arguments which have in fact been made in the transracial
adoption debate. Because the NABSW's position was so influential in
shaping the current policies regarding transracial adoption, the next
section of this Article considers the arguments raised by the NABSW
in opposition to the practice.
D. The NABSW's Arguments Against Transracial Adoption
1. The Necessity for Coping Skills
The first rationale advanced by the NABSW in opposition to trans-
racial adoptions is that only Black families can provide Black children
with the skills and coping mechanisms necessary for survival in a racist
society.' 0 5 This argument has also been made by scholars who have
adopted what Professor Perry has characterized as the "color and
99. Id. at 43-44.
100. See, e.g., Forde-Mazrui, supra note 89, at 939-42.
101. Perry, Discourse and Subordination, supra note 28, at 44-45. Perry states that the views
of Elizabeth Bartholet, Joan Mahoney and Margaret Howard reflect the colorblind individualist
perspective. Id.
102. Id. at 45 n.44-45.
103. Id. at 46.
104. Id. at 43.
105. Id. at 47.
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community consciousness" perspective. 0 6 There are, however, a
number of responses to this argument.
First, and most depressingly, there is little evidence that Black fami-
lies are generally successful in transmitting the skills necessary for suc-
cess in our "racist" society. If it were true that Black families
successfully teach children to thrive in our society, presumably there
would be evidence that Black children raised in Black families would
be less susceptible to the problems which plague far too many mem-
bers of the Black community. Surely there would be some evidence
that being raised in a Black home would result in decreased incidence
of drug abuse, criminal activity, or eventual dependence on welfare.
If this cannot be shown, at least there should be evidence that Black
adoptees raised in Black homes have better levels of self-esteem, bet-
ter peer relations, or better academic performance. In reality, such
evidence is sadly lacking. 0 7 There is in fact no evidence that Black
adults are more successful at teaching Black children to cope with our
"racist" society, at least if "coping" means scaling the barriers to suc-
cess that societal racism throws in the way of Blacks.
This is not meant to be a criticism of Black families. It is hard to see
how parents of any race could adequately teach Black children how to
cope adequately with the discrimination which exists in our society, at
least if "coping" means turning the experience into something re-
motely positive. It seems an impossible task to cope with even those
most overt forms of racist behavior which still occur. For example,
how does anyone "cope" with a burning cross planted by strangers on
your front yard? How is someone expected to "cope" with finding the
words "Die, Nigger!" scrawled anonymously across the windshield of
their car?
106. Id. at 57-65; see Bowen, supra note 84, at 510-11 (describing the potential survival devices
which might be taught to Black children).
107. The problems faced by Blacks in this country are legion and being raised in a Black home
does not seem to change the grim statistics. Black children are approximately twice as likely to
be born prematurely, live in substandard housing, and die within the first year of life. See CHIL-
DREN'S DEFENSE FUND, KEY FACTS (1986). In 1985, the mortality rate of Black infants was a
shocking 18.2 deaths per 1,000 live births; the rate for Whites was 9.3. U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1988, at 75, 76 (1987). Blacks are
plagued with illiteracy. Statistics suggest that approximately forty percent of minority youths are
functionally illiterate. See N. Francis, Equity and Excellence in Education, in ASSOCIATION OF
BLACK FOUNDATION EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 73 (1985). Blacks are also less
likely to be employed. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES: 1988, at 140 (1987); see also infra note 393 and accompanying text (comparing various
statistics of Blacks and Whites).
Rules and policies which have discouraged the transracial placement of children have not been
successful in helping Black children overcome the odds against them.
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The victim of such racial harassment can of course file formal com-
plaints with the authorities, but this is unlikely to result in apprehen-
sion of the responsible parties. In the end, the only way of coping
with such antisocial behavior is to get on with life, because there is no
effective way to respond to cowards who are unwilling to do so much
as reveal their identity. This coping mechanism, to the extent that it is
a coping mechanism, is no more or less likely to be successful when
taught by White families.
The more invidious forms of discrimination, like being ignored by
salespersons in stores, being conspicuously followed by store security
personnel, being marked down for misbehavior in school while similar
behavior by White children is ignored, being consistently passed over
for promotion, or being stopped and questioned more often by the
police, can be just as emotionally damaging and is just as impossible to
cope with in the sense of turning the event into a positive or learning
experience.1o8
It is possible that the NABSW means something entirely different
by suggesting that only Blacks can teach Black children "coping"
skills. For example, coping could mean learning strategies for con-
fronting the sources of racist behavior and attempting to change the
policies which encourage or permit such discriminatory actions. If this
is what is meant by "coping," there is far too much evidence that,
despite all the efforts of Black families to teach their children to cope
with racism, efforts at eradicating racism have been distressingly un-
successful. 10 9 Racist assumptions and patterns of behavior still persist
in our society. Moreover, in this limited context, to the extent that
there is a difference between the way Whites and Blacks react, White
families may actually be better equipped to help Black children learn
coping strategies designed to minimize future racism. Certainly in the
corporate setting, the ultimate decision-making authority is likely to
rest with White males and someone who is well versed in the way in
which White males make decisions might be more likely to be able to
influence those policies. Someone raised without such insights may be
less likely to be able to effect a more positive outcome to racist pat-
terns of behavior than merely accepting or ignoring it.
108. Of course, the impossibility of turning this type of experience into something positive
would confront White families just as clearly as it confronts Black families.
109. For a distressing recital of the inequalities faced by Blacks in America, see Luke Charles
Harris & Uma Narayan, Affirmative Action and the Myth of Preferential Treatment: A Trans-
formative Critique of the Terms of the Affirmative Action Debate, 11 HARV. BLACKLETI-ER J. 1,
17-26 (1994).
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Yet another potential coping mechanism is to overcome the dis-
crimination through personal success. However, if this is what is
meant by coping, there is no evidence that Black parents are better
able to teach these skills to Black children than White parents. In
fact, it has been suggested and supported by research that Black chil-
dren who identify with mainstream ideas and values generally do bet-
ter academically.' 10 This is especially significant because adults who
have done well academically tend to enjoy more success later in life.
This conclusion is supported by evidence which suggests that Blacks
who identify or comport with mainstream (or "White") ideas and val-
ues generally have better professional and financial success.' 1 '
Although Black parents can instill these values and attitudes in their
children, there is not even an intuitive argument which suggests that
White parents would be less able to do so.112
Logically, a regime in which race plays a significant and often deter-
minative role in the outcome of adoptions ought to be subject to strict
scrutiny." 3 This is the outcome that would appear to be mandated by
the Supreme Court's decision in Palmore v. Sidoti.114 This approach
would place the burden of establishing that there is a significant harm
associated with allowing White parents to adopt children identified as
Black on those opposing such placement. Presumably, this would re-
quire empirical evidence of negative outcomes from transracial adop-
1.10. Signithia Fordham, Racelessness as a Factor in Black Students' School Success: Pragmatic
Strategy or Pyrrhic Victory, 58 HARV. EDuc. REV. 54, 79-80 (1988) (discussing empirical study
showing that the majority of high-achieving Black high school students have adopted dominant
cultural values); Kathi Overmier, Biracial Adolescents: Areas of Conflict in Identity Formation,
14 J. APPLIED SOC. SCI. 157, 165 (1990) (finding that biracial adolescents who identify with
White middle-class values do better in school); see also Bartholet, supra note 90, at 1222 n.159
(noting research that suggests that transracial adoption has a positive influence on I.Q. develop-
ment of Black children raised in White families).
111. Cf. Fordham, supra note 110, at 80 (analogizing high-achieving Black students with
Blacks who do better in the workforce and stating that both refuse to identify "too strongly with
the Black community").
112. The strength of this response to the argument that White parents cannot teach Black
children adequate coping skills depends to some extent on who has the burden of proof concern-
ing whether White parents would necessarily fail Black children. If we start with the presump-
tion that White parents will not know enough or be sufficiently motivated to teach successful
coping strategies to Black children, then evidence that Black families may also be unsuccessful is
less than persuasive. If, however, we start from the assumption that race should not matter in
the adoption context, then evidence that neither Blacks nor Whites are particularly successful in
teaching coping strategies is significant.
113. Cf. Bowen, supra note 84, at 507 (complaining that the success of transracial adoption
has not been proven); Perry, Discourse and Subordination, supra note 28, at 57-65 (suggesting
that the experience of Blacks is such that substantial evidence would be needed to overcome the
belief that Whites would generally be unable to successfully raise Black children in our society).
114. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
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tions in order to justify adopting or retaining rules and policies which
act as barriers to transracial placements of Black children.
The bulk of empirical evidence suggests exactly the opposite-the
experiences of Black children raised in White homes are as positive as
those of Black children raised in Black homes. Admittedly, it is diffi-
cult to determine how to measure positive outcomes in adoptions.
Nevertheless, studies which address such diverse benchmarks as social
adjustment, self-esteem, racial self-identification, and comfort levels
with other Blacks and Whites, all suggest that transracial adoptees do
not suffer from being raised by parents of a different race. Studies
have reported good social adjustment for transracial adoptees, 115 self-
esteem that is as high as that of children adopted into same-race fami-
lies,116 appropriate self-identification, 117 and high comfort levels with
other Blacks and Whites. 1 8 None of these studies supports the idea
that transracial adoptees will be unable to cope with life in America.
It is true that a few studies have identified some areas of concern.
For example, one study found that young, transracially adopted Black
males were slightly more likely to experience serious school problems
115. See, e.g., LUCILLE J. GROW & DEBORAH SHAPIRO, BLACK CHILDREN-WHITE PARENTS:
A STUDY OF TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION 42-49 (1974) (finding good social adjustments by Black,
transracially adopted children); CHARLES ZASTROW, OUTCOME OF BLACK CHILDREN/WHITE
PARENT ADOPTIONS (1977) (finding that White parents of Black adopted children rated their
children's adjustment as highly as White parents who had adopted White children); Arnold R.
Siiverman & William Feigelman, The Adjustment of Black Children Adopted by White Families,
62 SOC. CASEWORK: J. CONTEMP. SOC. WORK 529-36 (1981) (finding that Black transracial
adoptees had the same levels of social adjustment as White adoptees when age at placement is
taken into account). In addition, a long-term study conducted by Rita Simon and Howard Alt-
stein also concluded that transracial adoptees had good social adjustment, based on such indica-
tors as school grades, relationships within the family, and anticipated future relationships. See
SIMON & ALTSTEIN (1977), supra note 76; RITA J. SIMON & HOWARD ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL
ADOPTEES AND THEIR FAMILIES: A STUDY OF IDENTITY AND COMMITMENT (1987) [hereinafter
SIMON & ALTSTEIN (1987)]; RITA J. SIMON & HOWARD ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION: A
FOLLOW-UP (1981) [hereinafter SIMON & ALTSTEIN (1981)]; see also WILLIAM FEIGELMAN &
ARNOLD R. SILVERMAN, CHOSEN CHILDREN: NEW PATrERNS OF ADOPTIVE RELATIONSHIPS 88-
90 (1983).
116. See Ruth G. McRoy et al., Self-Esteem and Racial Identity in Transracial and Inracial
Adoptees, 27 Soc. WORK 522-26 (1982) (finding no difference in the levels of self-esteem for the
groups studied); accord SIMON & ALTSTEIN (1977), supra note 76; SIMON & ALTSTEIN (1981),
supra note 115; SIMON & ALTSTEIN (1987), supra note 115.
117. See JOAN F. SHIREMAN, GROWING Up ADOPTED: AN EXAMINATION OF MAJOR ISSUES
71-74 (1988) (discussing similar findings at age thirteen); Penny R. Johnson et al., Transracial
Adoption and the Development of Black Identity at Age Eight, 66 CHILD WELFARE 49-52 (1987)
(finding similar racial preferences and racial self-identification between inracially and trans-
racially adopted Black children at age eight).
118. In fact, one study found not only that Black transracial adoptees related as well to Blacks
as inracial adoptees, but also that they related better to Whites than the inracial adoptees.
SHIREMAN, supra note 117, at 71-74.
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than Black males adopted into Black homes. 119 One study found a
slightly higher rate of disruptions (i.e., where the adoption does not
work out) for transracial placements, 12 0 although at least two other
studies found no change in disruption rates between transracial and
same race adoptions.' 2' In addition, some studies show that relatives
and neighbors are less likely, at least initially, to be supportive of
transracial adoptions. 22 Some anecdotal evidence also suggests that
transracial adoption can leave Black children feeling confused or iso-
lated.'2 3 None of this evidence suggests, however, that as a general
rule transracial adoption leads to negative outcomes for the children
involved.
Despite the lack of evidence that supports the conclusion that
White parents cannot successfully raise Black children, transracial
placements are still difficult. Although tens of thousands of Black
children wait to be adopted 24 and an insufficient number of Black
families wait to adopt them, 2 5 the popular press is full of stories of
Black children who have been removed from loving White foster par-
ents the moment those foster parents indicate a desire to adopt the
child.126 To deprive a child of a loving home on the basis of nothing
119. Id. at 63.
120. Victor Groze, Special-Needs Adoption, 8 CHILDREN & YOUTH SERVICES REV. 363-73
(1986).
121. RICHARD P. BARTH & MARIANNE BERRY, ADOPTION AND DISRUPTION: RATES, RISKS,
AND RESPONSES (1988); SUSAN PARTRIDGE ET AL., LEGACIES OF Loss: VISIONS OF GAIN, AN
INSIDE LOOK AT ADOPTION DISRUPTION 79 (1986).
122. See Laurence L. Falk, A Comparative Study of Transracial and Inracial Adoptions, 49
CHILD WELFARE 84-85 (1970); accord SIMON & ALTSTEIN (1981), supra note 115, at 37 (stating
that only 28% of aunts, uncles and grandparents initially approved transracial adoption).
123. See, e.g., Sonia L. Nazario, When White Parents Adopt Black Babies, Race Often Divides,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 1990, at Al.
124. See infra notes 148-50 and accompanying text (reciting the grim statistics relating to the
adoption of Black children).
125. See infra note 151 and accompanying text (stating that Black children are less likely to
find permanent placement outside the foster care system).
126. See, e.g., Ilene Barth, Another Child Torn from Those Who Love Her, NEWSDAY, Mar.
12, 1989, at 9 (describing removal of foster child from White foster parents); Mona Charen, For
Children Alone, The Best Color Is the Color of Love, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Feb. 24,1994, at 41A
(stating that "in case after heart-wrenching case, white parents who attempt to adopt black chil-
dren are thwarted by a social-work system that places racial purity above other considerations in
deciding the fates of children"); Michael Precker, The Battle for Christopher, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, June 6, 1993, at 1F (describing in detail the removal of a four-year old Black boy from a
White woman he considered to be his mother); Barbara Bisantz Raymond & Judy Turner, The
Color of Love, REDBOOK, Aug. 1992, at 140 (describing obstacles imposed when White family
tried to adopt Black foster child); Same-Race Adoption Law Ignites Deep Emotions, CHI. TRiB.,
Jan. 4, 1993, at 11N (reporting that a Black three-year-old was taken from White foster parents
whom she had called Mommy and Daddy for most of her life); Bill Sloat, Court Skeptical on
Custody Bid, PLAIN DEALER, May 4, 1994, at 2B (federal appeals court expressed misgivings
about asserting jurisdiction over appeal of White foster parents from lower court's decision re-
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more than the race of the prospective parents seems a poor choice,
especially from the child's point of view.
As evidenced by a tremendous body of research, the harms caused
by delays in the adoption process are dramatic.127 One harm docu-
mented by empirical studies is that the longer adoption is delayed, the
greater the risk of adoption disruption, where the adopted child is un-
able to assimilate into the adoptive family and must be returned to the
foster care system.12 8 Another concern is that the longer adoption is
delayed, the greater the risk of maladjustment for the child.129 One
recent study concluded that "there is little doubt that, if the alterna-
tive is between a transracial adoption and languishing in a sea of inde-
cision about placement, the former is vastly superior. 1 30
moving a Black foster child whom they wanted to adopt from their care); see also Erin Hallissy,
Bureaucratic Waste Cited in Adoptions, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 17, 1994, at A17 (finding that county
social workers "through mismanagement and stubbornly refusing to allow children to be
adopted by families from other races, are wasting millions of dollars by keeping youngsters in
long-term foster care rather than placing them permanently").
127. There is a substantial body of support in the mental-health fields for the idea that con-
tinuity of relationships is absolutely vital to the proper psychological development of children
and that any unnecessary delay in achieving permanent placement is extremely detrimental to
the children involved. See, e.g., Bartholet, supra note 90, at 1223-25 (discussing the body of
research demonstrating serious harm to children caused by delay in placement and concluding
that current same-race placement policies are detrimental); Perry, supra note 76, at 72-73 (citing
studies on psychological bonding and discussing the importance of children being able to bond
with their families); Patricia W. Ballard, Note, Racial Matching and the Adoption Dilemma: Al-
ternatives for the Hard to Place, 17 J. FAM. L. 333, 355 (1978-79) (noting overwhelming recogni-
tion of harm to child caused by delays in permanent placement); see also Marion N. Yarbrough,
Comment, Trans-Racial Adoption: The Genesis or Genocide of Minority Cultural Existence, 15
S.U. L. REV. 353, 358-59 (1988) (arguing that delaying or denying adoption placement to Black
children on the basis of race is overt racism).
128. See FEIGELMAN & SILVERMAN, CHOSEN CHILDREN, supra note 115, at 92-93 (comparing
the significance of the race-matching factor to the significance of delay in placement); Richard P.
Barth et al., Predicting Adoption Disruption, 33 Soc. WORK 227, 231 (1988) (documenting bene-
fits of permanent adoption and finding age at placement and previous adoptive placement re-
lated to adoption disruption, but race difference between parent and child not related).
129. It is universally agreed that stability and continuity are important to a child's normal
psychological development, especially during the early years. E.g., ANNA FREUD & DOROTHY
BURLINOHAM, INFANTS WITHOUT FAMILIES: REPORT ON THE HAMPSTEAD NURSERIES: THE
WRITINGS OF ANNA FREUD 182-83 (1973). Feigelman and Silverman report that these studies
indicate that "the absence of a stable and enduring parental relationship is seen as devastating
and traumatic to a child's development." FEIGELMAN & SILVERMAN, CHOSEN CHILDREN, supra
note 115, at 92. One study even concludes that stability and permanence is more important than
biological relationships. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD (1973). Feigelman and Silverman themselves conducted a study on the same issue and
their conclusion was that "the deleterious consequence of delayed placement are far more seri-
ous than those of transracial adoption." FEIGELMAN & SILVERMAN, CHOSEN CHILDREN, supra
note 115, at 100.
130. Thriving Kids; Exploding Myths About Adoption, STAR TRIB., July 1, 1994, at 16A (quot-
ing a report from the Search Institute, a Minneapolis-based research group studying 715 adop-
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In view of this evidence which supports transracial placements, how
can the NABSW and others who adopt the "color and community
consciousness" perspective continue to oppose such adoptions? The
must answer lie with the continuing distrust between the races. If
there is no significant empirical evidence to support the hypothesis
that Black children should not be adopted by White parents, all that is
left is intuition. Clearly, the intuition of the NABSW and scholars
who advocate continuing race-matching policies leads to the belief
that White families, however well intentioned, are not in a position to
appreciate what it means to be Black. This necessarily means that
they will not be in a position to teach children about what it means to
be Black.13' In addition, there is a general awareness that racism is
subtle and may even be subconscious, and this translates into the addi-
tional fear that White adoptive parents may be unable to overcome
ingrained, racist attitudes.132
One might hope that studies refuting the notion that transracial
adoptions result in negative outcomes in terms of poor-self image, ad-
justment problems and the like would be enough to dispose of such
fears, and there is some evidence that a growing number of Blacks do
support transracial adoption. 133 Notwithstanding such support, barri-
ers to transracial adoption remain in place, 34 possibly because of
other problems which the NABSW has identified with such
placements.
2. Racial and Cultural Identity
The second objection to transracial adoption raised by the NABSW
is that Black children will be deprived of their racial and cultural iden-
tity if they are reared in White homes. 35 There are a number of re-
tive families). The study has been described as "the largest U.S. study ever conducted on
adoptive families." Laura S. Stepp, Adoption and Well-Being, WASH. POST, June 24, 1994, at B5.
131. See Perry, Discourse and Subordination, supra note 28, at 71 (citing Rita J. Simon, Black
Attitudes Toward Transracial Adoption, 39 PHYLON 135 (1978), which found that less than one-
third of those interviewed believed Whites were competent to raise Black children in our
society).
132. Perry, Discourse and Subordination, supra note 28, at 63.
133. See, e.g., Bartholet, supra note 90, at 1236 ("Reported surveys of black community atti-
tudes indicate substantial support for transracial adoption .... "); Rita J. Simon, Transracial
Adoption in South Africa: Phase I, Vol.2, no.1 RECONSTRUCTION 102, 104 (1992). But see Perry,
Discourse and Subordination, supra note 28, at 62 n.120 (noting that people are often color-
conscious of transracially adopted children).
134. See infra notes 183-90 (noting that transracial adoption laws give undue weight to race
classifications).
135. Perry, Discourse and Subordination, supra note 28, at 47.
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sponses to this contention, but the first problem is to define what is
meant by "racial" and "cultural" identity.
As these terms are used by the NABSW, there is no real difference
between the concepts of racial and cultural identity. If "race" is
treated as a biological construct, it is impossible to deny anyone their
racial identity. 136 A person's ancestors are who they are; an individ-
ual's genetic makeup is immutable. Moreover, if members of our soci-
ety are going to identify someone as Black, it will happen, regardless
of whether that person is raised in a White home, a Black home, or a
multi-racial home. Thus, absent the cultural context, the idea that
children can somehow be deprived of their racial identity is highly
suspect.
The basis for the NABSW's position in this regard is more likely
premised on the idea that raising a Black child in a White home will
somehow threaten the development of that child's cultural identity as
a Black person. In other words, the real objection is probably that, as
a result of being raised in a White home, someone who is "really"
Black may wind up acting "White."
There are two ideas implicit in this position. The first is that chil-
dren raised in a White home will not be "Black" in some fundamental
sense;137 the second is that this lack will be detrimental to the children
involved.138 If these premises are accepted, it follows that the color of
one's skin is the best determinant of whether one will be a good or
even adequate parent for a Black child.
This type of attitude can be extremely damaging to those who do
not fit comfortably within the preconceived notions of others as to
136. Of course, to the extent that one is worried about the ability of adoptive parents to
transmit information about specific ancestors, Black adoptive parents are in no better a position
than White adoptive parents. In fact, even Black biological parents are not always in a particu-
larly good position to impart to their children an appreciation of their ancestry beyond two or
three generations. In part this is attributable to the horrors of slavery, where slave owners sys-
tematically sought to erase tribal and cultural identity in order to promote a more effective work
force. Mary C. Waters, The Role of Lineage in Identity Formation Among Black Americans, 14
QUALITATIVE Soc. 57, 60 (1991). In addition, the system of slavery also contributed to mixing of
"White" and "Black" blood, but typically in the context of rape or coercion of the mothers as
slaves. Id. Not surprisingly, Black slave families were often reluctant to pass along specific in-
formation about White fathers. Id.
137. It is this brand of thinking which leads to the promulgation of such pejorative terms as
"oreo," referring to someone who is Black in appearance but who has adopted White attitudes.
See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
138. This relates back to some of the ideas discussed in the preceding section of this Article.
Presumably, failing to properly identify with being Black could lead to such negative outcomes
as low self-esteem, poor social adjustment or problems with self-identity. See supra notes 115-18
and accompanying text (discussing studies suggesting that transracial adoption does not lead to
such outcomes).
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what it means to be Black. For example, my children, and a growing
number of other children who will be identified as Black, have a
multi-racial heritage. Many of these children, mine included, are in
fact part White. To believe the message of those who say that White
attitudes are wrong and harmful, and that White identity is incompati-
ble with being Black, means that these children will have to deny part
of who they are. Even worse, the innate distrust and prejudice im-
plicit in the assumption that Whites cannot adequately care for and
raise Black children is likely to be incorporated somewhere into the
belief systems of children exposed to that view, even if they are raised
in a White or multi-racial home.
My children have been hurt immeasurably, not by being raised in a
White home, but by being told that they are being cheated by having
White parents. It is hard to believe that anyone would seriously argue
that there is only one acceptable way to raise a child, of whatever
racial makeup, and that all other ways are harmful, but that is the
essential result of rules which say that only Black parents who will
teach Black culture and identity can successfully raise Black children.
Assuming that there is a set of experiences, attitudes, beliefs, values,
and preferences sufficiently concrete and cohesive to constitute a via-
ble Black culture or cultures in this country, this does not mean that
all Blacks must buy into those beliefs and value structures, or that one
must be Black to appreciate or, more importantly, teach appreciation
of such culture.
The objections to using "Black culture" as a basis for determining
who can adopt Black children are threefold. First, Black parents will
not always rear their children in accordance with the NABSW's ideas
of what constitutes appropriate Black culture. Second, there is no evi-
dence that White parents cannot inculcate an appreciation of Black
culture, however defined, in transracially adopted Black children. Fi-
nally, and most importantly, there is no evidence that only one type of
culture, that identified by the NABSW as being Black, is good for
Black children.
The first two objections seem obvious. There is plenty of evidence
that not all individuals of a particular race, or any other group for that
matter, will share the attitudes, ideas, values and beliefs of all other
members of that group. 139 Suggesting that all Blacks should identify
fully with Black culture buys into and perpetuates racial stereotypes, a
notion which inevitably works against those who are stereotyped. It is
139. It is well recognized that not all members of particular groups will share the same values
and expressions of behavior. Tommy E. Whittier et al., Strength of Ethnic Affiliation: Examin-
ing Black Identification with Black Culture, 131 J. Soc. PsYcH. 461, 461 (1991).
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unrealistic to implement policies which assume either that Black
adults will always teach their children the same version of Black cul-
ture t 40 or that White parents cannot adequately expose their children
to such attitudes, beliefs and experiences. 141 It is axiomatic that things
which are generally regarded as representing "Black culture" are
neither appreciated by or participated in by all Blacks, nor exclusively
appreciated by or participated in by Blacks. Rather, many things that
are generally thought of as representing Black culture are generally a
matter of taste which a significant number of Blacks may not enjoy
and an even greater number of non-Blacks may appreciate.1 42
These arguments are, however, less telling than the final point.
Even if one were willing to assume that Black culture will be best
taught by Black adults or that it cannot adequately be taught to a
Black child by a White family, the benefits of denying a child an adop-
tive home merely to improve his or her chances of learning "Black
culture" are not immediately obvious.
First, it is clear that if the only way for Black children to have a
positive self-image was for them to identify with Black culture, then
there would be a benefit to participating in that culture. However, the
140. It is in fact clear that not all Black families identify with or would transmit Black culture
to their children. There are, for example, Blacks who choose to live in virtually all-White neigh-
borhoods and who choose to send their children to schools where they may be the only Black
children in any of their classes. See Mahoney, supra note 95, at 498.
141. One study showed that in 1972, 75% of parents with transracially adopted children made
efforts to foster their child's ethnic identity through such things as books, music, toys and by
providing opportunities to play with other non-White children. SIMON & ALTSTEIN (1977),
supra note 76, at 102-03.
142. For example, an appreciation for jazz, particular sports, particular authors, and the art of
story-telling have been identified by some as part of "Black culture." See Jerome M. Culp, Jr.,
The Michael Jackson Pill: Equality, Race, and Culture, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2613, 2617, 2619 (1994).
In his article, Professor Culp presents a parable arising out of the discovery of a pill "that if
taken by black people will remove all vestiges of being black." Id. at 2615. The article is
presented in the form of a fictional dialogue concerning the desirability of Blacks taking this
"Michael Jackson Pill." Id. One of the concerns raised is that removing the physical appearance
of race might also result in a loss of culture. Id. at 2617-19. Yet it seems obvious that there is
nothing inherent in jazz, basketball, story-telling or Toni Morrison's writings that makes it essen-
tial for all Blacks to appreciate them or that prevents non-Blacks from enjoying them. In fact,
this is one of the points presented in Professor Culp's article. Id. at 2617. This point of view is
expressed by "Professor Not-Professor-Bell," a character who is an "amalgam of many views
from within the black academic community." Id. at 2615 n.9. This point of view is also ex-
pressed by "Geneva Crenshaw," another fictitious character originally created by Professor Der-
rick Bell. Id. at 2613 n.2. For reference to "Geneva Crenshaw," see DERRICK BELL, AND WE
ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 51-74 (1987). It is true that Blacks
may be more prone than Whites to appreciate certain forms of artistic and creative expression.
It does not seem accurate, however, to assume that these forms of cultural expression are
uniquely Black in such a way that one can assume a Black child raised in a White home will be
unable to gain an appreciation for them or to assume that a Black child will inevitably acquire an
appreciation for them just because the child is raised in a Black home.
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evidence suggests that a positive self-image is not dependent on iden-
tifying with Black culture.143
Alternatively, if the only way for Black children to assure success in
today's society is to identify with Black culture, then that might pro-
vide a sufficient basis for concluding that Black culture is essential.
However, evidence exists which suggests that not only is this not the
case, but that greater levels of success may be achieved when the child
does not identify overly strongly with what has been called Black cul-
ture. The reasons for this are not entirely clear, but it does appear
that there are at least aspects of Black culture that appear to foster or
encourage "failure," at least in terms of academic and financial suc-
cess. 144 Certainly, there are innumerable Black parents who not only
do not encourage this belief in their children, but actively discourage
it. Moreover, even if this was an attitude inculcated by Black parents,
it does not seem to be an attitude designed to help their children deal
successfully with life.
For these reasons, the argument that transracial adoptions should
be disfavored in the law because of the inability of White families to
teach Black culture seems to be an inadequate basis for denying Black
children an adoptive home.
3. Barriers to In-Race Adoptions
The third and final objection to transracial adoption offered by the
NABSW is that the only reason White families have been allowed to
adopt Black children is that discriminatory barriers exist which have
prevented Black families from adopting Black children. 145 Alice G.
Thompson, co-chair of the Family Preservation Task Force of the
NABSW, has said that "[t]he main reason I'm against transracial
143. Studies have shown that transracially adopted Black children feel positive about their
racial identity even when they do not particularly identify with Black culture. Ruth G. McRoy et
al., supra note 116, at 525 (stating that transracial adoptees have self-esteem levels as high as
inracial adoptees, even though they are less likely to identify strongly as Black.); see also supra
notes 115-18 and accompanying text (noting numerous studies which gauge the social adjust-
ment, self-esteem, and self-identification of transracial adoptees).
144. See Sophronia Scott Gregory, The Hidden Hurdle, TIME, Mar. 16, 1992, at 44 (stating that
"[s]tudents [who try to succeed] ... find themselves reviled as 'uppity,' as trying to 'act white,'
because many teenagers have come to equate black identity with alienation and indifference");
Lena Williams, In a 90's Quest for Black Identity: Intense Doubts and Disagreement, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 30, 1991, at Al (noting that "Black youths, for example, are sometimes accused by their
peers of 'acting white' simply because they study hard, go to the library or use standard Eng-
lish"). This has been characterized as an "anti-achievement ethic," and to the extent it is inte-
grated into Black culture or becomes an accepted aspect of Black identity, it means that "[s]ocial
success depends partly on failure." Gregory, The Hidden Hurdle, supra, at 45.
145. Rita Simon & Alice G. Thompson, Should White Families Be Allowed to Adopt African
American Children?, 7 HEALTH 22 (July-Aug. 1993).
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adoption .. is that it's unnecessary. There are plenty of black fami-
lies who would love to adopt a child, but there are barriers built into
the system."'1 46 She has suggested that "[s]tudies have shown that
when agencies are sensitive to African American families they have
no trouble finding enough black families to adopt black children."'1 47
Putting aside for a moment the notion that there are plenty of hypo-
thetical Black families who might be available if things were different,
the actual statistics on the adoption of Black children are grim.148
There are hundreds of thousands of children in foster care in this
country, many available for and awaiting adoption, and far too many
of those children are Black.149 Although only twelve to fourteen per-
cent of the total population in this country is Black, statistics indicate
that nearly forty percent of children needing adoptive homes are
Black. 150 On average, Black children wait far longer than White chil-
dren to be adopted, and are substantially less likely to find permanent
placement outside the foster care system.151
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. "Beneath the controversy lies the inescapable arithmetic of adoption supply and de-
mand. In 1991, the most recent years for which numbers are available, 31 percent of U.S. adop-
tive parents were black, while 67 percent of waiting children were, according to the National
Adoption Center." M. A. J. McKenna, Transracial Adoption, ATLANTA CONST., Mar. 21, 1995,
at El; see also Nina Shokraii, Adoption and Racial Preferences, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1995, at
A19 ("The tragedy is that while there is a shortage of families of color waiting to adopt children,
there is an excess of prospective white parents eager to take on the responsibility.").
149. "Advocates contend that a preference for same-race placement forces black and biracial
children to wait in foster care for years. While blacks are 13 percent of the U.S. population,
black children account for more than half of the 500,000 children in foster care." McKenna,
supra note 148, at El.
150. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2444 (1994) (stat-
ing that 12% of the general population is Black); Eubanks, supra note 95, at 1248 (stating that
approximately 14% of children under the age of nineteen are Black); McKenna, supra note 148,
at El (setting the percentage of Blacks in the general population at 13%).
According to a House Report, the proportion of minority children in foster care is 46%, more
than twice the proportion of such children in the general population. SELECT COMM. ON CHIL-
DREN, YOUTH, AND FAMILIES, No PLACE TO CALL HOME: DISCARDED CHILDREN IN AMERICA,
H.R. REP. No. 395, 101st Cong., 2d. Sess. 7 (1990). Statistics from the American Public Welfare
Association indicated that approximately 39% of children in foster care were Black. Lynne
Duke, Couples Challenge Same-Race Adoption Policies, WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 1992, at Al.
151. SELECT COMM. ON CHILDREN, YouTH AND FAMILIES, No PLACE TO CALL HOME: Dis-
CARDED CHILDREN IN AMERICA, H.R. REP. No. 395, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1990) (recognizing
the median length of stay for Black children in foster care is one-third longer than for the na-
tional median); see Bartholet, supra note 90, at 1193-94 (describing policies that involve holding
minority children in foster or institutional setting for substantial periods of time when no inrace
adoption is possible); Fenton, supra note 74, at 44 (comparing statistics of White children and
Black children involved in the foster care system and their respective chances of exiting the
system).
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The problem is not that Black families do not adopt Black children.
The evidence reveals that, when socio-economic status is taken into
account, Blacks adopt at a higher rate than White families. 152 The
problem is that there are so many Black children waiting for adoption.
Moreover, the number of children in foster care has been increasing
and is expected to increase even further in the future. In addition,
because a disproportionate number of Black children are victims of
abuse, neglect, homelessness, substance abuse, and the AIDS epi-
demic, 153 the number of such children in the foster care system is
likely to increase at a fast pace. This means that it is extremely un-
likely that it will be possible to reduce the delays in permanent place-
ment experienced by Black children unless barriers to transracial
adoption are removed. This is likely to be true even if in-race place-
ments are also encouraged, simply because the mismatch in numbers
is so great. Forcing Black children to wait for a "same-race" home
would only be justifiable if there was no real harm in delaying perma-
nent placement to adoptable but waiting children; this is not the
case.
154
It has been suggested that same-race families could be found for
Black children if traditional middle-class values were not emphasized
in the adoption process, and if Black families were actively sought out
by adoption agencies. There is nothing objectionable about actively
recruiting prospective adoptive families, and a very good case can be
made for dispensing with certain criteria which traditionally were ap-
plied to couples seeking to adopt, such as medical infertility and a
commitment on the part of the wife and mother to be a full-time
homemaker rather than working outside the home. 155 In fact, many
of the traditional requirements for adoptive parents have been aban-
152. See Macaulay & Macaulay, supra note 79, at 279. The North American Council on
Adoptable Children has concluded that Black families actually adopt four times more than
White families. Fenton, supra note 74, at 45 n.42.
153. See Fenton, supra note 74, at 39.
154. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text (noting numerous researchers who have
concluded that a delay in adoption is extremely traumatic and detrimental to the child's psycho-
logical well-being).
155. This and the following information about adoption standards comes from Macaulay &
Macaulay, supra note 79, at 275. According to one study, the most common traditional stan-
dards imposed by adoption agencies included the following:
(1) The couple had to have a good income and middle-class life style, including a well-
kept home, perhaps large enough so that the child could have a room of his or her own.
(2) The wife had to be a full-time mother, and she could not desire to work outside the
home ....
(3) The couple had to offer medical evidence that they were infertile ....
(4) The couple's health had to be excellent, including their mental health ....
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doned or softened so that they are no longer applied inflexibly.156 In
general, current standards refer to the ability of the prospective adop-
tive parents to meet the needs of the child or children being adopted.
It is true that some of the "middle-class" values which have tradi-
tionally appeared in adoption standards are still used today. For ex-
ample, all things equal, it is desirable to have a home where there is a
good income and an adequate home. It is preferable to have a stable
home environment which includes a father figure, and it is desirable
for both parents to enjoy good health. However, there is a sound ba-
sis for retaining such considerations, even if they do represent middle-
class White values.
The reality is that adoption agencies today are permitted to con-
sider a variety of factors in determining whether a particular place-
ment is in the best interest of the child concerned. The argument that
adoption policies fail to adequately search for Black families is there-
fore substantially weaker than might have been true in the past.
One other objection has been made to the practice of transracial
adoption as part of the solution to the crisis of unadopted Black chil-
dren. Some commentators have contended that there are insufficient
White families willing to adopt Black children, particularly those most
in need of adoptive homes: those with disabilities, older children and
those in sibling groups. This is the weakest of all arguments against
transracial adoption. In essence, the argument says that because we
cannot guarantee that transracial adoption will help all Black children,
we should not permit it to help any Black children.
Even if only a fraction of Black children waiting to be adopted are
transracially placed, those children will have been helped. Denying
them the best opportunity for a stable home simply because they were
Additional factors included the age of applicants and marital status. See Fenton, supra note
74, at 46.
156. For example, the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services lists the following
factors which are to be considered in evaluating prospective placements: 1) the wishes of the
child who demonstrates the maturity and cognitive ability to participate in the decision; 2) the
physical, mental, and emotional needs of the child; 3) the child's need for stability and continuity
of relationship with parent figures; 4) the interaction between the child and the prospective
adoptive parent; 5) the prospective adoptive parent's ability to meet the physical, mental, and
emotional needs of the child; and 6) the ability of the prospective adoptive family to provide an
environment which would preserve the child's racial, ethnic, and cultural heritage. Zreczny,
supra note 95, at 1123 n.14. Additional factors might include: the "moral fitness of the two
parties"; the age, sex, and health of the child; and the potential family environment. See D.
Michael Reilly, Constitutional Law: Race as a Factor in Interracial Adoptions, 32 CA'H. U. L.
REV. 1022, 1022 n.1 (1983).
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born Black is racist, and, as a friend and colleague so eloquently
stated, unloving. 157
E. Other Objections to Transracial Adoption
Although the objections raised by the NABSW have undoubtedly
been the most influential in shaping policies which discourage the
practice of transracial adoption, there are other objections to the prac-
tice. For example, some commentators have suggested that policies
which favor same-race placements are a positive step towards cor-
recting the familial imbalances which are a legacy of slavery. 158
There is abundant and heart-wrenching evidence of the break up of
families under slavery. 159 For those enslaved, the nuclear family was
not a protected unit. Children did not belong to their parents, but
rather to their "masters," and could be separated from their parents at
any time. 60 It has been suggested that some Blacks perceive trans-
racial adoption as a continuation of White control over Black children
and the further disempowerment of Blacks. 161 "For many Blacks,
then, transracial adoption is inextricably linked to the fragility of the
Black family, which fragility is the result of racism and oppression."' 62
If one views the current problems evidenced by the break-up of
Black families as a legacy of this shameful past, it can be argued that it
is necessary to take even extraordinary steps to reintroduce stable
family relationships into Black life. However, it seems unfair to ask
Black children waiting for adoptive homes to assume the burden of
remedying this legacy of slavery. In fact, the Supreme Court has said
that it is impermissible to adopt programs which place "the brunt of a
157. See Chen, supra note 51, at 174 (stating that it is unloving to condition parental affection
on anything, least of all race).
158. See generally Perry, Discourse and Subordination, supra note 28, at 40 (stating that trans-
racial adoption may actually subordinate Black children and Black people rather than making
them equal).
159. See, e.g., LINDA BRENT, INCIDENTS IN THE Ln OF A SLAVE GIRL 6 (1973) (reciting how
all five of her grandmother's children were sold away from her after long years of faithful ser-
vice); BULLWHIP DAYS-THE SLAVES REMEMBER 149, 290, 292, 293 (James Mellon ed. 1988)
(reciting anecdotes about the break up of their families by several slaves); DEBORAH GRAY
WHITE, AIN'T I A WOMAN? FEMALE SLAVES IN THE PLANTATION SOUTH 34, 145, 149 (1985)
(blaming part of this on the attitude of slave traders who tended not to view fathers as part of the
family unit); see also HERBERT G. GUTMAN, THE BLACK FAMILY IN SLAVERY AND FREEDOM
262-63, 1750-1925 (1976) (describing separation of a four-year-old from her family).
160. See Anita L. Allen, Surrogacy, Slavery and the Ownership of Life, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 139, 140 n.9 (1990) (stating that slave mothers had no legal claim of right to their children
and the masters could buy and sell the children to third parties without the consent of the biolog-
ical mothers).
161. Perry, Discourse and Subordination, supra note 28, at 55.
162. Id.
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benign [race-based] program" on individuals, particularly "those least
well represented in the political process. ' 163
Moreover, there have been substantial efforts at keeping families,
Black and White, intact and in reuniting children with biological par-
ents wherever possible. The express goal of child welfare establish-
ments has been to keep families together. As Professor Bartholet
recently noted, efforts at family reunification have been so significant
that "many are now questioning whether we have gone too far in this
direction, preserving families at the cost of subjecting children to un-
conscionable abuse and neglect." 164
It is certainly true that there are sound reasons for actively search-
ing for Black families willing to serve as adoptive families. However,
this does not mean that it is just or necessary to demand that children
wait in the limbo of foster care for such families to be found. One can
applaud the efforts at recruiting Black adoptive families, which have
resulted in Black families adopting at relatively high rates, 165 without
concluding that the diverse and diffuse needs of the Black community
in general outweigh the needs of individual Black children to find
adoptive homes as soon as possible.166
Another possible basis for opposing transracial adoption might be
derived from a consideration of the justifications which have been ad-
vanced to support immersion schools (schools which adopt a curricu-
lum specifically designed for Black children). In essence, this
argument is that if Black children would do better when educated with
other Black children, might they not also do better if they are raised in
a Black family.
163. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 361 (1978).
164. Bartholet, Race Separatism, supra note 95, at 101.
165. When socio-economic factors are controlled for, Blacks adopt at a higher rate than do
Whites. See Fenton, supra note 74, at 45 n.42.
166. One commentator described the relative interests of the Black community and Black
children as follows:
Furthermore, even if the law allowed courts and agencies to balance cultural interests
against the child's interests in placement proceedings, the child's interests would sub-
stantially outweigh cultural interests. A child whose placement is delayed suffers im-
mediate, concrete, and probably irreparable harm. Black culture, by contrast, if
harmed at all, suffers the minute and diffuse harm that results when a de minimis
number of Black children are placed in white homes. Therefore, advancing cultural
interests in the child-placement process compromises the interests of individual Black
children and is not necessary for Black cultural preservation.
Forde-Mazrui, supra note 89, at 961-62.
Kim Forde-Mazrui's voice may be particularly important in this debate as he is himself a mem-
ber of the Black community whose interests he is evaluating.
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One of the leading proponents of immersion schools is Professor
Kevin Brown, who has written several articles on the subject. 167 Pro-
fessor Brown aptly concludes that "[t]he benefit of any education is
measured by how well it prepares students to deal with the situations
that they will encounter throughout their lives."'1 68 He also concludes
that American society has adopted a stereotypic view of African-
Americans which is particularly negative. In this view, Blacks are por-
trayed and seen as "poor, lazy, lustful, ignorant, and prone to criminal
behavior. ' ' 169 Because individuals identified as Black cannot choose
to avoid these stereotypes, they must learn to deal with them. Profes-
sor Brown supports immersion schools as an "opportunity to develop
teaching strategies, techniques, and materials that take into account
the influence of the dominant American and the African-American
cultures on the social environment and understandings of African-
Americans.' 170 In this environment, it is at least possible that educa-
tors will be able to formulate and teach strategies and techniques to
Black students to help them overcome racial obstacles. It may also be
possible that cultural conflicts between the dominant American cul-
ture and the Black culture can be minimized in such an environment.
Arguably, similar concerns might be applicable to the transracial
adoption debate. In fact, much of this is incorporated into the posi-
tion of the NABSW, which postulates that only Black families are
properly equipped to teach Black children how to deal with racism. 171
However, the argument in the context of immersion schools is that
such single-race schools offer the possibility of developing and teach-
ing solutions to racism. Presumably because immersion schools allow
teachers to concentrate on the special problems of their students and
those aspects of history and society most likely to help overcome or
rebut the negative stereotypes often applied to Blacks as a group, the
possibility of developing successful strategies is heightened, and the
motives for minimizing the clash between dominant and minority cul-
tures are more pronounced. Whatever the validity of these arguments
in the context of immersion schools, they do not seem to translate well
into the adoption setting.
167. E.g., Kevin D. Brown, The Dilemma of Legal Discourse for Public Educational Re-
sponses to the "Crisis" Facing African-American Males, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 63 (1994); Brown,
Immersion Schools, supra note 46; Kevin Brown, A Reply to Cummings: Are the Racial Realists
Forced to Embrace the Legal Rationale of the Liberal and Integrationist Structures?, 20 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 783 (1993).
168. Brown, Immersion Schools, supra note 46, at 819.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See supra part II.D.1.
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In any family, parents are (or at least ought to be) motivated to find
strategies which will help their children develop into happy and pro-
ductive members of society. Undoubtedly, where Black children are
involved, this would include the need to develop and teach coping
strategies for dealing with our admittedly racist society. However,
there is little reason to believe that Black families will be more moti-
vated or have more resources available to devote to the search for
strategies which will be helpful to the children in the home. In fact, as
previously discussed, there is evidence that White families are in fact
as successful as Black families in teaching Black children to succeed in
our society. 172
Similarly, any multi-racial family will be faced with the need to min-
imize the clash of cultures. It might be easier for a Black family to
teach certain attitudes and values generally identified as Black cul-
ture, 173 but it is just as likely that a White family would find it easier to
teach "White" culture. There seems little reason to believe that it
would be easier for either group to teach cultural attitudes and beliefs
in a way which minimizes the differences between the two cultures.
Since there is as much hope for this happening in a White family as in
a Black family, the need to minimize the clash of cultures does not
seem to be an argument which justifies the adoption or retention of
policies which prevent White families from adopting Black children in
need of homes.
Finally, opposition to transracial adoptions might also be explained
by considering transracial adoption from the perspective of those who
are deeply suspicious of the motives of White adoptive parents. Pro-
fessor Twila Perry, in explaining her opposition to transracial adop-
tion,174 has examined a number of explanations for why Blacks might
be suspicious of the motives of White adoptive parents.
For example, Professor Perry is greatly concerned by the fact that
many Whites seeking to adopt transracially turn to international adop-
tions rather than adopting Black children waiting to be adopted in this
172. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text (stating that White families are as success-
ful as Black families in teaching Black children to succeed in society).
173. But see notes 140-42 supra and accompanying text (noting that not all Black families
choose to transmit Black culture, and certain forms of culture are not uniquely Black or White).
174. Professor Perry's opposition to transracial adoption is not, however, absolute. She recog-
nizes the harm where children are removed from those they have come to regard as primary
care-givers and psychological parents, and she would not oppose transracial adoption if it means
disrupting existing family-type relationships. Perry, Discourse and Subordination, supra note 28,
at 100-05. Perry also discusses the merits of NABSW's position that only Black families can
provide Black children with essential coping skills. Id. at 96-124.
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country. 175 She sees this as evidence supporting the Black commu-
nity's opposition to transracial adoption on a theoretical level-if
Blacks cannot trust Whites to value Black children except as a last
choice, they obviously cannot trust Whites to raise those children in a
loving and supportive environment.176
Assuming that Blacks do in fact oppose transracial adoption in sig-
nificant numbers,177 there are two questions which still have to be an-
swered before this can be taken as support for policies which disfavor
transracial placements. First, is the perception of Blacks accurate?
Do Whites in fact take Black children only as a last resort? And sec-
ond, even if most Whites are not at all willing to adopt Black children,
does that mean that our society should endorse rules which institu-
tionalize this negative preference?
As to the first question, there are a number of reasons why Whites
seek to adopt internationally. First, it is extraordinarily difficult to
adopt newborns, of whatever race, in this country, simply because
there are more people waiting to adopt infants than there are infants
needing to be adopted. Moreover, even where Black infants are avail-
able, race-matching policies virtually guarantee that White families
will not be able to adopt, at least not immediately. Thus, the barriers
to transracial adoption in this country may easily explain why Whites
adopt internationally.
A second reason may be that the plight of international adoptees is
seen as particularly poignant. The response of White Americans to
stories about the tragedy of Korean war orphans, abandoned children
in South America or babies lying essentially unattended in dark wards
in Romania can easily be viewed as a particular reaching out to these
children in need rather than a rejection of other children of whatever
race. In fact, there were a number of efforts to pursue adoption of
Black war orphans in Somalia and Rwanda on similar humanitarian
grounds. 178
175. Id. at 60-61.
176. Id.
177. This itself is a position which is the subject of some debate. Professor Bartholet suggests
that there is substantial evidence that Blacks, in growing numbers, support transracial adoption.
Bartholet, Race Separatism, supra note 95, at 104. Professor Perry is profoundly critical of stud-
ies purporting to demonstrate the validity of this position. Perry, Discourse and Subordination,
supra note 28, at 62-63 n.120.
178. See Adoptions Hard in Somalia: Orphans Caught in Legal Chaos, GREENSBORO NEWS &
REC., Mar. 7, 1993, at All (reporting that U.S. officials have received adoption requests from
soldiers and civilians); Steve Fainaru, Thousands of Rwanda Kids are Orphans in Zaire, SUNDAY
PATRIOT-NEws, HARRIsBURG, Aug. 7, 1994, at A10 (describing how the Red Cross received calls
from people wishing to adopt Rwandan orphans); Maggie Jackson, Rwanda Prohibits Adoptions;
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Finally, there is evidence that, notwithstanding the barriers to trans-
racial adoption, it does occur. Particularly in private agencies, where
race is less of a concern, a substantial percentage of Black children are
in fact adopted transracially. 179 This does not fit at all with the stereo-
typed view of Whites as rejecting of Black children.
In the end, however, it is the answer to the second question which is
more telling. Even if most Whites are unwilling to envision their fam-
ily with Black children, does that necessarily mean that we ought to
have laws which enforce and thereby legitimize this separation? As
Professor Bartholet has recently suggested, the law should not counte-
nance policies which enforce such racial separatism to the detriment
of the individuals involved and society at large. i80
A second example from Professor Perry's work also illustrates how
the perspective of the Black community on transracial adoptions may
differ from that of White America. Professor Perry sees the trans-
racial adoption debate as involving an attack on the parenting skills of
Black women.181 Because mothers in general continue to play a domi-
nant role in child-rearing, and Black mothers fit into this pattern at
least as clearly as White mothers, Professor Perry suggests that argu-
ments opposing same-race placements for Black children can be
viewed as a critique of Black mothers. 182
However, it is possible to read the literature cited by Professor
Perry without concluding that it contains or constitutes an attack on
Black mothers. The arguments in favor of transracial adoption are
more of an attack on policies which act as a barrier to Black children
Decision Raises Debate of How to Best Help the Homeless Children, FRESNO BEE, Aug. 29, 1994,
at Dl (describing efforts of "hundreds of Americans" to adopt young Rwandans).
In the end, the failure of these efforts to result in widespread placement of Somalian and
Rwandan orphans was due to laws in Somalia and Ethiopia making adoptions in general illegal
or preventing international placements, and is not attributable to refusal of White Americans to
adopt Black children. See Aid Workers Agonize over Somalian Orphans' Plight, SALT LAKE
TRIB., Sept. 10, 1992, at A6 (reporting that adoption is illegal in Somalia); Jack Kelley, Orphans
'Don't Deserve to Die,' USA TODAY, Aug. 2, 1994, at 1A (stating that a report from the State
Department warns that there is no legal way to adopt Rwandan orphans); Donatella Lorch,
Rwanda: Rape, Used as Weapon, Creates 'Genocide Orphans,' N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1995, at H10
(reporting that foreign adoption is illegal in Rwanda).
179. See Bartholet, supra note 90, at 1184. Another source cites an interview with one agency
which indicated that approximately 60% of the Black children it places are placed interracially.
See Zreczny, supra note 95, at 1123 n.11 (referring to a 1993 telephone interview with the direc-
tors of The Cradle Society).
180. Bartholet, supra note 95, at 102-03.
181. Perry, Discourse and Subordination, supra note 28, at 94.
182. Professor Perry suggests that the negative portrayals of Black parents in connection with
the transracial adoption debate "raise the question of whether advocates of transracial adoption
believe that white women are generally better at mothering than Black women." Perry, Dis-
course and Subordination, supra note 28, at 95.
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having any mother, rather than suggesting that Black mothers would
do an inadequate job. In general, the arguments in favor of trans-
racial adoption are not based on the conclusion that Black mothers
are worse than White mothers, but on the notion that there is no proof
that they are so much better that it is worth delaying adoptive place-
ments even though there are White mothers waiting for the chance to
adopt.
If one starts from the proposition that adoption should be delayed
or denied only when there is proof that the delay or denial is neces-
sary for the well-being of the child, or even for the good of society as a
whole, none of the arguments against transracial adoption provide
enough support to justify the government's use of race as barrier to
adoption of Black children.
F What the Law Says and What It Should Say
Even though empirical support for policies opposing transracial
adoption is sadly lacking, it is legally permissible to consider race in
deciding placement options for Black children, so long as it is not the
only factor.183 Not only is race expressly mentioned in some state
statutes, 184 it is given substantial unofficial weight elsewhere. 185
As a result of compromises, a recent attempt by concerned legisla-
tors to increase the placement options for Black children actually fur-
ther legitimized the use of race as a factor in placement decisions. 186
The real problem is that rules which make it possible for race to be
considered in the adoption process mean in fact that Black children
will continue to suffer unnecessary delays in being adopted, and that
some children who might have been adopted will not be. 187 The poli-
183. See In re Adoption of a Minor, 228 F.2d 446, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
184. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-102a (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995) (requiring "due considera-
tion" to be given to a child's race or ethnicity); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.29 (West Supp. 1996)
(establishing that the best interests of a child requires "due, not sole, consideration of the child's
race or ethnic heritage").
185. The unwritten rules favoring race-matching have been detailed by Professor Bartholet.
See Bartholet, supra note 90, at 1183-84; accord Zreczny, supra note 95, at 1123 ("[P]ublic agen-
cies almost always declare the ability to preserve a child's racial, ethnic, and cultural heritage as
one issue to be considered .... ).
186. The Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, sponsored by then Senator Howard Metzen-
baum and Senator Carol Moseley-Braun, as finally adopted, expressly permits agencies to "con-
sider the cultural, ethnic, or racial background of the child" in evaluating potential foster and
adoptive parents. Pub. L. No. 103-382 §§ 551-54, 108 Stat. 3518, 4056-57 (1994) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5115a (1994)).
187. See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 89, at 939-42 (describing how courts give undue weight to
race when they are allowed to consider it as a factor in placement decisions).
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cies of adoption agencies, written and unwritten,188 and decisions from
various courts189 indicate that race is in fact a significant factor in de-
nying and delaying adoptive placements. Regardless of how mildly
such policies are worded, it is clear that there are substantial barriers
to transracial adoption imposed by governmental authorities on the
basis of race.
While the best interests of the child is the articulated standard most
often given lip service in the adoption arena, it is all too clear that the
presumptions in favor of race-matching and against transracial place-
ments are functioning in such a way that this standard is not being
met. As Professor Randall Kennedy, a well-known scholar who has
published extensively on the issue of race-relations, recently noted,
"[a]ll across the United States, adults seeking to offer loving, secure
homes to parentless children are obstructed by officials obsessed with
racial matching ....
There is one final question about the role of race in adoption and
placement decisions which needs to be addressed. This Article takes
the position that the government should not use race as a basis for
making placement decisions, but what happens when it is the choice of
the prospective parents or the preference of a child old enough to be
able to express concern about concepts like race? While most of us
would prefer to live in a society where race would not play a role in
such decisions, even from the perspective of the individuals involved,
188. Professor Elizabeth Bartholet, a Harvard University Law Professor who has written ex-
tensively about transracial adoption, has concluded that "[e]very state has written or unwritten
policies that recommend racial matching in adoption." Ruth Richman, Transracial Adoptions
Get a Vocal Advocate, PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 7, 1993, at 6C (quoting Bartholet). She is not the
only one to have noted the prevalence of policies which work against transracial adoption. An-
other commentator has stated:
However, current adoption practices, both formal and informal, are working to pre-
vent white parents from adopting minority children. It takes twice as long for a white
family to adopt a black child than for them to adopt a white child or a child from
abroad; and while federal, state, and local laws actively prohibit discrimination on the
basis of race for a whole range of activities, race can and is used as a basis of discrimina-
tion in adoption cases.
Shokraii, supra note 148, at A19.
189. See, e.g., Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Servs., 563 F.2d
1200, 1205 (5th Cir. 1977) (stating that transracial adoption is "potentially tragic" because such
parents may be unable to cope with child's problems), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978); In re
Adoption of a Minor, 228 F.2d 446, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (citing lower court, which had opined
that the child in question might lose his White status if adopted by a Black man); In re B. Chil-
dren, 391 N.Y.S.2d 812, 814 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1977) (overruling social agency decision to leave
Black child with White foster mother by relying in part on view that such children "could de-
velop dysfunctional coping mechanisms"); In re Davis, 465 A.2d 614, 623 (Pa. 1983) (arguing that
child raised in racially different environment may face hostility of adoptive parents' relatives).
190. Randall L. Kennedy, Interracial Adoption: Is the Multiethnic Placement Act Flawed?
Yes: Race-matching Is Horrendous, 81 A.B.A. J. 44 (Apr. 1995).
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we do not. Many White parents will not want to adopt a child of a
different race. Some older Black children may also not want to be
placed in a White home. To tell them that race cannot be considered
seems to be one way of encouraging failed placements, certainly not a
desirable outcome.
The real problem with the present system is that official policies
essentially mandate consideration of race when placement decisions
are being made.19' Such policies reinforce the notion that race is a
proper basis for distinguishing between individuals by officially sanc-
tioning the differential treatment of individuals based on the color of
their skin. In the context of adoption, the children denied adoptive
homes are harmed, and society suffers from the artificial barriers be-
tween the races imposed as a result of rules which say that it is better
not to place Black children in White homes.
Our government should not be in the business of encouraging racial
separation, not in the arena of child placement or elsewhere. Rather,
we need to focus on steps which are likely to break down the barriers
between the races. As Professor Chen, a scholar of color writing
about racial divisions in the familial context, urges, "children [should]
be raised to regard race as an irrelevant category, . . . one that can
never be used productively to define."' 92 Especially when the govern-
ment uses race to distinguish between individuals, the resulting
problems are overwhelming. This statement is equally true in other
contexts.
III. RACE AS A FACTOR IN CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING
The second paradigm in which this Article examines the effects of
differential treatment based on racial classification is congressional re-
districting. 93 As every voter in America probably knows, where one
lives determines one's congressional district. This in turn determines
who will be the eligible candidates in a given election and ultimately
191. See supra notes 183-89 and accompanying text (discussing case law and statutes which
allow the race of the child to be considered and the detrimental results which follow).
192. Chen, supra note 51, at 174 (quoting Emily S. Tai, Lesser Half, 2 RECONSTRUCrION 17, 18
(1994)).
193. To avoid confusion, it is important to distinguish between "districting" or "redistricting"
and "apportionment" and "reapportionment." "[A]pportionment and reapportionment involve
the allocation [by Congress] of a finite number of representatives among a fixed number of pre-
established areas. Districting and redistricting ... refer to the processes by which the lines
separating legislative districts are drawn [by states]." Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188, 1190
n.1 (W.D. La. 1993) (quoting Charles Backstrom et al., Issues in Gerrymandering: An Explora-
tory Measure of Partisan Gerrymandering Applied to Minnesota, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1121, 1121 n.1
(1978)).
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who will be the congressional representative. The boundaries of such
districts, which seem to be constantly subject to change,194 are a
source of much debate and frustration, as well as some amusement,
when one contemplates the truly bizarre shape of some districts.195
Perhaps the most incisive, and certainly one of the most clever, ex-
planations of redistricting was advanced by Professors Aleinikoff and
Issacharoff: "In a democratic society, the purpose of voting is to allow
the electorate to select their governors. Once a decade, however, that
process is inverted, and the governors and their political agents are
permitted to select their electors."'1 96 The process of drawing congres-
sional districts has been said to be no more than "politics pure, fraught
with the capacity for self-dealing and cynical manipulation."'197 Unde-
niably, race has played a significant role in political process in this
country, historically to the disadvantage of minorities.198 Clearly,
drawing districts so as to intentionally frustrate the ability of Blacks or
other racial groups to choose candidates to represent their interests is
unfair and unconstitutional.
A. Congressional Redistricting Under the Voting Rights Act of 1965
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
vides that "[n]o State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws."'199 The Supreme Court has held
that the essential mandate of this provision is racial neutrality, which
means that it is impermissible to rig the democratic process in such a
way as to intentionally exclude minorities from participating in elec-
tions, or even to minimize the voting power of minority groups.200
194. The boundaries of congressional districts are generally revised whenever census data sug-
gests that changes in population have resulted in districts which do not adequately insure pro-
portional representation.
195. For a compilation of diagrams illustrating some of the peculiar shapes of congressional
districts, see Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and
Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV.
483, 542-48 (1993).
196. T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing Consti-
tutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH L. REV. 588, 588 (1993).
197. Id.
198. See generally Howard Ball, The Perpetuation of Racial Vote Dilution: An Examination of
Some Constraints on the Effective Administration of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, as Amended in
1982, 28 How. L.J. 433 (1985).
199. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
200. See Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989) (plurality opinion) (noting
that states have many legislative means both to punish and prevent discrimination and "to re-
move arbitrary barriers to minority advancement"); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (holding that "racial and ethnic classifications of any sort are inherently
suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination"); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
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The principle of racial neutrality applies to all aspects of the electoral
process, as well as to a state's redrawing of its congressional
districts.201
The Voting Rights Act of 1965202 was intended to help remedy the
rampant discrimination that had resulted in a variety of barriers to
effective minority participation in the democratic process.20 3 The Vot-
ing Rights Act has been quite successful in combating overt discrimi-
nation on the basis of race and in dramatically increasing minority
participation at the polls. 20 4
Although the Voting Rights Act applies to discrimination anywhere
in the electoral process, certain parts of the statute focus on the redis-
tricting process. For example, section 2 of the Act requires all state
districting plans to provide an equal-opportunity for minority voters to
elect the candidates of their choice.20 5 Section 5 of the Act,20 6 which
only applies to those jurisdictions found to have had a history of sys-
tematic racial discrimination, establishes a particular review process
11 (1967) (stating that Virginia's prohibition of only those interracial marriages involving White
persons was a racial classification designed to maintain White supremacy); McLaughlin v. Flor-
ida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964) (stating that the primary objective of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was to "eliminate racial discrimination emanating from official sources in the states");
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (holding that segregating children in public
schools solely on the basis of race deprives the minority of equal opportunities even if the segre-
gated facilities are equal).
201. See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2824 (1993) (holding that a valid Equal Protection
Clause claim was stated by alleging that district reapportionment was so irrational on its face
that it could only be an effort to segregate voters into districts based on race).
202. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994)).
203. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(1)(1994)).
204. The Act's effectiveness in increasing minority participation has been demonstrated by an
increase of more than one million Black and other minority voters in the electoral process.
Laughlin McDonald, Racial Fairness-Why Shouldn't It Apply to Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act?, 21 STErSON L. REV. 847, 847 (1992); see also Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2823 (noting that while the
registration of Black voters was 50% behind that of Whites before the Act, by the early 1970s
the difference between Black and White registration in several southern states had fallen below
10%); Ripley E. Rand, The Fancied Line: Shaw v. Reno and the Chimerical Racial Gerryman-
der, 72 N.C. L. REV. 725, 732, 735 (1994) (reviewing the background involved in Shaw, scrutiniz-
ing the practical effects of the Court's decision, and suggesting alternative approaches to solving
problems of reapportionment).
205. Section 2 of the Act was amended in 1982 to prohibit all forms of racial discrimination in
the electoral process, regardless of whether there was any proof of discriminatory purpose or
intent. Congress apparently deemed the amendment necessary in the wake of City of Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980), in which the Supreme Court held that in order to establish a
constitutional violation, proof of discriminatory intent was required.
If Congress had been more patient, the amendment may not have been necessary. In Rogers
v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 618-21 (1982), the Court allowed discriminatory intent to be inferred
from a preponderance of plaintiffs' evidence.
206. The express purpose of section 5 is to identify and eliminate new state voting require-
ments or procedures that have the purpose or effect of "denying or abridging the right to vote on
account of race or color." 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994).
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by which the Department of Justice (DOJ) examines proposed
changes to voting laws.20 7 Section 5 is often referred to as the
"preclearance section, '20 8 and it requires subject jurisdictions to ob-
tain approval for any changes in congressional districts from the
United States Attorney General or the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia.20 9 The burden of proof lies with the pro-
ponent of any change, who must establish the absence of discrimina-
tory intent or effect before a proposed change is enacted.210
The constitutionality of this provision was challenged in 1966 in
South Carolina v. Katzenbach.211 The United States Supreme Court
upheld section 5, noting that it represented "an uncommon exercise of
congressional power. '212 The majority in Katzenbach reasoned that,
as a practical matter, courts lacked the ability to remedy systematic
discrimination on a case-by-case basis, and therefore the unusual
preclearance procedures of section 5 were necessary.213
The importance of section 5 has varied over the years. While the
original focus of activities pursuant to the Voting Rights Act was not
section 5, the provision's significance was greatly enhanced as a result
of the Supreme Court's decision in Allen v. State Board of Elec-
tions.214 In Allen, the Supreme Court interpreted section 5 broadly,
holding that it applies to even minor changes to state voting
practices. 2 15
However, in Beer v. United States,216 the Court dramatically limited
the reach of section 5, holding that the "effects" language of that pro-
vision would only apply if the proposed change "would lead to a retro-
gression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their
207. At the Act's inception, only seven states were subject to the provision: Alabama, Geor-
gia, South Carolina, Mississippi, Louisiana, Virginia, and parts of North Carolina. 28 C.F.R. pt.
51 app. (1995). Today the provision applies to sixteen states or parts thereof. 28 C.F.R. pt. 51
app.
208. The reason for this reference is the requirement, contained in section 5, that any new
state voting "qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure" must be approved by
the Attorney General before implementation. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994).
209. Only jurisdictions which have been found to have discriminated in the past are subject to
this preclearance requirement. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994). Under the procedures established in
the statute, if the Attorney General rejects a particular change, the jurisdiction retains the right
to seek a declaratory judgment that the proposed change will not violate the Act. § 1973c.
210. § 1973c.
211. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
212. Id. at 334.
213. Id. at 328, 334-35.
214. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
215. Id. at 566-67.
216. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
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effective exercise of the electoral franchise. '217 This meant that, ab-
sent discriminatory intent, a proposed change would violate section 5
only if minority voting strength would actually be diminished under
the new plan.
For the most part, litigation alleging that redistricting has the effect
of discriminating against minorities in violation of section 5 is now
limited to cases involving discriminatory purpose or intent.218 There-
fore, section 5, by itself, is useful only in a limited number of situations
because a discriminatory purpose exists only if there is proof of a "de-
sign or desire to restrict a minority group's voting strength. '219
Because of the narrowed focus of section 5, Congress amended sec-
tion 2 of the Act in 1982 to prohibit racial discrimination in all forms,
regardless of discriminatory intent.220 As a result of this amendment,
whenever a redistricting plan is discriminatory, it will violate section 2.
In addition, Congress specified that section 5 preclearance is not to be
awarded whenever there would be a violation of section 2.221 The ef-
fect of amending section 2 to remove the traditional requirement that
a plaintiff alleging discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause
must establish intent to discriminate 222 was therefore to bring sec-
tion 5 back into the limelight.
The Supreme Court first addressed the amended section 2 in 1986
in Thornburg v. Gingles.223 Thornburg held that a violation would be
established under section 2 whenever "'as a result of the challenged
practice or structure plaintiffs do not have an equal opportunity to
participate in the political processes and to elect candidates of their
choice.', 224
217. Id. at 141.
218. See, e.g., Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494, 516 (D.D.C. 1982) (interpreting the Beer
standard), affd, 459 U.S. 1166 (1983).
219. Busbee, 549 F. Supp. at 516-17.
220. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994)).
221. See McDonald, supra note 204, at 859-60 (citing S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 12
n.31 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 189 n.31).
222. Bernard Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi Have Been Right if He Had Said: "When It
Comes to Redistricting, Race Isn't Everything, It's the Only Thing"?, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1237,
1244-45 (1993). By amending section 2 of the Act in 1982, Congress removed the traditional
intent requirement for Fourteenth Amendment discrimination cases that had previously been
articulated in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
265 (1977), and expressed again in the voting rights context in City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S.
55, 62 (1980).
223. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
224. Id. at 44 (quoting S. REP. No. 97-417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206). The test established in Thornburg requires plaintiffs to make a three-
pronged showing in order to prevail in a redistricting case. The claimant must establish: (1) that
there exists a large and geographically compact minority population that could be grouped in a
single district; (2) that this group is politically cohesive; and (3) that members of the majority
[Vol. 46:1
1996] HOW RACE MATTERS AND WHY IT SHOULDN'T 57
As a result of the inclusion of section 2 standards into the
preclearance criteria, the DOJ was able to breathe new life into sec-
tion 5. In fact, the DOJ has not hesitated to evaluate proposed
changes in congressional districts based on standards which are not
covered by the direct language of section 5.225 John Dunne, then-As-
sistant Attorney General of the United States, outlined practices to
which the DOJ looked in evaluating redistricting proposals under sec-
tion 5 in remarks addressed to the 1991 National Conference of State
Legislators. 226
These practices led some commentators to complain that the only
way to obtain preclearance from the DOJ was to create gerry-
mandered 227 districts designed to maximize minority voting power.228
consistently vote as a bloc and make it virtually impossible for minority candidates to be elected.
Id. at 50-51.
225. McDonald, supra note 204, at 869 ("Indeed, the Attorney General is administering the
statute in such a manner now.").
226. F. Faison Middleton, Comment, Who Drew Congressional District Lines: The Georgia
General Assembly or the United States Department of Justice?, 11 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 381, 389-90
(1995) (citing John R. Dunne, Remarks at National Conference of State Legislators 13-15 (Aug.
13, 1991)) (transcript available in the Georgia State University College of Law Library).
According to Mr. Dunne, the DOJ would look askance at any of the following practices:
1) Concentrating members of minority groups into a single district when they might have been a
majority in multiple districts.
2) Fragmenting a compact minority group into multiple districts in order to insure that they
constitute an electoral minority.
3) Reducing the percent of minorities in a district where minority voters were previously able to
elect candidates by very slim margins.
4) Preserving old district lines at the expense of minority voters.
5) Altering district boundaries to prevent minority voters from constituting a majority.
6) Drawing district boundaries to place minority groups at a disadvantage in electing their
candidates.
7) Deviating from established redistricting criteria without a reasonable explanation.
8) Excluding minority participation in the redistricting process.
9) The unexplained or arbitrary use of multi-member districts.
Id. at 389 n.67.
227. The term "gerrymander" has a fascinating history. In 1812, then Massachusetts Gover-
nor Elbridge Gerry created a district having such a bizarre shape that one commentator appar-
ently suggested it looked like a salamander. Gilbert Stuart, a noted painter, thoughtfully replied
that it was not a salamander, it was a "gerrymander." Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 196,
at 588 n.1 (citing Frank R. Parker, Racial Gerrymandering and Legislative Reapportionment, in
MINORITv VOTE DILUTION 85 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984)). The pejorative term remains in
the modern lexicon.
228. It was precisely this position, taken by the DOJ when it examined the new districts pro-
posed by Georgia following the 1990 decennial census, that led to the recent Supreme Court
decision in Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995). The particular option favored by the DOJ
was the "max-black" plan drafted by the ACLU which would have maximized the number of
minority controlled districts in the state. Id. at 2484.
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Many observers and commentators have objected vehemently to this
practice.229
In 1993, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of racial gerryman-
dering in Shaw v. Reno.230 The redistricting plan in Shaw had re-
ceived preclearance under section 5, but the plaintiffs in that case,
who were White, argued that the plan in question was so irregular that
it could "be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for pur-
poses of voting, without regard for traditional districting principles
and without sufficiently compelling justification."' 231 This, the plain-
tiffs contended, violated their Equal Protection rights. 232 The Court
agreed, holding that the plaintiffs had stated a cognizable claim under
the Equal Protection Clause. 233 Shaw, therefore, makes it clear that
preclearance does not preclude a successful constitutional
challenge. 234
Shaw did not answer the question of whether the redistricting plan
in question was unconstitutional, although Justice O'Connor did warn
that racially motivated legislation, including that which would create
new districts, would be unconstitutional unless supported by a suffi-
ciently compelling justification.235 With regard to the question of
when a redistricting plan would violate the Equal Protection Clause,
the Court provided the example of drawing a district to include minor-
ities "by disregarding traditional districting principles such as com-
pactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions," thereby
creating a district where voters shared no common associations other
than their skin color.236
The Supreme Court made a more recent pronouncement on con-
gressional redistricting on June 29, 1995. In Miller v. Johnson,237 the
Court evaluated Georgia's redistricting plan implemented following
the 1990 Census. As had been the case with the redistricting plan in
229. Such practices formed the basis for the plaintiffs' complaints in Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct.
2816, 2818 (1993), and Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2485 (1995).
230. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993). The Court addressed the issue of whether five White plaintiffs
had standing to challenge North Carolina's redistricting legislation under the Equal Protection
Clause. Id. at 2820, 2824.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 2824.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 2831; see also Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 549-50 (1969) (stating
that private parties may prevent the enforcement of new enactment laws only by using tradi-
tional constitutional attacks).
235. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2832.
236. Id. at 2827.
237. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
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Shaw, 2 38 the Georgia plan had been subject to preclearance under sec-
tion 5 of the Voting Rights Act.239 The history of Georgia's redistrict-
ing plan is rather convoluted.
Between 1980 and 1990, Georgia had ten congressional districts,
only one of which included a majority of Black voters.2 40 The 1990
Census indicated that the state was entitled to an eleventh district, and
Georgia's General Assembly drew up guidelines requiring single-
member districts of equal population, contiguous geography, non-dilu-
tion of minority voting power, and compliance with the Voting Rights
Act.241 In August 1991, the General Assembly, in special session, pro-
posed a plan which would have created a second district in which ra-
cial minorities constituted a majority of eligible voters, and an
additional district where Blacks would have constituted thirty-five
percent of the voting population.242 This proposal was rejected by the
DOJ despite the fact that the proposal would have resulted in an in-
crease in the number of minority-controlled districts and even though
Georgia had no intent to discriminate. 243 The reasons given by the
DOJ were that the proposed plan created only two districts in which
minority populations were a majority of the voters and that certain
minority populations had been left in White-controlled districts.2 "
Georgia tried another proposal that also would have created only
two districts in which Blacks were a numerical majority, and the plan
was denied again by the DOJ.245 In denying the second redistricting
proposal, the DOJ relied on a so-called "max-black" plan, drafted by
the American Civil Liberties Union, which would have allowed for the
creation of three minority-controlled districts, albeit of unusual
configuration. 246
Following the second rejection, the Georgia General Assembly gave
in and devoted its efforts to creating three districts in which Black
238. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2831.
239. Id. at 2483-85. Georgia was designated as a covered jurisdiction in 1965 by the Attorney
General. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1994); see 28 C.F.R. pt. 51, app. (listing states subject to the
provisions of § 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act and the year in which the state became subject to
the provisions); see also City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 161 (1980) (stating that
Georgia became a covered jurisdiction in 1965 and, thus, its municipalities must comply with the
preclearance procedure).
240. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2483.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. See Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1363 & n.7 (S.D. Ga. 1994).
244. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2483-84.
245. Id. at 2484 (citing lower court opinion, Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp 1354, 1365-66
(1994)).
246. Id.
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populations would constitute a numerical majority.247 The DOJ
precleared this proposal. 248
After elections in which three Black candidates were elected from
the three Black-majority districts, a challenge to the new Eleventh
District, one of the new minority districts, was filed by a group of
White plaintiffs who alleged that the new district violated their Equal
Protection rights.249 The district court agreed that the plan which had
created the new Eleventh District was invalid under Shaw.
250
The district court first determined that the plan had to be evaluated
under strict scrutiny because race had been the predominant force in
the redistricting plan.251 The court then found that, although comply-
ing with the Voting Rights Act could be a compelling state interest,252
the Act did not require three Black districts, and thus the plan was not
narrowly tailored to comply with the Act.253
Before the United States Supreme Court, the appellants first ar-
gued that the district court's finding that race was the predominant
factor in drawing the Eleventh District was not supported by the evi-
dence.254 The appellants contended that the General Assembly's de-
liberate classification of voters along racial lines was insufficient to
support the lower court's finding that the district should be subject to
strict scrutiny, and that only proof that the district's shape was so bi-
zarre that it could not be explainable on any grounds other than race
would suffice.255 The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding
that the district court's determination that race was the predominant
factor in drawing the Eleventh District was adequately supported by
"the shape of the Eleventh District, together with the relevant racial
demographics, '256 as well as direct evidence presented by the state
itself about its redistricting process. 257
The Court then applied strict scrutiny to Georgia's redistricting
plan.258 In doing so, it found that the state's interest in complying
with the Voting Rights Act could not be used to justify the challenged
state action since the Act, if constitutionally applied, could not be read
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 2485.
250. See Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1393 (S.D. Ga. 1994).
251. Id. at 1378.
252. Id. at 1381-82.
253. Id. at 1392-93.
254. Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2485 (1995).
255. Id.
256. Id. at 2488-89 (citing Johnson, 864 F. Supp. at 1375).
257. Id. at 2489.
258. Id. at 2490.
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to require the creation of three minority-controlled districts.259 As the
Court explained, "Georgia's drawing of the Eleventh District was not
required under the [Voting Rights] Act because there was no reason-
able basis to believe that Georgia's earlier enacted plans violated
§ 5. '' 260 The Supreme Court concluded that no plan which served to
ameliorate past discrimination could possibly be violative of
section 5.261
To summarize the law as it currently exists, any redistricting plan
which is primarily motivated by racial considerations must be judged
under strict scrutiny.262 Plaintiffs may prove the racial motives of the
state by establishing that the district in question is so bizarre that it
cannot be reasonably explained by anything other than race, or by any
other evidence which supports the inference that the plan was primar-
ily racially motivated.263 Preclearance from the DOJ is no guarantee
of judicial approval.264 Rather, a racially motivated redistricting plan
can be justified only if it is narrowly tailored to satisfy a compelling
governmental objective. 265 The need to remedy past discrimination
would be such a purpose.266 It is unclear whether a state will be able
to justify a racially motivated plan by proving that the plan was neces-
sary to comply with section 5 of the Voting Rights Act,2 67 but it is
clear that section 5 cannot be read as requiring the maximization of
minority power in the electoral process unless the previous plan actu-
ally discriminated on the basis of race and the new proposal is
designed to remedy that discrimination.26 If a plan improves the vot-
ing power of racial minorities, however marginally, it is deemed to be
259. Id. at 2491-92.
260. Id. at 2492.
261. Id. Obviously, this analysis would have applied to either of the first two proposals made
by Georgia's General Assembly, since both of those proposals would have increased the number
of minority-controlled districts and since neither of those plans was in any way motivated by
discrimination. See Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1363-64 & n.7 (1994).
262. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2485-86.
263. Id. at 2487.
264. Id. at 2491-92.
265. Id. at 2490-91.
266. This was not the holding of Miller, in that Georgia did not, and could not, argue that the
purpose of the Eleventh District was anything other than compliance with the Justice Depart-
ment's orders. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2490-91. However, Shaw v. Reno is cited in Miller as standing
for the proposition that "[t]here is a 'significant state interest in eradicating the effects of past
racial discrimination."' Id. at 2490 (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2831 (1993)).
267. The viability of this justification is still an open question. See Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2490-91
(stating that compliance with section 5 did not suffice in the case at bar, "[w]hether or not in
some cases compliance with the Voting Rights Act, standing alone, can provide a compelling
interest").
268. Id. at 2490-91; see also Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 75-76 (1980) (plurality opinion)
(stating that "the Fourteenth Amendment does not require proportional representation as an
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ameliorative and can never be found to violate the Voting Rights Act
absent proof of actual discrimination. 269
Therefore, states can and sometimes must use race as a basis for
fashioning congressional districts, although the precise limits of their
power to do so is uncertain.
B. Problems Inherent in the Current Approach
One problem with using the current rules which allow the race of
residents to be considered in determining appropriate boundaries for
congressional districts is that this reinforces the notion that race is an
inherently significant human characteristic. If, as the first section of
this Article contends, race is a social and political construct which is
not based on intrinsic differences between individuals,270 the only jus-
tification for adopting rules based on race must be either that it is
beneficial to society to use race as a legal construct or that the only
solutions to a particular problem require reliance on racial classifica-
tions as a proxy for making distinctions on the basis of "real" differ-
ences. Neither of these positions seems supportable in the context of
congressional redistricting.
First, it does not seem to be a very a good idea to encourage the
notion that racial identity is so important that it says more about a
person than political ideology, religious affiliation, socio-economic
status, or anything else. Ideally, everyone should be judged as an indi-
vidual, not as a member of a group, and each member of any racial
group should be free to adopt his or her own political agenda. When
the law acts as if members of a given race share certain attitudes,
which is an implicit assumption when race is used as a basis for draw-
ing congressional boundaries, this encourages the belief that broad
generalizations about members of the group are appropriate. This in
turn creates a mindset which allows stereotypes to persist. Such a
mindset also tends to undermine our efforts to create an integrated,
color-blind society by making efforts to end race-based discrimination
look half hearted. In addition, such generalizations also place pres-
sures on members of that group to conform to a certain set of beliefs.
This creates an artificial pressure for the races to remain separate.
These problems will be addressed in turn.
The first problem is created when the law legitimizes the use of race
as a basis for making broad generalizations about individuals. Once
imperative of political organization"); Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976) (discussing
ways in which states had circumvented court decisions striking down their discriminatory laws).
269. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2492.
270. See supra part I.
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people are acclimated to thinking about members of a given race as if
every person of that race shares certain characteristics, it is all too
easy to perpetuate negative stereotypes about people who are identi-
fied as belonging to that race.271 Once we accept the false premise
that all members of a racial group share similar outlooks, attitudes
and behaviors, a premise which our current method of congressional
districting encourages, it is hard to avoid falling into the trap of over-
generalizing about members of that racial group in contexts other
than political cohesiveness. When the news programs on television
show clips of Blacks being arrested, it is too easy to think of Blacks as
criminals. When the press reports high incidents of drug use among
young Blacks, it is too easy to make the mistake of assuming that
Blacks in general fit that pattern. Stories about the Black drop-out
rate, Black unemployment, teen pregnancies among young Black
women, and the like also support negative stereotypes about Blacks in
general. 272 Unfortunately, such beliefs are only reinforced when the
law also assumes and acts as if broad generalizations based on race are
legitimate and appropriate.
In addition to making it easier for Whites to perpetuate negative
stereotypes about Blacks, the adoption of laws and rules which rely on
race as a basis for differentiating between individuals also undermines
the goal of a color-blind society. After all, how color blind can society
271. For a discussion of the prevailing stereotypes which are applied to Blacks, see supra
notes 52, 65-66.
272. The problem is that when we are bombarded by negative information about some Blacks,
it no longer seems irrational to make assumptions about Blacks in general, if we are accustomed
to thinking about Blacks as a cohesive group whose members generally share common ideas,
attitudes and beliefs. One scholar of color, Dinesh D'Souza, has carefully documented the basis
for many of the negative stereotypes which appear to confront Blacks.
Take, for example, the problems that young Black men face in trying to find a cab in New
York City. D'Souza found that cabdrivers who admitted a reluctance to pick up young Black
males had previous experiences with threats, robberies and assaults by other Blacks, or had
perceived a pattern of Blacks refusing to pay a tip or "beating the fare." D'SouzA, supra note
65, at 250-53. Similarly, the perception of Blacks as criminals can be traced to a general aware-
ness of the fact that young Blacks are convicted of a high percentage of violent crimes. Id. at
261-62. The fact that Americans are risk averse can therefore explain the phenomenon of
Whites crossing the street to avoid passing closely by a group of Black youths. Id. at 264-66.
If, however, we were not accustomed to thinking of race as an intrinsically important charac-
teristic, such generalizations would be less likely to occur. We would not, for example, tend to
generalize that all people who have red hair are criminals just because we have witnessed crimes
being committed by other redheads. Nor do we make generalizations about people on the basis
that they are right or left handed, have blue or green eyes, are bald, etc. Because we do not
generally regard such superficial physical characteristics as defining, in any important measure,
the individuals who possess those biological traits, we do not feel comfortable making general-
izations on that basis. Race, however, is a very different matter, precisely because we have
become so used to making judgments based on race.
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be if the law persists in classifying individuals by race and by making
decisions based on those classifications?
On one hand, we say that race should not matter; but, on the other
hand, we act as if it does by adopting rules and laws which treat Blacks
as a group apart. Race relations in America have been an enduring
problem and there have been any number of efforts directed at eradi-
cating unfair and discriminatory treatment of individuals based on
their race. It is likely that part of the reason that racial tensions con-
tinue to be so high is that, while we pay at least lip service to the
notion that we want to end disparate treatment based on race, we also
retain a wide variety of official policies which institutionalize such dif-
ferential treatment.
Ideally, to move toward a color-blind society, the law ought to en-
courage the notions that race does not matter, and that race is not an
appropriate basis for making broad generalizations about individuals.
Using race as a basis for drawing congressional boundaries therefore
seems a step in precisely the wrong direction.
Finally, it seems obvious that members of any racial group ought to
be permitted to adopt beliefs and attitudes with which they are com-
fortable. When the law says that Blacks should be concentrated in a
single voting district, the pressure on Blacks to conform to the polit-
ical views held by other Blacks is increased. There is a political moti-
vation to denigrate those Blacks who adopt mainstream or White
values. 273 To make race relations even less friendly, such division be-
tween the races also acts to reinforce the idea that Whites cannot
share concerns and beliefs with Blacks, and therefore must not be al-
lowed to have voting control in any district where Black political ide-
als are supposed to prevail. Again, a system which encourages such
divisions between the races does not seem to be designed or likely to
ease racial tensions.
These problems with broad racial classifications illustrate why es-
tablishing congressional district boundaries based on the race of resi-
dents can be harmful to society. Official policies which require that
individuals be classified by race and then treated differently according
to that classification make it harder for us to make progress towards a
point where race will no longer be a dividing line between individuals.
273. Others have documented and discussed the tendency of some Blacks to reject other
Blacks who espouse traditionally White values. Certainly Justice Clarence Thomas has been
criticized for failing to adhere to "Black" values. See infra note 439. For a further discussion of
the problem of Blacks denigrating other Blacks who adopt mainstream or "White" values, see
supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
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Even acknowledging that the official use of race as a basis for distin-
guishing between individuals can be detrimental to society, it might be
possible to justify the use of racial classifications if the only way to
assure fair representation in our political process is to draw congres-
sional districts so as to concentrate minority populations in separate
districts. There are a number of responses to this claim.
First, current rules governing the redistricting process make it clear
that racially-motivated districts are unlikely to address discrimination
against or underrepresentation of Blacks or other minority groups. To
the extent that states wish to continue to draw districts in an attempt
to minimize minority voting power, the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the Voting Rights Act is one which will probably allow such
behavior to continue.274 So long as the jurisdiction camouflages the
state's motives,275 it ought to possess enough flexibility to hold minor-
ity gains to a bare minimum, even in the face of increasing minority
populations. Since the Miller Court rejected the approach taken by
the DOJ which would have required Georgia to maximize the number
of minority-controlled districts, such a failure to maximize minority
voting power cannot be used as a basis for challenging residual ine-
quality in the electoral process. Moreover, under Miller a state cannot
deliberately seek to maximize minority voting power under the Voting
Rights Act absent proof of a compelling state interest, which is likely
to be hard to prove.2 76
Finally, even if one assumes the very best of motives for state offi-
cials charged with redistricting, the decision of where to place bound-
ary lines is one which would test the powers of Solomon. Deciding
where to draw district lines in an attempt to allocate fairly voting
power to discrete and cohesive minority groups is virtually impossible
given our fragmented society. Even assuming that all members of a
racial minority share cohesive political views, those persons are not
likely to be living in one geographically contiguous, segregated area.
Rather, they are likely to be geographically dispersed, and drawing a
gerrymandered district, which, of necessity, will also include individu-
als not of that minority group, is basically as unfair to those individu-
274. This attempt to minimize minority voting power is certainly plausible given the political
nature of the redistricting process. Wherever those in control of the districting process are un-
likely to be supported by a minority-controlled district, there is a built-in incentive to create
districts which will sufficiently fragment the voting power of minority groups who would other-
wise be likely to elect political opponents of those charged with establishing district lines.
275. Again, given the fact that motives and intent are always so hard to establish, it is quite
likely that a state could easily hide a real objective to minimize minority voting power.
276. Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2490-91 (1995).
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als who are not in the favored minority as placing the members of the
racial minority in a predominantly majority-controlled district.
If race-based congressional districts are unlikely to remedy the
problems of discrimination against, and underrepresentation of,
Blacks, it is hard to see how these problems can be used as a justifica-
tion for using race in the drawing of such districts. Given the signifi-
cant drawbacks to using race as an official basis for differentiating
between individuals, one would think that race-based decisions would
only be made if they were a powerful and effective tool against op-
pression. Moreover, one would expect the use of race to be necessary,
and this is perhaps the most important objection to using race as a
basis for determining congressional districts.
Even if one assumes that race-based congressional districts would
be an effective way in which to combat discrimination against minori-
ties, given the problems created by the official use of race as a basis
for differentiating between individuals, it would seem logical to avoid
this alternative except as a last resort. The reality is that there are
other options which should at least be explored before one concludes
blindly that society must continue to differentiate between individuals
on the basis of their race.
Professor Lani Guinier, for example, has offered a number of sug-
gestions for remedying the persistent problem of underrepresentation
of minorities in the political process which do not require that the
government classify persons by race or use those classifications to
make official policies. 277 In 1991, Professor Guinier suggested that we
move to a system of proportionate interest representation to remedy
the problems of minority participation in the political process.278 Her
concept of proportionate interest representation would require at-
large elections, without any requirement of majority approval for
candidates.279
277. Professor Guinier achieved a degree of notoriety when President Clinton nominated her,
on April 29, 1993, to be Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights. The barrage of strident
criticism that followed the President's announcement resulted in a decision to withdraw the
Guinier nomination on June 3, 1993. See Jeffrey H. Birnbaum & Joe Davidson, Clinton Pulls
Plug on Choice for Rights Post, WALL ST. J., June 4, 1993, at A16; Bob Cohn, So Long, Lani,
NEWSWEEK, June 14, 1993, at 26, 27. The bulk of the criticism, and the precise views which the
President cited in explaining why he had changed his mind about the nomination, were Professor
Guinier's proposals concerning minority participation in the political process. David Van Biema,
One Person, Seven Votes, TIME, Apr. 25, 1994, at 42.
278. Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black
Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1136 (1991).
279. An election where voters elect more than one candidate for the same type of office is
said to be "at-large." See Ronald W. Chapman, Judicial Roulette: Alternatives to Single.Member
Districts and a Legal and Political Solution to Voting-Rights Challenges to At-Large Judicial Elec-
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Under current rules, a political candidate can only be elected if he
or she receives at least fifty percent plus one of all votes cast. This
means that it is possible for a group having as much as forty-nine point
nine percent of the vote to wind up with none of its candidates being
elected.280 Even if the minority group is sufficiently cohesive that its
candidates win a plurality, in a run-off election, the majority can still
elect its candidate of choice.
The problem is illustrated by Professor Guinier in a colorful exam-
ple in which she posits a hypothetical jurisdiction containing two kinds
of people: yellow and blue.281 In this hypothetical society, yellow
people constitute seventy-five percent of the population, and a sub-
stantial percentage of these yellow people would vote only for yellow
candidates.282 However, a small group of yellow people are more tol-
erant, but they constitute only seventeen percent of the jurisdiction's
total population.2 83 Blue people are also politically cohesive, but be-
cause they constitute only twenty-five percent of the voting popula-
tion, they have never succeeded in electing any blue candidates. 284
Under Professor Guinier's proportionate interest representation
proposal, "[i]nstead of requiring the 50% plus one vote for election
jurisdiction-wide, the votes needed for election would be reduced, for
example, to 20% plus one of all votes cast" (assuming that four candi-
dates were to be elected). 285 The voters would also be given four
votes and allowed to "cumulate" those votes, by casting one, two,
three or four for one candidate, until all four votes have been used.286
This proposal would result in a politically cohesive minority having at
least twenty percent plus one of the vote being guaranteed the ability
to elect at least one representative. In her hypothetical jurisdiction,
Professor Guinier concludes that if the blues work with the liberal
tions, 48 S.M.U. L. REV. 457, 458 (1995) (citing Richard Saks, Note, Redemption or Exemption?:
Racial Discrimination in Judicial Elections Under the Voting Rights Act, 66 CHi.-KENT L. REV.
245, 246 (1990)).
280. Guinier, supra note 278, at 1136 n.287.
281. Id. at 1138-40.
282. Id. at 1138.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. Professor Guinier suggests an "across-the-board minimum threshold of exclusion ...
set to meet the concern that the tiniest politically cohesive minority could not be empowered
merely to fragment or destabilize the ability to govern." Id. at 1139 n.297. She suggests a cut-off
of between fifteen to twenty percent on the intuition that groups with such a percentage of
voting power are unlikely to be satisfied with any system in which they are permanent losers. Id.
286. This system of cumulative voting is exceedingly rare in political elections, although it is
very common in corporate America. According to one source, only Chilton County, Alabama
and the cities of Alamagordo, New Mexico and Peoria, Illinois use it in elections for public
office. Van Biema, supra note 277, at 43.
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yellow voters, the eventual outcome of an election could be one blue
candidate, one green candidate, and two yellow candidates.287
It seems obvious that this approach would do far more to guarantee
fair representation of minority interests than our current rules which
focus on creating districts drawn along racial lines. By replacing sin-
gle-member districts with at-large elections with winners elected by a
plurality vote, representation of politically cohesive minorities would
be guaranteed. No one would be effectively disenfranchised by being
placed in a single-member district where they would always be out-
voted. No one would be given the essentially impossible task of draw-
ing fair and appropriate district boundaries. The fairness of the
elections would not depend on the fairness of the boundaries so
drawn. Most importantly, this approach avoids giving the stamp of
official approval to the notion that race matters so much that people
can be classified along broad racial lines and properly treated differ-
ently based on that classification.
It is far beyond the scope of this Article to delve into the precise
nature of alternatives to single member districts drawn along racial
lines; instead, it should be enough to show that there is an alternative
to using race as a basis for the official function of drawing congres-
sional districts. If there is no need to use race as a proxy for determin-
ing the existence of meaningful differences among members of the
electorate and there are significant disadvantages to continuing to do
so, it seems obvious that the best approach would be to prohibit the
consideration of race in the drawing of congressional districts.
It is not the thesis of this Article that different voices should not be
included in the political process. The problem is that using race as a
basis for deciding to whose voices to listen undermines the goal of a
color-blind society where race is generally regarded as irrelevant in
the eyes of the law and, eventually, in the eyes of society's members.
Ideally, once race is excluded from consideration as a basis for draw-
ing boundaries, other avenues would be explored to guarantee repre-
sentation of the diverse interests and points of view which exist in this
country. Professor Guinier offers one possibility, and surely there are
others.
287. Guinier, supra note 278, at 1140.
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IV. RACE AS A BASIS FOR DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT IN
EMPLOYMENT AND EDUCATION: THE CASE OF
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
The final section of this Article examines how differential treatment
based upon racial classifications fares within the context of affirmative
action in education and employment. Both education and employ-
ment opportunities are discussed in this section because they repre-
sent two distinct stages of professional development. Denial of
educational opportunities early in life often translates into a denial of
career and employment opportunities later in life. The affirmative ac-
tion debate thus impinges on professional development at every stage
of life-preparation for a career in early adulthood, and the rate and
extent of professional progress once a career has been established. To
the extent that affirmative action programs allow or require race to be
used as a basis for determining to whom opportunities (either in edu-
cation or employment) should be made available, racial classifications
become intertwined with professional development as well as with the
personal and political aspects of our lives.
It is the central thesis of this Article that differential treatment of
individuals based on their race should not be permitted where it re-
sults in denial of opportunity to others who are not members of the
favored group. Obviously, because of the breadth of this topic, and
because it is only one of three separate examples of how race has been
incorporated into law as a basis for determining how to treat individu-
als in our society, there is no way to address all of the issues related to
affirmative action in this forum. This Article focuses solely on affirm-
ative action as it applies to race, and it uses the illustration of affirma-
tive action for Blacks rather than entering the debate over the
propriety of extending affirmative action to certain other racial groups
who may have differing interests or claims. 288
The following materials discuss the general arguments which have
been made in favor of, and in opposition to, affirmative action. In
addition, the final section of this Article also introduces the notion
that alternate methods of achieving a fairer allocation of resources
needs to be explored if affirmative action, as it is currently constituted,
288. For a discussion of the debate over extending affirmative action to other racial groups,
see Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47 STAN. L. REv. 855 (1995)
(analyzing law school affirmative action programs considering the inclusion of African-Ameri-
cans, Native-Americans, Latinos, Asian-Americans and people of low socioeconomic status) and
Frank H. Wu, Neither Black nor White: Asian Americans and Affirmative Action, 15 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 225 (1995) (discussing affirmative action as it applies to Asian-Americans).
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is abandoned, although such alternative approaches will not be ex-
plored in depth.289
A. The Meaning of "Affirmative Action"
At the outset, it is important to make sure that there is a common
understanding of what is meant by "affirmative action." These two
words call up all sorts of images and trigger numerous associations,
and for many people, many of these are negative.290 Clearly, the pop-
ular press assumes that many people strongly associate racial quotas,
set-asides, or other programs guaranteeing preferential treatment at
the expense of "majority" applicants with the notion of affirmative
action.291 This interpretation of affirmative action is actually a signifi-
cant distortion of what the phrase originally meant.
"Affirmative action" first appeared in federal legislation in 1935,
albeit in a context other than civil rights.292 The National Labor Rela-
289. For example, one alternative to using race as a basis for allocating scarce resources would
be to provide special opportunities for those most handicapped by socioeconomic status. Alter-
natively, one might change the criteria used in the admissions or hiring process to make sure that
minority applicants are not indirectly disfavored because of their race. In addition, this discus-
sion of alternatives to conventional affirmative action programs assumes that direct barriers to
minority representation and participation have been removed. In any case where such barriers
still exist, I would, of course, favor taking immediate steps to see that such obstacles are elimi-
nated. For a further discussion of alternatives to criteria which may act as indirect barriers to
minority representation and participation, see infra part IV.D.
290. Among the negative associations which one might have to affirmative action are reverse
discrimination (which has caused a growing resentment and backlash against the very groups
once though to be benefitted by affirmative action), tokenism (the phenomenon or perception of
hiring, promoting, or admitting a minimal number of women or minorities and no more), the
assumption that members of "favored" groups cannot compete on the real merits (which ignores
the reality that preferential treatment is not the only reason to hire, admit or promote women
and minorities), and the legitimization of "race" as a meaningful classification upon which im-
portant decisions can properly be based.
It is not, however, only Whites who have negative reactions to affirmative action. A recent
article addressing affirmative action starts with an impressive list of quotes from individuals pos-
sessing a variety of perspectives, all of whom are critical of affirmative action. See Harris &
Narayan, supra note 109, at 1-3 (quoting ELLIS COSE, THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS 1, 130-
31 (1993); AMY HILL HEARTH, HAVING OUR SAY: THE DELANY SISTERS' FIRST 100 YEARS 110
(1993); CORNEL WEST, RACE MATrERS 52, 64 (1993)). As Professors Harris and Narayan note,
these comments come from a Black conservative, a Black liberal, a Black on the radical left, a
White conservative and a Black woman over one-hundred-years old.
What their views have in common is this: they all begin with a recognition that being a
Black American has historically meant and continues to mean being the target of
profound exclusions and unequal treatment; and they all end with either a rejection of,
or a lack of enthusiasm for, race-based affirmative action policies that are meant to
mitigate this exclusion and unequal treatment.
Harris & Narayan, supra note 109, at 3.
291. See infra note 425 (discussing popular attitudes toward affirmative action).
292. See Frank W. Andritzky & Joseph G. Andritzky, Affirmative Action: The Original Mean-
ing, 17 LINCOLN L. REV. 249, 252 (1987).
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tions Act, which was intended primarily to prohibit employers from
harassing unions, required individual employers who had committed
certain unfair labor practices "to take such affirmative action" as will
be necessary to remedy the unlawful labor practice.2 93 The history of
the phrase "affirmative action," as used in this legislation, indicates
that it was intended to require employers who had been found to have
violated specific statutory prohibitions to take "affirmative action" to
neutralize their illegal conduct. 294
When Congress finally enacted significant legislation addressing
civil rights, it also included the phrase "affirmative action." The Civil
Rights Act of 1964 outlawed discrimination in employment, voting,
public schools, and federally funded programs.2 95 The legislation spe-
cifically contemplated affirmative action to remedy past discrimina-
tion. Title VII, the most far-reaching part of the statute, prohibited
discrimination in employment and authorized the federal courts to or-
der appropriate "affirmative action" on any employer who "has inten-
tionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful
employment practice. 2 96 This language appears to track the focus of
the National Labor Relations Act, in that affirmative action was re-
quired to remedy specific prior instances of discrimination.
The term "affirmative action" also appears in Executive Order
11246, issued by President Lyndon Johnson in 1965, which directed
that "all Government contracting agencies ... [must] take affirmative
action to ensure that applicants are employed ... without regard to
their race, creed, color, or national origin. '2 97 Two years later, this
order was amended by the addition of a prohibition against discrimi-
nation on the basis of gender.298 Substantial evidence exists to suggest
293. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1994).
294. Andritzky & Andritzky, supra note 292, at 254.
295. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h (1994) (prohibiting racial discrimina-
tion in voting (Title I), public accommodations (Title II), public facilities (Title III), public
schools (Title IV), programs receiving federal funds (Title VI), and employment by firms affect-
ing interstate commerce (Title VII)).
296. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1994). The Act did, however, provide that nothing in Title VII
shall be interpreted to require:
preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the race, color,
religion, sex or national origin of such individual or group on account of an imbalance
which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by any employer.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1994).
297. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-65), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
298. Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. 684 (1966-70).
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that President Johnson also intended that the phrase have a limited
meaning.2 99
The first case which appeared to accept that "affirmative action"
authorized more than limited remedial measures was Contractors
Ass'n of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary of Labor.300 This case up-
held the use of racial quotas in hiring as a method of ensuring future
equal opportunity. 3 1 The Supreme Court also came to adopt an ex-
pansive approach to Title VII and affirmative action, eventually hold-
ing that Title VII did indeed authorize preferential treatment based
on race to remedy past discrimination,30 2 that Title VII did not require
that a court have proof of conscious intent to discriminate prior to
ordering remedies, 30 3 and that it was not necessary to specifically
identify victims of discrimination in order to impose remedial
programs.30 4
299. See Andritzky & Andritzky, supra note 292, at 257-72. The real question is why the term
"affirmative action," as used in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Executive Order 11,246, has
come to be understood to mean so much more than a reference to neutralizing specific instances
of past discrimination. Perhaps one explanation lies in the historical context in which the Civil
Rights Act was enacted and the Executive Order was issued and, more importantly, the context
in which those provisions came to be interpreted.
The Supreme Court's landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
provided a substantial basis for the notion that officially sanctioned race-conscious measures
might be required in order to remedy past discrimination. The direct result of Brown was mas-
sive involuntary desegregation of the nation's public schools; but the indirect results over time
have included a large number of remedial race-conscious measures designed to achieve racial
equality even absent proof of specific discrimination.
300. 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971).
301. Id. at 177; see James E. Jones, Jr., Twenty-One Years of Affirmative Action: The Matura-
tion of the Administrative Enforcement Process Under the Executive Order 11,246 as Amended,
59 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 67, 93 (1982) (stating that "prior to this case [affirmative action] had little
content and no clear definition").
302. In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), a sharply di-
vided Court invalidated a set-aside program for medical students. Four Justices would have
found the set-aside to be permissible under the Constitution. Id. at 325 (Brennan, White, Mar-
shall and Blackmun, JJ.). Four of the Justices, Stevens, Burger, Stewart and Rehnquist, would
have ruled in favor of the White plaintiff on statutory grounds. Id. at 408, 418-19. Justice Powell,
who cast the deciding vote, concluded that a preferential program could be justified if it was
needed to remedy past discrimination or if it was intended to create diversity among the student
body. Id. at 307, 311-13. He concluded that the plan at issue in the case did not satisfy these
standards. Id. at 319-20. However, a majority of Justices in Bakke clearly articulated a position
that would support some preferential programs.
303. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (stating that "good intent or absence
of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that
operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job
capability").
304. In United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979), the Court upheld
a private, voluntary affirmative action plan simply on the basis that Blacks as a group had been
historically excluded from the craft trades which would be affected by the plan at issue in the
case. Similarly, in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 490-92 (1980), the Court upheld a feder-
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Despite the fact that Title VII has been interpreted quite broadly, it
is still not accurate to view affirmative action as being synonymous
with quotas, set-asides or similar preferential programs pursuant to
which members of a preferred group receive special treatment at the
direct expense of persons who are not members of that group. In ac-
tuality, any program designed to avoid or mitigate the effects of dis-
crimination can be classified as affirmative action. For example, in the
arena of employment, actively seeking to increase the pool of minority
applicants by advertising available positions in publications designed
to reach members of such minorities would be an affirmative act to
avoid discrimination. Eliminating barriers to employment which dis-
proportionately impact minorities without being truly related to pro-
spective employees' ability to perform the job is also an affirmative
act designed to remedy discrimination. Of course, creating an addi-
tional job line which is reserved for minority applicants would be af-
firmative action as well, and setting quotas by race would also qualify
as affirmative action, although strict numerical quotas are generally
not permissible under the Constitution as currently interpreted. 30 5
The current debate about affirmative action is primarily a discussion
about the merits of race-conscious preferential programs. No one is
objecting to such actions as wider advertising of available positions,
the removal of discriminatory, but otherwise irrelevant, job criteria, or
the like. Affirmative action on the basis of race becomes debatable
only when it involves racial preferences.
Therefore, because it is the thesis of this Article that race and racial
classifications should not be incorporated into legal doctrine as the
basis for differential treatment of individuals, this Article will talk
about affirmative action only in the context of race-conscious prefer-
ential programs. Although this may be an unfair characterization of
affirmative action programs, it needs to be understood that the objec-
tions raised and discussed herein apply only to programs which class-
ify and treat individuals differently based on their race. A program
such as wider advertising directed to particular segments of society is
not objectionable because it is not exclusionary. Elimination of dis-
criminatory criteria for admissions or hiring is not exclusionary. In
fact, failing to direct advertising which seeks to notify potential candi-
dates or applicants of available opportunities equally to all races or
ally imposed affirmative action program designed to provide relief to specifically identified mi-
norities even absent any identifiable victims of past discrimination.
305. This is the legacy of Bakke. That case declared numerical set-asides to be impermissible,
while clearly stating that other types of preferential programs could pass constitutional muster.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307-15 (1978).
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retention of discriminatory criteria for admissions or hiring is itself a
discriminatory practice which should be eradicated. It is the practice
of using race to allocate opportunities which is objectionable, not the
fact that one might choose to characterize a particular response to
discrimination as "affirmative action."
In other words, problems begin to arise when one looks at programs
which utilize race as a basis for allocating training or educational op-
portunities, or for deciding whom to hire for a limited number of posi-
tions or whom to fire when layoffs are required. In such cases, the
ultimate decision about whom to train, educate, employ, promote, or
fire is based on a characteristic which has no intrinsic relevance and is
made significant only because of erroneous and societally harmful be-
liefs about what race means. When the law itself utilizes such factors
in making these types of decisions, the law reinforces the underlying
assumption that race, in and of itself, is important. This Article argues
that because this assumption is flawed, and because the official sanc-
tion of race as an important human characteristic makes it harder to
move toward a color-blind society where race does not matter, affirm-
ative action becomes unsupportable even though something must be
done to equalize the treatment and position of Blacks in our society.
In order to understand the arguments supporting and criticizing af-
firmative action and how the concerns raised in this Article relate to
those arguments, a general understanding of the history of the law
relating to affirmative action programs is necessary. There are many
other sources which have documented this history in great depth and
detail, and no attempt is made to include a comprehensive history or
analysis here. However, in order to provide a framework in which to
analyze the necessity or desirability of continuing affirmative action
programs designed to achieve racial equality by granting preferential
treatment based on race, a brief synopsis of the law in this area
follows.
B. The State of the Law Regarding Affirmative Action
Until quite recently, federal efforts to promote affirmative action
generally received substantial deference from the courts. For exam-
ple, the Supreme Court interpreted Title V130 6 and Title VI130 7 to pro-
hibit not only deliberate racial discrimination but also unintentional
discrimination caused by the disparate impact of facially neutral prac-
306. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 612-15 (1983) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
307. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
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tices.308 Because the applicable statutes "standing alone" did not spe-
cifically prohibit practices which would have a disparate impact on
minorities, the Court authorized enforcement agencies and depart-
ments to issue regulations making them illegal or requiring remedial
affirmative action. 30 9 The Supreme Court took this step even though
Congress had specifically barred "preferential treatment to any indi-
vidual or to any group because of [race]. '310
At various times, affirmative action has been extended to benefit a
variety of different groups,311 leaving White males, many of whom are
innocent of any overt discrimination, "to bear the burdens of re-
dressing grievances not of their making. '312 This phenomenon,
quickly dubbed "reverse discrimination," involves the perception that
White males have been denied equal opportunities as a result of race-
or gender-based preferences. It has become a cause celebre for con-
servative legal commentators and politicians.
In order to understand how various race-based classification
schemes designed to satisfy the goal of "affirmative action" have been
evaluated by the courts, it is important to understand the constitu-
tional basis for challenges to such schemes. For the state govern-
ments, the prohibition against unequal treatment is found in the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which provides that
"[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws. '313 The limit on federal action is found
in the Fifth Amendment, which does not expressly impose the obliga-
tion of equal protection. Rather, the Fifth Amendment requires that
"[n]o person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law. ' 314 Over time, however, the Fifth Amendment
has come to be understood as incorporating a guarantee of equal pro-
tection. This conclusion was not, however, automatic.
308. Id. at 432.
309. See Guardians Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 592; Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1974) (Stew-
art, J., concurring).
310. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1994). The Supreme Court has suggested that the hiring of quali-
fied minorities should be in proportion to the proportion of qualified minorities in the work-
force. See Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 448-49
(1986) (plurality opinion). One conservative Justice, however, denounced such a rigid numerical
requirement as an "impermissible quota." Id. at 495 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). Similar views were expressed by Justices White and Rehnquist and Chief Justice
Burger. Id. at 499-500.
311. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978) (plurality opinion).
312. Id.
313. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
314. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
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In cases where the issue was not race, the view of the Court through
the 1940's was that "[u]nlike the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifth
contains no equal protection clause and it provides no guaranty
against discriminatory legislation by Congress. ' 315 The first time the
Court evaluated a Fifth Amendment equal protection challenge to a
racial classification, it reached a similar conclusion with respect to a
wartime curfew imposed only upon Americans of Japanese descent. 316
Some months later, the Court also approved an order that completely
excluded Japanese-Americans from certain areas.317 While the Court
stated that "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a sin-
gle racial group are immediately suspect ... [and] courts must subject
them to the most rigid scrutiny, ' 31 8 the Court appeared to have no
trouble in concluding that the racially discriminatory order then at is-
sue was proper.319
The first time the Court explicitly questioned the notion that the
state and federal governments have different obligations regarding the
avoidance of racial classifications was in 1954, in Boiling v. Sharpe.320
In Bolling, the Court finally concluded that "[i]n view of [the] decision
that the Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially
segregated public schools, it would be unthinkable that the same Con-
stitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government. '32'
This has become a well accepted doctrine. 322
The key question therefore is, under both the Fourteenth and Fifth
Amendments, what standard must be employed by the courts in re-
viewing the constitutionality of race-based classification schemes. The
Supreme Court first examined the constitutionality of racial classifica-
tions against a claim of reverse discrimination in 1978, in Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke.32 3 Bakke involved a White male
who would have been admitted to medical school except that "his"
315. Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 337 (1943).
316. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
317. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223-24 (1944).
318. Id. at 216.
319. Id. at 223-24. There were vigorous dissents filed by three Justices, which basically argued
that the order was racist and therefore improper. Id. at 240. The majority of the Court, how-
ever, cited the "principles... announced in Hirabayashi" as sufficient justification for the order
excluding Japanese-Americans from certain areas. Id. at 217-18.
320. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
321. Id. at 500.
322. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166 n.16 (1987) (plurality opinion) (stating
that "the reach of the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment is coextensive with
that of the Fourteenth"); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) (stating that the "[e]qual protec-
tion analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth
Amendment").
323. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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slot was reserved for, and given to, a "less qualified" minority appli-
cant, pursuant to the University's admission program. 324 A bitterly
divided Supreme Court325 invalidated the admission program in ques-
tion on the ground that it was impermissible to reserve a fixed number
of seats in the entering class for racial and ethnic minorities. 32 6 How-
ever, the Court's position was that it was permissible to use race-con-
scious affirmative action under specified circumstances. 327
The attorneys for the medical school had argued that "strict scru-
tiny" should apply only to "classifications that disadvantage 'discrete
and insular minorities.' ' 328 While there was no single opinion of the
Court in the case, Justice Powell's opinion announcing the Court's
judgment rejected that argument. Justice Powell, joined by Justice
White, wrote that "[t]he guarantee of equal protection cannot mean
one thing when applied to one individual and something else when
applied to a person of another color. ' 329 Justice Powell concluded
that "[r]acial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect
and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination. ' 330 On the
other hand, four Justices in Bakke would have applied a less stringent
standard of review to racial classifications "designed to further reme-
dial purposes."'331
In the post-Bakke era, the Court has sent out mixed signals about
the constitutionality of racial preferences, sometimes approving such
measures 332 and sometimes disapproving them.333 Moreover, the next
324. While one might debate the appropriateness of the Medical School's admission stan-
dards, at the time of Bakke, the determination of which candidates were best qualified depended
almost exclusively on test scores. id. at 273.
325. There were six separate opinions in Bakke. Justice Powell announced the decision of the
Court in a plurality opinion. 438 U.S. at 269. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun
wrote an opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Id. at 324. Justices White, Marshall
and Blackmun also each wrote separately. Id. at 379, 387, 402. Finally, Justice Stevens wrote an
opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, concurring in part
and dissenting in part.
326. Id. at 319-20.
327. Id. at 307. Justice Powell, writing for the Court, required a compelling state interest to
justify race-conscious affirmative action. He suggested that having a diverse student body would
constitute such an interest, but special admission based solely on race was found to be unconsti-
tutional. Id. at 312-20.
328. Id. at 287-88 (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)).
329. Id. at 289-90.
330. Id. at 291.
331. Id. at 359 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
332. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 185-86 (1987) (upholding court-ordered
hiring quota for minorities based upon proof that the Alabama State Police had previously dis-
criminated against Blacks); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 490 (1980) (upholding congres-
sionally mandated set-asides for minority contractors on the grounds that traditional
procurement procedures could perpetuate discrimination); United Steelworkers of Am. v.
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several opinions were marked by substantial disagreements among
members of the Court, and no clear consensus developed about the
appropriate standard of review for race-based classifications.
A number of affirmative actions programs were upheld by the
Supreme Court in the following years. For example, the Court upheld
a voluntary plan which reserved half of the slots in a training program
for Black employees334 and a program of congressional set-asides re-
serving certain opportunities for minority-owned businesses.335 Court
orders imposing minority membership goals on a union336 and a "one-
black-for-one-white promotion" scheme were also sustained.337 Fi-
nally, the Court also upheld policies which favored minority appli-
cants in the granting of broadcast licenses.338
There were some common themes in these opinions. One of the
most important was the issue of whether the affirmative action pro-
gram had to be remedial in nature, addressing either past or present
discrimination or racial imbalances however caused. Several of the
programs were sustained on the grounds that the affirmative action
programs in question were necessary to remedy either intentional dis-
crimination or existing racial disparities. 339
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209 (1979) (finding that Title VII does not prohibit a private affirmative
action plan pursuant to which employer used a quota system for Blacks in its training program
until the proportion of Black workers equaled proportion of Blacks in the local work force).
333. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 283-84 (1986) (plurality opinion)
(invalidating a school board plan that would have required layoffs of Whites to be in same pro-
portion as Blacks on the ground that the measure discriminated against Whites with seniority
and could not be upheld under strict scrutiny solely on the grounds that the measure was in-
tended to remedy societal discrimination); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S.
561, 578-80 (1984) (holding that Title VII prohibited a layoff scheme that would have replaced a
system of layoffs based on seniority absent proof that the seniority system was intended to dis-
criminate or had to be abandoned in order to provide a remedy to a proven victim of direct
discrimination).
334. Weber, 443 U.S. at 209.
335. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 490.
336. Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 480 (1986).
337. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 153.
338. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 600 (1990), overruled by Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
339. For example, the remedial nature of the program being challenged in Weber, 443 U.S. at
208-09, was sustained because of the existence of a manifest racial imbalance in the workplace.
Similarly, the congressional set-asides which were dealt with in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. at
490-92, were also upheld as being necessary to remedy past discrimination. Noteworthy is the
portion of the opinion in which Justice Marshall (joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun)
concurred in the judgment, on the grounds that any race-based action designed to "remed[y] the
present effects of past racial discrimination" should be upheld if it was "substantially related" to
the achievement of an "important governmental objective." Id. at 518-19. Finally, the promo-
tion policy which was imposed upon the Alabama Department of Public Safety in Paradise, 480
U.S. at 167, 185, was also upheld because of the existence of past and present discrimination by
that department.
1996] HOW RACE MATTERS AND WHY IT SHOULDN'T 79
This was not, however, an entirely consistent pattern. The affirma-
tive action programs in some cases were sustained without any partic-
ular emphasis on prior or existing discrimination. 340 In addition,
mixed in with these opinions sustaining affirmative action programs
were a number of other opinions which struck down other affirmative
action plans.
For example, the Court struck down a plan pursuant to which a
school board would have adopted d system which included race-based
preference in deciding which teachers to layoff. 34 1 Similarly, a pro-
gram which called for a set aside of thirty percent of city contracts to
be awarded to racial and ethnic minorities was also found to be
unconstitutional.342
In fact, the most striking pattern which emerged over the years was
a pattern of intense disagreement among members of the Court about
the proper way in which to evaluate affirmative action programs. This
issue produced a record number of opinions. Not only were there an
amazing number of affirmative action cases, many of the cases re-
sulted in a number of separate opinions on the constitutional issues.
In fact, in many instances the Court was so divided that it could not
produce a majority opinion.343
The issue which most troubled the Court was the appropriate stan-
dard of review for affirmative action programs. The disagreement
started with Bakke,344 in which Powell wrote that "[r]acial and ethnic
distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the
most exacting judicial examination. ' '345 At the same time, four Jus-
tices in that case would have applied a less stringent standard of re-
view to racial classifications "designed to further remedial
purposes. '346
In 1979, the Court, in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,347
specifically upheld a voluntary affirmative action plan adopted by a
private employer. By a 5-2 vote, the Court held that Title VII did not
340. See Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 547; Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l, 478 U.S. at 421.
341. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
342. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 511. (1989).
343. See, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l, 478 U.S. 421 (plurality opinion with separate opin-
ions by Brennan, Powell, O'Connor and Rehnquist); Wygant, 476 U.S. 267 (plurality opinion
authored by Powell in which Justice White concurred only in the judgment and in which four
Justices dissented, in two separate opinions); Fullilove, 448 U.S. 448 (separate opinions by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Marshall, Stewart and Stevens).
344. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
345. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978).
346. Id. at 359 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
347. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
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condemn all race-conscious affirmative action plans. 348 Rather, the
Court determined that race-conscious plans are permissible if they are
designed to remedy a "manifest racial imbalance ... in traditionally
segregated job categories. '349 In addition, the plan is not permitted to
"unnecessarily trammel the interests of [other] employees. ' 350 The
test enunciated in this case is clearly different from traditional formu-
lations of strict scrutiny, but is not easily classified as intermediate or
relaxed scrutiny either.
One year later, in Fullilove v. Klutznick,351 the Court again ad-
dressed the appropriate standard of review for affirmative action pro-
grams without specifically adopting any readily accepted standard of
review. Chief Justice Burger, in an opinion joined by Justices White
and Powell, observed that "[a]ny preference based on racial or ethnic
criteria must necessarily receive a most searching examination. ' '352
Chief Justice Burger was careful, however, to specify that the analysis
which had been used by Justice Powell in Bakke was not being
adopted by him. 353 Instead, his opinion employed a two-part test
which required a finding that the objectives were "within the power of
Congress" and that the use of racial or ethnic criteria was "a constitu-
tionally permissible means for achieving the congressional
objectives." 354
Justice Powell wrote separately to express his view that the plurality
opinion had essentially applied "strict scrutiny" as described in his
Bakke opinion.355 Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and
Blackmun, concurred in the judgment, on the grounds that any race-
based action designed to "remed[y] the present effects of past racial
discrimination" should be upheld if it was "substantially related" to
the achievement of an "important governmental objective. '356 Justice
Stewart, joined by then-Justice Rehnquist, dissented, arguing that the
Constitution required the Federal Government to meet the same strict
standard as the States when enacting racial classifications and that the
program before the Court failed that standard.357 Justice Stevens also
dissented, arguing that "[r]acial classifications are simply too perni-
348. Id. at 208.
349. Id. at 208-09.
350. Id. at 208.
351. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
352. Id. at 491.
353. Id. at 492.
354. Id. at 473 (emphasis omitted).
355. Id. at 496.
356. Id. at 518-19 (Marshall, J., concurring). In other words, such classifications should be
subject only to what is now referred to as "intermediate scrutiny."
357. Id. at 523 n.1.
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cious to permit any but the most exact connection between justifica-
tion and classification. ' 358
The proper standard of review was also at issue in Wygant v. Jack-
son Board of Education.359 In Wygant, the plurality opinion appeared
to adopt strict scrutiny, inquiring as to whether the layoff policy was
"supported by a compelling state purpose and whether the means cho-
sen to accomplish that purpose [we]re narrowly tailored. '360 This
view was not, however, espoused by a clear majority of the Court.
Justice White concurred only in the judgment, 361 and four Justices dis-
sented. Three of the dissenting Justices again argued for intermediate
scrutiny of remedial race-based government action. 362
The views of various members of the Court on the proper standard
of review in affirmative action cases were also brought into focus in
United States v. Paradise.363 In that case, Justice Brennan concluded
that the governmental interest in remedying past and present discrimi-
nation was compelling and that the plan under review was "an effec-
tive, temporary, and flexible" method of achieving that objective.364
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia, dissented, insisting that the plan should have been judged
under strict scrutiny, and that if this standard was applied the plan
would fail because it was not "narrowly tailored" to meet the govern-
mental objectives. 365
It was not until 1989 that a clear majority developed with regard to
the appropriate standard of review for racial classification schemes.
In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,3 6 6 a majority of the Court
finally held that race-conscious preferences should be evaluated under
strict scrutiny.367
The apparent certainty offered by Croson was short lived. One year
after Croson was decided, the Court complicated matters by deciding
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC368 in such a way as to again confuse
the issue as to the appropriate standard of review for race-based clas-
358. Id. at 537.
359. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
360. Id. at 274.
361. Id. at 294-95.
362. Id. at 301-02 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
363. 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
364. Id. at 167, 185.
365. Id. at 196-97 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
366. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
367. Id. at 493-94. Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment stating that he agreed "with Jus-
tice O'Connor's conclusion that strict scrutiny must be applied to all governmental classifications
by race." Id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring).
368. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
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sification schemes. In Metro Broadcasting, the Court repudiated the
long-held notion that race-based classifications imposed by the Fed-
eral Government should be judged by the same standards as similar
classifications employed by state governments. Even though Croson
had just determined that race-based classifications imposed by State
governmental units must be evaluated under "strict scrutiny, ' 369 the
Metro Broadcasting opinion stated that "benign" federal racial classi-
fications need only satisfy intermediate scrutiny.370 The broadcast
policies at issue in that case were upheld because they served the "im-
portant governmental objective of broadcast diversity,"' 371 and were
"substantially related" to that objective. 372 This result was reached
despite a finding by the Court that the FCC policies in question were
not intended as a remedy for past discrimination.
This schism between the analysis required when evaluating race-
based classification schemes imposed by state and local governmental
units and the Federal Government existed until June 12, 1995, when
the Court expressly repudiated that part of the Metro Broadcasting
opinion. In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,373 the Court was
faced with a challenge to federal laws offering financial incentives for
general contractors on government contracts to hire subcontractors
controlled by "socially and economically disadvantaged individuals," a
group which presumptively included members of racial minorities. 374
In Adarand, a subcontractor who submitted the low bid on a federal
highway project was rejected in favor of a small business controlled by
"disadvantaged" individuals. 375 The subcontractor's legal challenge to
that determination was that the race-based presumptions included in
the subcontractor clauses of the government contracts violated his
right to equal protection.376 The lower courts, obediently following
Metro Broadcasting, evaluated the race-based classification scheme
under intermediate scrutiny and upheld the challenged policies. 377
369. 488 U.S. at 493-94.
370. Benign federal racial classifications, the Court said, "even if those measures are not 're-
medial' in the sense of being designed to compensate victims of past governmental or societal
discrimination-are constitutionally permissible to the extent that they serve important govern-
mental objectives within the power of Congress and are substantially related to achievement of
those objectives." Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 564-65.
371. Id. at 566-67.
372. Id. at 569.
373. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
374. Id. at 2103.
375. Id. at 2104.
376. Id.
377. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Skinner, 790 F. Supp. 240, 244 (1992), affd sub nom.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 16 F.3d 1537 (10th Cir. 1994).
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The Supreme Court reversed, 378 finding that the appropriate stan-
dard of review had to be strict scrutiny:
Accordingly, we hold today that all racial classifications, imposed by
whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be ana-
lyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. In other words,
such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tai-
lored measures that further compelling governmental interests. To
the extent that Metro Broadcasting is inconsistent with that holding,
it is overruled. 379
Unfortunately, the Court's opinion gives little guidance as to when
race-conscious remedial programs will be deemed to satisfy strict scru-
tiny. Justice O'Connor does suggest that racial classifications will "sel-
dom" be justified. 380 However, the constitutionality of the remedial
program at issue in Adarand was not addressed by the Court, which
remanded the matter for a determination by the lower court under the
new standard announced in Justice O'Connor's opinion.381
Justice O'Connor's opinion 382 does specifically address the notion,
originated by Justice Marshall in his concurrence in Fullilove,38 3 that
strict scrutiny is "strict in theory, but fatal in fact.''384 Citing United
States v. Paradise,385 Justice O'Connor noted that as recently as 1987,
the Court had upheld a race-conscious program designed to remedy
"pervasive, systematic, and obstinate discriminatory conduct." 386
However, her opinion in Adarand offers no additional guidance on
the subject of how strict scrutiny should be applied to race-conscious
programs in the future.
Justice Scalia, in his pivotal concurring opinion,387 would have given
clear guidance on the issue of how strict scrutiny should be applied.
He would have found that the "government can never have a 'compel-
ling interest' in discriminating on the basis of race in order to 'make
up' for past racial discrimination in the opposite direction. '388
378. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2118. The opinion of the Court was written by Justice O'Connor.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Thomas and Scalia joined in most of the opinion.
Id. at 2101.
379. Id. at 2113.
380. Id. at 2113 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 534 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
381. Id. at 2118.
382. Justice Thomas also wrote a separate concurrence. 115 S. Ct. 2119.
383. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519.
384. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117.
385. 480 U.S. 149, 167 (1987) (plurality opinion).
386. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117 (quoting Paradise, 480 U.S. at 190).
387. Id. at 2118-19 (Scalia, J., concurring).
388. Id. at 2118.
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Justice Thomas concurred in the conclusion that "strict scrutiny ap-
plies to all government classifications based on race. ' 389 Like Scalia,
however, Thomas is fundamentally opposed to programs which dis-
tribute benefits on the basis of race, regardless of motivation. "In my
mind," he wrote, "government-sponsored racial discrimination based
on benign prejudice is just as noxious as discrimination inspired by
malicious prejudice. In each instance, it is racial discrimination, plain
and simple. '390
Regardless of the lack of certainty as to the proper application of
the test, it is finally clear that affirmative action programs which give
preferential treatment based on racial classifications are permissible
so long as they are supported by a compelling state interest and are
narrowly tailored to meet those interests. The question remains as to
whether this is a desirable rule, or whether Justices Scalia and Thomas
are right in asserting that "benign" discrimination is not a proper way
of remedying the evils of past discrimination.
C. Justifications for Affirmative Action
Commentators have advanced three principle justifications for af-
firmative action programs: to compensate for past discrimination, to
correct existing discrimination, and to redistribute society's resources
more equitably.391 A closer examination of these arguments reveals
that affirmative action programs which provide for differential treat-
ment based on race have not been particularly successful in remedying
the effects of past discrimination, correcting existing problems, or re-
distributing resources in an equitable fashion. Even worse, too often
such programs have been counterproductive and actively harmful to
society, including those members of society who affirmative action
was designed to assist.
389. Id. at 2119 (Thomas, J., concurring).
390. Id. (footnote omitted).
391. These labels are not original. Other scholars have described the goals of affirmative ac-
tion as fitting into one or more of these three general objectives. See, e.g., Brest & Oshige, supra
note 288, at 856 (suggesting diversity, compensatory and distributive justice as broad rationales
for affirmative action in the law school setting); Harris & Narayan, supra note 109, at 14-17
(discussing the compensatory rationale and the goal of a more equal society); Donald P. Judges,
Light Beams and Particle Dreams: Rethinking the Individual vs. Group Rights Paradigm in
Affirmative Action, 44 U. ARK. L. REV. 1007, 1009-17 (1991) (listing all three justifications for
affirmative action programs); Don Munro, Note, The Continuing Evolution of Affirmative Ac-
tion under Title VII: New Directions After the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 81 VA. L. REV. 565, 580
n.57 (1995) (discussing the compensatory and remedial purposes of affirmative action).
Of course, not all proponents of affirmative action accept each of these justifications. For
example, Professors Harris and Narayan are avid supporters of affirmative action, but they disa-
vow the notion that it is or should be viewed as compensatory in nature. See Harris & Narayan,
supra note 109, at 14-17.
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Admittedly, the goals of affirmative action programs are laudable.
There are plenty of valid reasons for providing victims of discrimina-
tion with adequate compensation, for eradicating existing patterns of
discrimination and the residual disparities in position and power
which it has caused, and for seeking a fairer allocation of our limited
societal resources. Unfortunately, affirmative action is not the way to
achieve these goals, however commendable. In fact, such programs
can act as a barrier to achieving racial equality in this country.392
First, it is troubling that years after affirmative action at its most
intensive, the plight of Black Americans in general has not improved
significantly,393 while the attitude of many Whites seems to be that
affirmative action has virtually replaced merit as a basis for allocating
educational and professional opportunities. 394 The dramatically nega-
tive assumptions which seem so prevalent among some Whites do not
seem to be based on a corresponding dramatic improvement in the
lives of those who would seem to most need the assistance implicit in
392. The objections to affirmative action raised in this Article are not founded on the belief
that no one deserving of special consideration has ever benefited from such programs. Undoubt-
edly, there are a number of such individuals who have achieved their successes directly or indi-
rectly because of affirmative action programs. Nor is it true to say that affirmative action
necessarily means that opportunities in either education or employment are reserved for those
who are somehow less worthy or less able than those not benefited by such programs. The
objections to affirmative action raised in the Article are more deeply rooted in the general
problems inherent in any governmental program which attempts to justify differential treatment
based on the race of those involved.
393. Julius Chambers, Protection of Civil Rights: A Constitutional Mandate for the Federal
Government, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1599, 1612 (1989) (noting that both economic and social inequal-
ity based upon race still exists in the United States). The grim statistics which back up these
claims seem indisputable. Black children are twice as likely as White children to be born prema-
turely, live in substandard housing, and die within the first year of life. CHILDREN'S DEFENSE
FUND, KEY FACTS, supra note 107. The same source suggests that more than forty percent of
Black children live in poverty. Id.
In fact, the plight of Blacks seems to have worsened in recent years. For example, Blacks have
suffered an overall decline in relative income and educational levels in the past decade. See
WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 109-10 (1987) (noting a similar decline in the Sixties, Seventies, and early-Eight-
ies). The disparity between Whites and Blacks is especially troubling. In 1990, the median in-
come for White households was $31,231, while the average income for Black households was a
paltry $18,676. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES: 1992 445 tbl. 696 (112th ed. 1992).
394. Professors Harris and Narayan characterize this as the "myth" of preferential treatment.
In their view, affirmative action does not come close to overcoming the barriers to success im-
posed by society on Blacks. Harris & Narayan, supra note 109, at 11-14. Nonetheless, one re-
cent study showed that only thirty-one percent of Whites felt affirmative action was necessary,
compared to eighty-one percent of Blacks. Audrey Edwards, Race in America: Report, FAM.
CIRCLE, Oct. 10, 1995, at 83, 84. The quotation used to sum up the White perspective was:
"Today, the group most discriminated against is white males.... We got the message; we made
corrections - get on with it." Id.
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the promise of affirmative action. A closer examination of each of the
asserted rationales for benign affirmative action seems to reveal a dis-
tressing pattern of failed objectives and backlash against the well-mo-
tivated attempt to alleviate the lingering effects of societal
discrimination against Blacks.
1. Compensating for Past Discrimination and Correcting Existing
Discrimination
Attempts have been made to justify affirmative action programs on
the basis that they are compensatory in nature and that they are
designed to alleviate continuing discrimination. 395 These explanations
stem first from the observations that past discrimination has imposed
injuries which should now be remedied and that there are continuing
patterns of discrimination which need to be addressed. Based on
these observations, some supporters of affirmative action have drawn
the conclusion that race-conscious programs are the way to effect ap-
propriate compensation for the harms inflicted by past discrimination
or to deal with continuing discrimination. Because these two justifica-
tions are so closely related, this Article will address them together.
Certainly, it is beyond dispute that there have been terrible inci-
dents of injustice in this country, many of which were perpetrated
against individuals on the basis of their race. The imposition of slav-
ery upon Blacks and the genocidal treatment of Native Americans are
the most dramatic examples of racial injustice, although there are nu-
merous other incidents of discrimination which have occurred in mod-
ern history. The problem with the compensatory rationale for
affirmative action programs is not that there has been no injury, not
that there is no need or merit to the idea that those who have been
injured deserve reparations, and not that discrimination is no longer a
problem. Rather, the problem is that affirmative action programs
aimed at all members of a particular race are not an appropriate or, as
importantly, an effective remedy for those harms.
The grossly unfair and discriminatory treatment of Japanese-Ameri-
cans during World War II provides a clear illustration of why the com-
pensatory and corrective rationales do not support the use of
preferences based on race as an appropriate response to past or con-
tinuing inequalities. Admittedly, individuals of Japanese descent who
395. See, e.g., Myrl L. Duncan, The Future of Affirmative Action: A Jurisprudential Legal
Critique, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 503, 510-20 (1982) (addressing the criticisms of the com-
pensatory justice rationale for affirmative action).
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were unfairly subject to curfews 396 or excluded from certain areas in
California 397 during World War II suffered injury. A compelling argu-
ment can be, and has been, made that they should be compensated for
those harms.398 However, it is also abundantly clear that the remedy
should not be awarded solely on the basis of race, even though the
harm was inflicted because of race. First, not all Japanese-Americans
were hurt as a result of the discriminatory policies. To treat all Japa-
nese-Americans as deserving of special treatment now for misconduct
in the past trivializes the harm actually done to some Japanese-Ameri-
cans and provides an unearned windfall to many others. Second, as-
signing a remedy based solely on race provides no basis for
determining the degree of harm suffered by particular individuals or
the magnitude of the appropriate remedies in particular cases. Com-
pensation should be based on the injury suffered by individuals and,
therefore, should be tailored to the circumstances of those actually
disadvantaged. This necessitates an individualized approach to reme-
dying discrimination, rather than the group approach inevitably taken
if broad racial classifications are used to determine the applicability of
preferential programs.
These arguments apply with equal force to affirmative action pro-
grams designed to provide special opportunities to Blacks. Clearly, if
the discussion is limited to academia and the work place, not all
Blacks have been discriminated against to a material degree. Admit-
tedly, virtually all Blacks in our society suffer, to some degree, humili-
ation and stigmatization inflicted by racists and those who act based
on racist assumptions, perhaps even without realizing that they do.399
That does not mean that all Blacks are materially disadvantaged with
regard to education and employment opportunities. Shelby Steele, for
example, has suggested that there are middle-class Blacks, such as his
own two children, who "have never experienced racial discrimination,
have never been stopped by their race on any path they have chosen
396. Such curfews were upheld as constitutional in Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81,
104 (1943).
397. Such exclusions were upheld in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944).
398. This is, in fact, the conclusion recently reached by the United States Congress. The Civil
Liberties Act of 1988 contained an apology to United States citizens and resident aliens of Japa-
nese ancestry who were evacuated, relocated, and interned during World War II, and it provided
for $20,000 payments as reparations. Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat.
903, 906.
399. See Duncan, supra note 395, at 516-17 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 400 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting): "[I]t is unnecessary in 20th century America
to have individual Negroes demonstrate that they have been the victims of racial discrimination;
the racism of our society has been so pervasive that none ... has managed to escape its impact
. ..'.
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to follow," notwithstanding the "racial insensitivity" to which they
have been exposed. 400
In fact, affirmative action programs have been upheld even absent
any finding of discrimination. 40 1 If affirmative action is really to be
justified on the basis that it is necessary to compensate for or correct
existing discrimination, it is clear that the courts have taken the wrong
track in affirmative action jurisprudence. This objection could easily
be overcome, however, by retargeting affirmative action so that pro-
grams would be imposed only in the event of a finding of discrimina-
tion. However, even if this were to happen, the notion that
affirmative action is an appropriate or desirable mechanism for
awarding compensation for or correcting exisiing discrimination
seems problematic.
Notwithstanding the regrettable fact that Blacks in our society are
often the victims of negative stereotypes and of unfair patterns of be-
havior based on such misconceptions, generally speaking, affirmative
action programs are not set up to remedy most of the myriad forms of
discrimination which continue to exist. Such programs cannot force
cabdrivers to stop for the Black pedestrian waiting for a ride; they
cannot force shopkeepers to open their doors or provide equal service
to Black customers; they cannot force passersby to stop to provide
assistance in the event that a Black driver experiences car trouble.40 2
Worst of all, such programs cannot counteract the pervasive negative
stereotypes about Blacks, which contribute to the patterns of behavior
just described. Rather, they encourage the false and destructive no-
tion that Blacks cannot succeed without special advantages. 40 3
400. SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER: A NEW VISION OF RACE IN
AMERICA 111 (1990).
401. For example, in United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209 (1979), the Court up-
held a private, voluntary affirmative action plan simply on the basis that Blacks as a group had
been historically excluded from the craft trades which would be affected by the plan at issue in
the case. Similarly, in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 490 (1980), the Court upheld a feder-
ally imposed affirmative action program designed to provide relief to specifically identified mi-
norities even absent any identifiable victims of past discrimination. Further, in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971), the Supreme Court held that "good intent or absence of
discriminatory intent" was not relevant when employment practices were challenged under Title
VII.
402. These examples are not entirely random. For example, the picture of a Black man trying
in vain to hail a cab in New York City is an image referred to frequently in literature addressing
the issue of race. See WEST, supra note 290, at x.
403. It would be impossible to list all of the rebuttals to the notion that affirmative action
proves that Blacks cannot succeed without special assistance. One might respond by noting that
affirmative action offers marginal, even token assistance when considered in light of the over-
whelming obstacles placed in the path of most Blacks. One might respond by noting that many
Blacks did not achieve their success because of any affirmative action, but on their own merits.
One might respond that too many Whites achieve their positions through unfair advantage (such
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So what types of discrimination are race-conscious affirmative ac-
tion programs generally designed to address? Typically, such pro-
grams are designed to assist in the inclusion of minorities in
academic4°4 or training40 5 programs, to make sure that general em-
ployment opportunities are available to minorities,406 to see that mi-
norities are offered certain positions in a defined arena,407 and to
ensure that minorities are awarded a certain proportion of govern-
ment contracts. 408 Affirmative action is designed to remedy past and
present discrimination in these areas, and such remedies are appropri-
ate only to the extent that discrimination in education and employ-
ment has affected those afforded the remedy.
Consider the case of affirmative action programs designed to pro-
mote the hiring of Blacks into certain fields of endeavor. The prob-
lem which existed historically, and to some extent continues to exist, is
that large numbers of Blacks were denied employment opportunities
because of their race. Some of the evidence concerning the extent to
which such discrimination continues is anecdotal, but there have been
studies which show that when otherwise equal applicants apply for the
same position, the color of one's skin does matter. One such study
showed that White applicants received three times as many job offers
as equally qualified Blacks.409 The question is whether it is appropri-
ate to use broad racial classifications as a basis for awarding prefer-
ences in the hiring process as a solution to the inequities caused by
past discrimination or to eliminate continuing patterns of employment
discrimination.
as through family connections and the "good old boy" networks which operate to their exclusive
advantage).
It certainly seems true that affirmative action should not be taken as evidence that Blacks can
only succeed if they are given special advantages. Not only are the so-called advantages typically
insignificant when measured against the disadvantages which Blacks often face, there are a
number of Blacks who succeed without any such special assistance. Nonetheless, the evidence
suggests that there is in fact considerable backlash against affirmative action, in the form of a
widespread belief that Blacks cannot succeed on their own. For a more detailed discussion of
such backlash against Blacks as a result of affirmative action, see infra notes 421-26 and accom-
panying text.
404. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
405. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
406. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (addressing a program in which no
greater percentage of minority employees could be laid off than were currently employed).
407. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); Minnick v. California Dep't of Correc-
tions, 452 U.S. 105 (1981).
408. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
409. See MARGERY AusTN TURNER ET AL., OPPORTUNITIES DENIED, OPPORTUNITIES DIMIN-
ISHED: RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN HIRING 56-58 (1991).
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There are a number of objections to affirmative action in this con-
text. First, broad racial classifications are likely to result in unde-
served windfalls to some. The following example illustrates this
problem. Take the case of a young Black woman, from a middle-class
background, who was admitted to an elite educational institution as a
result of affirmative action programs. As a new graduate, she may be
offered employment on the basis of her race notwithstanding the fact
that, as a new member of the job force, there is no possibility that she
has been the victim of past employment discrimination. This illustra-
tion is particularly important because new graduates of elite institu-
tions are likely to be the hottest prospects for firms with affirmative
action programs. Thus, the very people such programs are most likely
to help are those who are least likely to have been significantly disad-
vantaged in the past.410
Another problem with affirmative action programs is that they are
likely to offer inadequate recompense to those who have suffered ac-
tual injury. In reality, most Blacks who were denied equal access to
jobs in the past are not going to be in a position to benefit from af-
firmative action programs designed to reach Blacks today. For the
most part, the Blacks who were discriminated against in the past will
have moved on. Even where discriminatory practices continue, offer-
ing opportunities solely on the basis of race does nothing to guarantee
that those who were discriminated against will be the ones hired, pro-
moted, trained or retained. The unfortunate reality is that affirmative
action is not well suited to be a remedy for past or existing patterns of
discrimination.
It is true that many Blacks, in a sense, suffer from the effects of
residual discrimination. The continuing disparity in family incomes
perpetuated when Blacks were forced into lower-paying, less-desira-
ble jobs is a particularly significant example of how past discrimina-
tion can have a negative impact on persons other than the individuals
actually denied a particular job.41' The negative stereotypes which
might be attributable to the fact that observers tend to see Blacks in
410. See infra notes 414-21 and accompanying text (discussing how affirmative action helps
those who need it least).
411. For example, in 1988, the median income of Black families was only 57% that of Whites.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES: 1990, at 450, tbl. 727 (110th ed. 1990). In fact, between 1970 and 1986, the proportion
of Black families with incomes of less than $10,000 grew from 28.8% to a staggering 30.2%.
Derek T. Dingle, An Agenda for the Black Middle Class, BLACK ENTERPRISE, Nov. 1989, at 53,
55. In 1991, the median income of Black families was $21,423 while that of Whites families was
$36,915. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 1992, at 451 (112th ed. 1992) [hereinafter 1992 CENSUS]. In addition while only
10.7% of Whites lived below the poverty line, 31.9% of Blacks lived below that line. Id. at 457.
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menial rather than managerial positions can also impact on more peo-
ple than the individuals actually relegated to menial roles.412 Does it
necessarily follow, however, that because Blacks are stigmatized and
many have had to grow up in poverty, the appropriate remedy is to
award benefits on the basis of race alone?
The answer to that question must lie in deciding what harms affirm-
ative action is really designed to remedy. In general, when the law
speaks of "remedies," it is referring to the need to address a particular
harm. The particular harm which is usually identified when one looks
at the need for affirmative action programs in employment is that cer-
tain individuals were wrongfully excluded from job opportunities in
the past solely because of their race. That specific harm is limited to
those who were wrongfully excluded and cannot be "remedied" by
offering other persons similar opportunities.
If affirmative action is seen as a remedy for disparity in income, why
is race used as a basis for awarding preferential treatment? Why is the
solution not targeted to the problem, with special opportunities being
reserved for individuals who have grown up in low-income homes?
Most evidence suggests that affirmative action programs benefit pri-
marily middle-class Blacks, which means that those programs benefit
least those who need the assistance most.413 Numerous commentators
have decried this unfortunate reality. For example, Professor Donald
Judges has concluded that "[a]ffirmative action in the workplace, like
its counterpart in the school system, has done little or nothing to re-
lieve the plight of the underclass. ' 414 Others have commented on the
fact that affirmative action programs seem geared towards highly
skilled professions, which are simply not generally accessible to the
The problems of the underclass actually go far beyond income alone. In 1986, 45.3% of those
behind bars in America were Black. ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE,
SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL 197 (1992). In 1990, the unemployment rate among Blacks was
11.3% compared to 4.1% for Whites, and in every year since 1975, the unemployment rate for
Blacks has exceeded 10%. Id. at 103. The average SAT score for Blacks is 737; for Whites it is
933. Id. at 142. The life expectancy at birth for White females in 1989 was 79.2 years, Black
females 73.5 years, White males 72.7 years, and Black males 64.8 years. 1992 CENSUS, supra, at
77.
412. For a discussion of how such observations about individual Blacks can spread negative
stereotypes about Blacks in general, see infra note 272.
413. For example, Stephen L. Carter suggests that affirmative action is essentially "irrelevant"
to millions of Black Americans. CARTER, supra note 57, at 7.
414. Donald P. Judges, Bayonets for the Wounded: Constitutional Paradigms and Disadvan-
taged Neighborhoods, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 599, 644-45 (1992); accord America's Wasted
Blacks, ECONOMIST, Mar. 30, 1991, at 11 ("[T]he real problem is that it [(affirmative action)]
reaches mainly those who need it least. The chief beneficiaries of affirmative action are univer-
sity students and black businessmen, who are the blacks most likely to succeed anyway. It does
not touch most poor blacks' lives.").
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poorer and less educated and trained Blacks.4 15 The failure of affirm-
ative action to reach the poorest individuals is perhaps clearest in the
employment context because illiteracy, which is rampant among the
most disadvantaged segments of our society,4 16 is a virtually absolute
bar to consideration. As scholar Cornel West has noted with regret,
affirmative action is "neither a major solution of poverty nor a suffi-
cient means to equality." 417
The general failure of affirmative action to address the needs of
those Blacks who live in the worst of conditions is, in fact, one of the
objections to affirmative action raised by Derrick Bell 418 and some
critical race theorists.41 9 None of these individuals believe that race-
bias does not exist or that we should ignore the problems of racial
discrimination. Rather, they are all concerned that affirmative action
seems to be viewed as a panacea, when in reality it does little to help
those who need the most help today.
The fact that affirmative action programs generally do a poor job of
targeting those who are in the worst shape has even been commented
upon by Supreme Court Justice Stevens, who noted in his dissent in
Fullilove v. Klutznick that "those who are the most disadvantaged...
415. Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action De-
bate, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1333 n.23 (citing J. LEONARD, THE IMPACT OF AFFIRMATIVE Ac-
TION 132 (1983) (noting that federal affirmative action programs have "raised the demand for
black males more in the highly skilled professional and technical occupations and in white collar
clerical jobs than in the blue collar operative and laborer occupations")); see also Charles Fried,
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Two Concepts of Equality, 104 HARV. L. REV. 107, 120 (1990)
(observing that the FCC programs "do not benefit the broad mass of minority group members
who suffer disproportionately high rates of poverty and unemployment"); Christopher Jencks,
Affirmative Action for Blacks: Past, Present, and Future, 28 AM. BEHAVIORAL ScI. 731, 749-52
(1985) (affirmative action has helped black women and highly educated black men, but not less
educated black men).
416. It is estimated that nearly forty percent of minority youths are functionally illiterate. See
N. Francis, Equity and Excellence in Education, in ASSOCIATION OF BLACK FOUNDATION EXEC-
UTIVES CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 73 (1985).
417. WEST, supra note 290, at x.
418. Professor Bell, who reluctantly supports affirmative action as the only game in town,
characterizes it as "the latest contrivance the society has created to give blacks the sense of
equality while withholding its substance." Derrick Bell, Xerces and the Affirmative Action Mys-
tique, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1595, 1598 (1989); see also DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT
SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 140-61 (1987).
419. Indeed, the primary objection to affirmative action which is made by critical race theo-
rists is that affirmative action is ineffective. See Carlos J. Nan, Adding Salt to the Wound: Af-
firmative Action and Critical Race Theory, 12 LAW & INEQ. J. 553 (1994). Richard Delgado
complains that affirmative action programs were "designed by others to promote their purposes,
not ours." Richard Delgado, Affirmative Action as a Majoritarian Device: Or, Do You Really
Want to Be a Role Model?, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1222, 1226 (1991). In his opinion, "affirmative
action serves as a homeostatic device, assuring that only a small number of women and people of
color are hired and promoted." Id. at 1224.
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are the least likely to receive any benefit[s] from the special
privilege. "420
While it may be true that affirmative action helped establish the
Black middle class, the fact is that such programs today tend to con-
centrate on those who have already reached that level of success and
no longer seem to have as compelling a claim to the need for special
consideration. There is little evidence that the underclass benefits sig-
nificantly from affirmative action programs.
The failure of affirmative action to focus on the underclass is com-
pounded by the fact that it diverts attention from the underclass by
focusing on strategies which offer the most disadvantaged little
hope.42' While there is nothing inherent in the nature of race-con-
scious affirmative action programs which would preclude testing other
programs, the economic and political reality is that while we retain
current affirmative action programs, we are not likely to look at other
solutions to racial inequality. Alternatively, if affirmative action is to
be justified as a remedy for negative stereotypes, one must ask
whether affirmative action is an appropriate vehicle to remedy this
problem. Is it not at least as likely that affirmative action programs
will perpetuate the very stereotypes about Black inadequacies which
one would hope they would remedy? This is the problem of
backlash.422
Affirmative action programs undeniably foster the notion that
Blacks cannot succeed without special privileges. The stigmatizing ef-
fects of affirmative action have been commented on by a number of
Supreme Court Justices in their opinions on affirmative action.42 3 Ac-
420. 448 U.S. 448, 538 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
421. See, e.g., THOMAS SOWELL, CIVIL RIGHrs: RmTORIC OR REALTY? 48-53 (1984) ("[I]t is
precisely the disadvantaged who suffer most from affirmative action."); WILsON, supra note 393,
at vii-19 (challenging liberals to change the way they approach the "ghetto underclass"); Judges,
Light Beams, supra note 391, at 1045-46 ("The final bitter irony is that affirmative action thus
may represent more an accommodation of than a challenge to the status quo.") (emphasis omit-
ted); Judges, supra note 414, at 647-59 (arguing that affirmative action programs create a caste
society).
422. Even the most vehement supporters of affirmative action programs are profoundly con-
cerned with the problems of backlash. See Harris & Narayan, supra note 109, at 3 ("In this
Article we will focus on the pervasive backlash against race-based affirmative action policies
.... ) (emphasis in original).
423. E.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 636 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(describing a FCC policy as "based on the demeaning notion that members of the defined racial
groups ascribe to certain 'minority views'); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493
(1989) (plurality opinion) ("Classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm.");
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 545 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that an affirma-
tive action plan "inevitably is perceived by many as resting on an assumption that those who are
granted this special preference are less qualified in some respect that is identified purely by their
race").
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ademicians and other commentators have also discussed the problems
of backlash and stigmatization caused by affirmative action
programs. 424
Because of this type of backlash and other problems, affirmative
action programs have come to be regarded with hostility and suspi-
cion.425 It is too easy to imagine a dejected and angry White job appli-
cant complaining: "I didn't get the job because it was reserved for
some Black." The clear implication is that the Black candidate was
less qualified and only hired because of race. This in turn encourages
or permits the false belief that successful Blacks only attained their
424. See, e.g., SOWELL, supra note 421, at 118 ("Among the insidious dangers are the under-
mining of minority and female self-confidence .... ); William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage:
Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. Cm. L. REV. 775, 787 n.38 (1979) (stating
affirmative action plans "unquestionably impose a racial stigma on those who benefit by them");
Charles Murray, Affirmative Racism: How Preferential Treatment Works Against Blacks, NEW
REPUBLIC, Dec. 31, 1984, at 18, 22 ("Every black who is hired by a white-run organization that
hires blacks preferentially has to put up with the knowledge that many of his co-workers believe
he was hired because of his race; and he has to put up with the suspicion in his own mind that
they might be right."); see also Nathan Perlmutter, Testimony of Anti-Defamation League of
B'nai B'rith, in SELECTED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ToPiCs IN EMPLOYMENT AND BUSINESS SET
ASIDES: A CONSULTATION/HEARING OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
Mar. 6-7, 1985, at 200 (1985) ("Resentment by coworkers, and low expectation[s] by employers
act as barriers to meaningful advancement."); Morris B. Abram, Affirmative Action: Fair
Shakers and Social Engineers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1312, 1322-23 (1986) (recognizing that affirma-
tive action will produce a group of persons who received their position on merit but are viewed
as recipients of preference by others and even themselves, and are thus stigmatized); Terry East-
land, The Case Against Affirmative Action, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 33, 41-43 (1992) (arguing
that "implied inferiority" is the quality that earns minorities preferential treatment); Thomas G.
Gee, Race- Conscious Remedies, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 63, 67-68 (1986) (noting that quota
systems encourage minorities to achieve victim status, not excellence); William B. Reynolds,
Individualism vs. Group Rights: The Legacy of Brown, 93 YALE L.J. 995, 1003 (1984) (arguing
that affirmative action encourages us "to view their advancements not as hard-won achieve-
ments, but as conferred benefits").
425. There is substantial evidence of this increasingly negative public opinion on affirmative
action. Take for example the opinion poll of Chief Executive Officers done by Fortune Maga-
zine. In 1989, 68% of CEO's rated the results of affirmative-action programs as "good" or "very
good." In 1995, that number fell to 52%, and even more telling, 78% of CEO's today would
back a complete ban on racial and gender preferences. James P. Pinkerton, Why Affirmative
Action Won't Die, FORTUNE, Nov. 13, 1995, at 191. A new survey of small business owners
revealed that only 15% felt that affirmative action programs benefited small business. Tracey
Drury, Survey Shows Little Support for Affirmative Action, Bus. FIRST-BUFFALO, Nov. 6, 1995,
at 7.
Some surveys suggest that between eighty to ninety percent of Whites and at least a majority
of other respondents oppose affirmative action if there is any hint of racial preference included
in the pollster's questions. John Leo, Endgame for Affirmative Action, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Mar. 13, 1995, at 18. In a TIME/CNN poll taken in early 1995, 77% of Whites thought
affirmative action frequently discriminates against Whites, and two-thirds of Black respondents
agreed with that statement. Richard Lacayo, A New Push for Blind Justice: Preferences for
Minorities and Women Are Under Attack in the Courts, in Congress, and on the Ballot, TIME, Feb.
20, 1995, at 39.
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position because of their race and not as a result of hard work. 426 If
affirmative action is supposed to combat the negative attitudes which
confront Blacks today, it is clearly not an effective solution.
Finally, even when affirmative action programs do happen to match
up someone who was improperly discriminated against in the past
with specific opportunities made available through affirmative action
today, there is no opportunity to make sure that the level of compen-
sation is tied to the magnitude of past discrimination. By using a
group-rights focus, the compensatory rationale falls short of justifying
affirmative action in hiring.
When it comes to affirmative action programs in education, many of
the same objections can be made. Even if one is willing to assume
that such programs are effective in addressing the inadequacies of our
educational system, the programs seem poorly designed to remedy the
problems which Black students face, and they are both over- and
under-inclusive. In addition, the problem of backlash also exists in the
academic setting.
Another deficiency with the affirmative action solution to racial ine-
quality is that many of the problems with educational systems which
are being discussed today do not relate to the type of harms which
affirmative action programs are designed to correct. Affirmative ac-
tion in education is generally geared to admission to institutions of
higher learning. Unfortunately, most of the recent criticisms of our
educational system, at least insofar as it seems to have failed Black
students, are not addressed to the exclusionary policies implemented
by such institutions, but rather the inadequate preparation that Black
students receive in public school. Complaints relate to the attitudes,
sometimes subconscious, of public school teachers toward Blacks, ra-
cially insensitive curricular choices,427 and the inadequacy of public
schools in poorer neighborhoods which are predominantly Black. Af-
firmative action addresses none of these problems. Instead, affirma-
tive action programs take students who are often inadequately
prepared and thrust them into an academic environment where it is
happenstance as to whether or not there will be adequate support
services which are necessary to remedy the worst of the educational
deficiencies which those students have suffered.
426. In turn, this creates what has been labeled as "toxic" race relations in the workplace.
Steven V. Roberts et al., Affirmative Action on the Edge, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 13,
1995, at 32-33, 35, 37-38, (quoting Sharon Brooks Hodge, a Black writer and broadcaster).
427. For example, Professor Brown recites a particularly traumatic experience where he was
forced to endure an oral rendition of Mark Twain's "The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn,"
which includes multiple repetitions of the racial insult "nigger." Brown, supra note 46, at 815-16.
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The strongest compensatory argument in favor of this type of treat-
ment is that the harms suffered by Black students in our public school
system justify special race-conscious admissions programs. The argu-
ment is two-fold. First, because the harms of inadequate and insensi-
tive education are inflicted on Blacks in general, the remedy can also
be addressed to Blacks in general. 42 8 Second, because of the failures
of public schools to adequately prepare Black students for higher
learning, preferential admissions programs are necessary to see that
Blacks are not penalized for the public school system's failures.
One response to this argument is to look closely at the question of
whether all Blacks really suffer from the problems which plague many
Blacks in terms of educational disadvantages, or whether affirmative
action targeted to all Blacks is over-inclusive. While many Blacks
grow up in poorer neighborhoods and consequently attend poorer
schools, this is certainly not universally true. The sons and daughters
of middle-class Blacks escape the educational disadvantages imposed
by poverty. Similarly, not all Blacks suffer equally from insensitive
teachers and curriculum.
For example, in two of the three schools which my son has attended,
teachers and administrators have gone out of their way to address is-
sues important to Black Americans, including special topics address-
ing the contributions of Black Americans, the plight of Blacks in the
innercities of this country, and the problems of racism and stereotyp-
ing. This is true even in the rural Arkansas school which my son cur-
rently attends, even though it has a very small percentage of Black
students. Ironically, the one school which seemed to be less than sen-
sitive to issues relevant to Black Americans was a middle school in
New Jersey, where thirty percent of the student population was Black.
A group of parents, who were concerned that there were no Black
teachers in the entire school, set up a meeting with the principal to
discuss the problem. Her response was that Black students had an
appropriate role model-the hard-working janitor was Black.
Clearly, while incidents like this document the continuing problems
in our educational system, such problems do not necessarily translate
into a completely inadequate educational experience. For example,
my husband and I carefully maintain friendships with a number of
Black professionals, including law professors, school teachers, health
care workers and others. The failure of one school system to expose
428. There are, of course, other rationales which support the inclusion of Blacks in academic
programs, including the need for diversity. These other justifications will be addressed later. See
infra notes 432-50 and accompanying text (discussing other rationales for affirmative action
programs).
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my son (and daughter) to adequate role models has been compen-
sated for by our efforts, and my son's overall educational experience is
no worse than that of his White peers. Moreover, by all of the tradi-
tional indicia of educational success, my son is a star. He makes
straight A's, and he consistently scores well above the ninetieth per-
centile in national tests designed to measure academic performance.
Nonetheless, if current admissions programs continue, when my son
applies for college, he will probably be given preference during the
admissions process because of his race. This will be in spite of the fact
that his education has been as complete as that of any of his White
friends. Why then does he deserve special consideration? In fact, why
is it assumed that he will need special consideration?
Ironically, those Black students who might have the best case for
deserving special consideration in the admissions process are least
likely to receive it. Black students in the poorest neighborhoods, who
have been forced to attend the poorest schools while avoiding the twin
perils of drugs and violence which are often rampant in the neighbor-
hoods in which they live, can legitimately claim that they should re-
ceive some special consideration simply by having persevered enough
to graduate from high school. Regrettably, these students are the
ones least likely to benefit from special admission programs.
Special admission programs are most visible at the more elite insti-
tutions, where competition for positions is vigorous. Obviously, in an
institution with open enrollment for all high school graduates, there is
no need for a special admissions program to guarantee opportunities
for minority students. However, the tuition and other expenses at
elite institutions are typically very high, and the workload is rigorous.
Frankly, the most disadvantaged high school graduates are unlikely to
be able to compete for places at such institutions. Not only are the
expenses likely to be more than such students can afford, especially in
this era of decreasing student aid, but the level of work required is
probably also beyond them because of the inadequate preparation
that they have received.
The other side of preferential admissions programs is that people
like my son will probably be eligible for special admissions programs
even if they do not "deserve" or need the assistance. It is particularly
galling to think that, when my son goes to college, it is likely that some
of his peers will assume he was admitted under some "special" admis-
sions process and not because of his abilities and hard work. This atti-
tude seems to pervade academia, where the widespread assumption
seems to be that most minority students got their position because of
special consideration rather than merit.
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One other point is worth making in the context of affirmative action
in the admission process. It has been suggested that such policies are
a fair response to existing admission policies which unfairly advantage
White applicants. It is undeniably true that there are admissions pro-
grams, particularly at some of the more prestigious educational insti-
tutions, which favor certain privileged White applicants. For example,
the children of alumni and donors tend to receive preference in the
admission process, particularly at the most elite institutions.429 Such
preferences obviously favor wealthier, White applicants to the disad-
vantage of all others. However, there is a better solution to the ine-
qualities posed by such policies than race-conscious admission
programs. Since family relationships and wealth do not translate to
academic ability or promise, they should not be used as factors in the
admission process. Eliminating unfair preferences is a far better solu-
tion to the problem discriminatory admission policies than race-con-
scious admissions decisions, which aid only those of the preferred race
rather than all of those unfairly excluded by virtue of their failure to
have proper family connections.
In the end, it does not seem that there is a particularly strong case
for viewing race-conscious admission programs as an appropriate ve-
hicle for compensating for past and present inequalities in education.
Not only are most forms of racial prejudice in our educational system
unaffected by affirmative action, the programs are not limited to per-
sons actually denied equal educational opportunities as a result of ra-
cial inequalities. Moreover, the legacy of racism disproportionately
affects those Blacks who are raised in poverty and who attend the
poorest schools, and it is those individuals who are least likely to be in
a position to benefit from the educational opportunities created by
affirmative action. Finally, affirmative action programs tend to rein-
force the belief that Blacks cannot make it on their own, without help,
as well as the misconception that any Black who succeeds must have
been the beneficiary of affirmative action.
The indisputable facts that Blacks have been the historical victims
of discrimination, and that the legacy of such discrimination continues
in the underrepresentation of Blacks in both academia and major seg-
ments of our economy, are insufficient to support the conclusion that
affirmative action programs are necessary to compensate the victims
of such discrimination. There have to be other ways to remedy dis-
crimination than by implementing discriminatory counter-measures.
The old adage that two wrongs do not make a right seems appropriate
429. See Harris & Narayan, supra note 109, at 33-34.
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in this context. "Because race is not a factor indicating anything about
the moral worth or persons, race is morally irrelevant to state laws and
policies. '430 Rather than continuing to implement and enforce poli-
cies which require differential treatment based on race, we ought to be
focusing on rules which prohibit discrimination in any form. This
would seem to be the approach most closely aligned with the ideal of
correcting the past wrongs of racial discrimination. The hope that af-
firmative action will be a successful response to the problems of dis-
crimination is not borne out by the evidence.431 Programs fail to
reach most of those who need them most, and by diverting attention
and resources away from programs which might be targeted to the
underclass in our society, affirmative action seems to have outlived its
marginal usefulness as a compensatory or corrective tool.
2. Redistributive Justice
Perhaps the most persuasive justification for affirmative action pro-
grams which offer preferential treatment to members of favored
groups is the notion of redistributive justice. In other words, preferen-
tial treatment is justified as one step towards a more just society. Be-
cause historical policies have resulted in an unfair and unjust division
of resources, we should reallocate those resources more equitably.
Affirmative action is touted as one method of achieving this more eq-
uitable allocation of resources.
Again, it is beyond question that not only have many members of
minority racial groups been the victims of individualized discrimina-
tion, on average they are more likely to be among the most chroni-
cally disadvantaged members of society.432 The biggest objection to
affirmative action as a solution to the unfair allocation of society's re-
sources is that it is not much of a solution to that problem.
As discussed above, affirmative action programs benefit most those
who need it least 433 and divert resources and attention from programs
which would focus on those most needing extra assistance. 434 These
criticisms go a long way in explaining the problems with using affirma-
tive action as a mechanism for redistributing scarce resources. Of
430. Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1030 (1979).
431. See Nan, supra note 419, at 561-62.
432. See supra note 411 (discussing the fact that the incomes for blacks are generally lower
that incomes for whites).
433. See supra notes 414-21 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons that affirmative
action programs allegedly benefit those who need the programs the least).
434. See supra note 421 and accompanying text (demonstrating that affirmative action pro-
grams place a burden on the lower socioeconomic class).
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course, the alleged distributive benefits of affirmative action include
more than the immediately obvious opening of educational and em-
ployment opportunities to underrepresented groups. For example, af-
firmative action has also been defended as eliminating negative
stereotypes, helping to provide positive role models, and increasing
diversity. 435 In reality, there is too much evidence that none of these
laudable goals are well served by affirmative action.
First, as discussed above, affirmative action programs do not elimi-
nate negative stereotypes. In fact, the reverse is more likely to be
true. Authorities discussing the stigmatizing effects of affirmative ac-
tion programs are legion.436 Affirmative action stigmatizes by creat-
ing and reinforcing the false impression that Blacks and other
minorities can succeed only if given special preferences, and that they
can be the "best" only when compared to others of their race, not
when compared to all others.437 All too often, even those who achieve
success without being given preferential treatment are treated as if
their success were attributable not to their own efforts, but rather to
the affirmative action programs ostensibly designed to level the play-
ing field and reduce the very stereotypes they actually foster.
The notion that affirmative action programs are likely to provide
positive role models is also doubtful. First, affirmative action is likely
to reach those from the neighborhoods most in the need of positive
role models only rarely. The success achieved by a middle-class Black
is not likely to be perceived as generally attainable by Blacks living in
the urban ghetto. Only if affirmative action was consistently success-
ful in reaching the poorest communities would it be fair to applaud
such programs as giving the neediest positive role models. In order to
avoid the impression that there is room only for a token handful of
truly disadvantaged Blacks in academia or business, there would have
to be a reasonable number of the poorest Blacks succeeding because
of affirmative action. It is all too likely that individuals left behind in
the inner city slums will have adequate role models only if there are
success stories in more than token numbers from among people like
435. See Kennedy, supra note 415, at 1337-41 (critiquing objections to using "motive analysis"
as part of a broader policy analysis); see also Duncan, supra note 395, at 525-26 (listing the
promotion of minority role models as one widely-recognized advantage of affirmative action);
Patricia J. Williams, Comment, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Regrouping in Singular Times,
104 HARV. L. REV. 525, 544-46 (1990) (suggesting that diversity is a driving force behind affirma-
tive action).
436. See supra notes 421-24 and accompanying text (arguing that affirmative action programs
have an adverse impact on minorities).
437. For a ringing condemnation of the "best Black" phenomenon, see CARTER, supra note
57, at 7.
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them. And unfortunately, affirmative action is not targeted to reach
such people in numbers. As discussed earlier, most of the benefi-
ciaries of affirmative action are those who have already achieved a
measure of success. Not only does affirmative action focus on the
least needy members of disadvantaged groups, it removes attention
from the real underclass and, in this way, affirmative action may actu-
ally serve to prevent the adoption of programs which would really in-
sure the presence of effective role models. 438
Nor is it fair to say that a success story for any Black translates into
role models for all Black youth. For example, it is highly doubtful that
many poor Black youths desire to accept Supreme Court Justice Clar-
ence Thomas as a role model. While he may have risen to the pinna-
cle of the legal profession and is a success from any professional
perspective, he is also widely viewed as having "sold out" his Black
brothers.439 He is not seen as a hero to be emulated, despite his
''success."
438. See supra note 421 (arguing that affirmative action programs fail to benefit those people
who need the programs the most).
439. Many Blacks condemned Clarence Thomas for his conservative views which were gener-
ally viewed as antithetical to Black interests. E.g., Charles R. Lawrence, The Epidemiology of
Color-Blindness: Learning to Think and Talk About Race, Again, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1,
9 (1995) (comparing Clarence Thomas to A. Philip Randolph, Thurgood Marshall and Nolan
Richardson, all of whom have evidenced a respect and compassion for those who are Black that
Thomas seems to lack); Trevor W. Coleman, Doubting Thomas: Some of Clarence Thomas For-
mer Supporters Feel Betrayed, ETHNIC NEWSWATCH EMERGE, Nov. 30, 1993, at 39, 41 (sug-
gesting that Clarence Thomas was "the worst kind of racist-a black man who hates himself")
(quoting Alice Presley); Lena Williams, In a 90's Quest for Black Identity: Intense Doubts and
Disagreement, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1991, at Al ("Many blacks questioned the 'blackness' of a
man who embraces a conservative philosophy and is married to a white woman.").
The condemnation was so significant that it led many Blacks to oppose the nomination of
Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court. See Congressional Black Caucus Foundation, In Oppo-
sition to Clarence Thomas: Where We Must Stand and Why, in COURT OF APPEAL: THE BLACK
COMMUNITY SPEAKS OUT ON THE RACIAL AND SEXUAL POLITICS OF CLARENCE THOMAS VS.
ANITA HILL 231-54 (Robert Chrisman & Robert L. Allen eds. 1992); NAACP, The NAACP
Position on Clarence Thomas: The NAACP Announces Opposition to Judge Thomas's Nomina-
tion, in COURT OF APPEAL: THE BLACK COMMUNITY SPEAKS OUT ON THE RACIAL AND SEX-
UAL POLITICS OF CLARENCE THOMAS VS. ANITA HILL, at 269-71; Bill Sammon, Nominee Too
Far Right: NAACP Leader Opposes Thomas, CLEv. PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 13, 1991, at 3C (quot-
ing a local NAACP chapter head as saying about Thomas that "any black who wants the status
quo is not black"); Ronald Walters, Thomas: Estranged from His "Blackness," WASH. POST, July
15, 1991, at All (criticizing Thomas' record and views, and noting that Thomas "will be found
not to be the 'black' nominee to the court, because 'blackness' ultimately means more than
color; it also means a set of values from which Thomas is apparently estranged").
The opposition to the nomination of Clarence Thomas from the Black community was espe-
cially surprising in light of the typical patterns of Black solidarity. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr.,
Justice Clarence Thomas in Retrospect, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1405, 1407 (1994) ("It was a significant
event when the national delegates of the premier professional bar association of African-Ameri-
cans, dedicated to the concept of advancing Black lawyers into positions of power, were so
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In the end, even if affirmative action programs produce some role
models from whom others can derive the belief that they too can suc-
ceed, it is a false hope unless the programs do indeed make such op-
portunities available. When affirmative action does so little to help
the underclass most in need of role models and most in need of special
attention in order to make opportunities available, the promise of op-
portunity offered by the success of a few others is a false assurance
which is likely to be at least as frustrating as having no obvious role
models. To the extent that affirmative action diverts resources from
better solutions, or solutions more closely targeted towards those who
most need help to overcome the vestiges of past discrimination, it ac-
tually serves to increase racial tensions and frustration, because the
promise that success is attainable is empty.
Finally, the ideal that affirmative action fosters diversity deserves
attention. There is a benefit to be realized from being exposed to di-
verse viewpoints and perspectives, but the notion that the goal of di-
versity justifies affirmative action programs is questionable. On a
theoretical level, diversity as an ends unto itself cannot be a sufficient
justification for differential treatment based on race.440 Because eve-
ryone is in some sense unique, no matter whom one admits to an edu-
cational institution or whom one hires, diversity will be enhanced.
Perhaps an individual adds to diversity by being left-handed, or Pres-
byterian, or red-headed, or Libertarian. Diversity becomes a justifica-
tion for affirmative action based on race only if racial diversity is the
desirable result.
If the real intent is to add to the subject population (of students or
employees, depending on the context) those who have had to over-
come economic adversity, or those who possess a particular political
or theoretical perspective, that should be the criteria, instead of the
race of the individuals involved. As the first section of this Article
attempts to demonstrate, race in and of itself says very little about any
particular individual.441 In fact, this precise comment has been made
by some individuals who are themselves members of racial minori-
doubtful of Clarence Thomas' worthiness that they would not give a majority vote in favor of his
nomination to the United States Supreme Court.")
440. See Anthony D'Amato, Is Equality a Totally Empty Idea?, 81 MICH. L. REv. 600 (1983);
Sheila Foster, Difference and Equality: A Critical Assessment of the Concept of "Diversity", 1993
Wis. L. REv. 105, 133 (citing Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 537
(1982)); Kent Greenwalt, How Empty Is the Idea of Equality, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1167 (1983);
Michael Rosenfeld, Affirmative Action, Justice, and Equalities: A Philosophical and Constitu-
tional Appraisal, 46 OH1o ST. L.J. 845, 847 (1985).
441. See supra part I.
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ties.442 Racial diversity becomes important if race is a useful proxy for
real and relevant characteristics, and presumably if there is no other
way to ascertain the actual presence of such characteristics in an
individual.
Race has been used as a proxy for having had a "different experi-
ence" in our society, based upon the exclusion and subordination of
individuals because of their race. This does not mean, however, that
every member of the same race will have had the same experiences or
the same reactions to those experiences which they do have in com-
mon. Some racial and ethnic groups have achieved high levels of eco-
nomic success notwithstanding prejudice and discriminatory
treatment," 3 and some Blacks have achieved success even though
Blacks as a group are overrepresented in our nation's underclass." 4
Similarly, even some Blacks who have risen from the underclass with
the aid of affirmative action possess views that most Blacks would find
objectionable."45 The fact is that members of any given racial group
experience and react to life differently. That indisputable fact helps
explain why even some of the most ardent supporters of affirmative
action admit that there is no one voice of color or one perspective
shared by those who have lived in our racist society.446 The type of
diversity that is likely to be achieved by using race as a proxy is there-
fore uncertain.
Moreover, if diversity is the true objective, affirmative action fails to
reach those whose experiences are most likely to be different from the
White majority.447 If there is a need to increase the representation of
certain viewpoints in either an academic or business setting, it would
seem logical that the best way to insure that such viewpoints are ex-
pressed, or at least represented, is to seek out individuals who meet
442. See Chen, supra note 51, at 150-51 (asking whether it even makes sense to speak of
"Asian-Americans" considering that there is no one uniform Asian culture).
443. "Groups such as the Japanese, Chinese, and West Indian blacks have fared very well in
American society despite racial bias against these groups." Abram, supra note 424, at 1315 (cit-
ing THOMAS SOWELL, THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF RACE: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPEC-
rivE 190 (1983)).
444. See supra note 411 and accompanying text (discussing the fact the black's incomes are
lower than white's incomes).
445. Clarence Thomas may be the most notable case on point. See supra note 439 (discussing
the fact that many black commentators are critical of Justice Thomas).
446. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal
Academia, 1990 DuKE L.J. 705, 728 ("I would deny the existence of a 'black point of view' or a
'black voice' in any essentialist (or racialist) sense."); Williams, supra note 435, at 535 ("I do not
believe that a 'pure' black or feminist or cultural identity of any sort exists .... ).
447. The poorest Blacks are likely to have had life experiences which are the furthest from
mainstream White Americans. It is those Blacks who are least likely to be recruited as a result
of affirmative action programs. See supra notes 421-24 and accompanying text.
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the particular criteria. Diversity in terms of skin color alone hardly
seems important or relevant enough to continue policies which rein-
force the societally damaging notion that race is a legitimate basis for
treating individuals differently.
Finally, it seems to be dangerous to talk about the need to achieve
diversity as a basis for hiring Blacks or others. This is dangerously
close to tokenism.448 If this is the justification for affirmative action, it
could also be a basis for insuring that programs did not include too
many representatives of racial or other minorities.449
In the final analysis, the biggest failures of affirmative action seem
to be that such programs simply do not achieve their laudable goals,
and those advancements that are attributable to such programs come
at a terrible cost. Blacks, regardless of their individual abilities and
efforts, are labeled affirmative action babies.450 White resentment in-
creases as the negative stereotypes about Blacks being unable to make
it on their own are reinforced. Racial tensions increase, and the Black
underclass is essentially left to struggle in an environment of increased
hostility.
I applaud the goal of racial equality. I deplore racial bias and nega-
tive stereotypes. Unfortunately, it does not seem to me that affirma-
tive action significantly aids in the former, and there is evidence that it
contributes to the latter.
D. Is There an Alternative?
So if we abandon racial-preferences, with what are we left? One of
the biggest fears of many supporters of affirmative action is likely to
be that if we abandon these programs, we will have nothing to replace
them. Such a failure would indeed be tragic.
Blacks in particular continue to be over-represented in the eco-
nomic underclass of our society. They still suffer the effects of centu-
ries of racial prejudice. 451 "The United States remains scarred by
economic and social inequality based on race. Racial isolation, im-
poverishment, limited opportunity, and inferior education, medical
care, and housing compromise the lives of black Americans today. ' '452
448. See Delgado, supra note 419, at 1224 (urging scholars to reject the role model rationale
for similar reasons).
449. This is another objection to affirmative action programs which has been made by certain
critical race theorists. See supra note 419.
450. This is the lament of Stephen Carter and others. See CARTER, supra note 57, at 7; Nan,
supra note 419, at 553.
451. Nan, supra note 419, at 562 nn. 73-85.
452. Julius Chambers, Protection of Civil Rights: A Constitutional Mandate for the Federal
Government (1989 Survey of Books Relating to the Law), 87 MICH L. REV. 1599, 1612 (1989).
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In fact, evidence suggests that the plight of Blacks has worsened in
recent years,4 53 notwithstanding affirmative action.
If affirmative action as it is currently conceived was the only option
for attempting to redress these inequities, that would be an exceed-
ingly powerful argument for retaining race-conscious programs, even
if they offered only minimal hope of redressing the racial inequities
which plague our society. The fact is, however, that we are not limited
to affirmative action programs which are based on racial preferences.
A growing number of commentators have urged a rethinking of af-
firmative action along class lines.454
While a detailed examination of alternatives to affirmative action in
the arenas of education or employment is far beyond the scope of this
Article, it is essential that there be other options because it is indispu-
table that there are tremendous inequities in our society which we
must address if we are to continue to grow and thrive. The basic ap-
proach which has been urged by so many others is to cease targeting
remedial and preferential programs on the basis of race and, instead,
to focus on alleviating the effects of growing up or living in the
underclass.
While this means that poor Whites as well as poor Blacks may re-
ceive special assistance, the entire thesis of this Article is that race per
se should not matter. Societal help can be justified for anyone who is
trapped in the cycle of poverty.
Nor is a class-based system of aid the only available alternative to
race-conscious affirmative action programs. For example, a number
of critical race theorists have suggested that one of the principle barri-
ers to the success of minorities is the use of artificial concepts of
merit.45 5 These scholars maintain that by conditioning access to aca-
453. Id. at 561-62.
454. See, e.g., DINESH D'SouzA, ILLIBERAL EDUCATION: THE POLITCS OF RACE AND SEX
ON CAMPUS 251-53 (1991) (naming two proposals as "nonracial affirmative action" and "choice
without separation"); WEST, supra note 290, at 64 (suggesting that affirmative action plays the
"negative role" of ensuring that discriminatory practices are abated); Judges, supra note 414, at
644-45 (noting that one effect of affirmative action programs is to create a caste society);
Kimberly P. Taylor, Note, Affirmative Action for the Poor: A Proposal for Affirmative Action in
Higher Education Based on Economics, Not Race, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 805, 814-17 (1993)
(arguing that current affirmative action programs assume that blacks are economically disadvan-
taged and proposing that affirmative action programs should only consider the economic status
of their beneficiaries); Steven A. Holmes, Mulling the Idea of Affirmative Action for Poor
Whites, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1991 § 4, at 3 (asserting that poor whites suffer under current
affirmative action programs); Richard Kahlenberg, Class Not Race: An Affirmative Action that
Works, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 3, 1995, at 21 (arguing that affirmative action programs should
benefit the lower socioeconomic class, regardless of race).
455. See Daniel A. Farber, The Outmoded Debate over Affirmative Action, 82 CAL- L. REV.
893, 894 (1994) (noting that critical race theory scholars agree that Blacks "could achieve pro-
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demic or educational opportunities on arbitrary or artificial standards
which impact disproportionately on minorities, we have perpetuated
the exclusion of minorities from opportunities essential for success in
our society.456 Nor are scholars of color the only commentators to
have noted the exclusionary effects of selective standards of merit.457
The argument over whether current standards of merit are appro-
priate is particularly vehement in the context of academia. This is so
because there is more evidence that admissions criteria are suspect, 458
and because success in academia is often a prerequisite to economic
success later in life. In addition to exploring socio-economic status as
an alternative to race-based affirmative action programs, it is also
likely that progress in our race relations could be made if we paid
more attention to suggestions as to how the notion of merit should be
modified in making educational and employment opportunities
available.
Finally, one other point raised by proponents of affirmative action
needs to be addressed. It has been suggested that we do not need to
abandon affirmative action based on race to pursue these other alter-
natives as well. I believe that we do.
There is abundant evidence that affirmative action has produced a
backlash of anger against preferential treatment. So long as we con-
portional representation in the economic and academic worlds were it not for discriminatory
selection criteria").
456. See Richard Delgado, Brewer's Plea: Critical Thoughts on Common Cause, 44 VAND. L.
REV. 1, 8-9 (1991); see also Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Quotas in Affirmative
Action: Attacking Racism in the Nineties, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1043, 1068-71 (arguing that quotas
are necessary to ensure that affirmative action programs actually benefit minorities).
457. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
1060, 1067-68 (1991) (implying that I.Q. tests may be invalid because of the failure of test design-
ers to ensure equal scores for African Americans and Whites); Alan Freeman, Racism, Rights
and the Quest for Equality of Opportunity: A Critical Legal Essay, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
295, 324, 381-85 (1988) (arguing that merit has been defined and used as a vehicle to rationalize
class-based hierarchies); Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758, 778, 803, 806-07
(arguing that supposedly objective standards are created by White culture).
458. See AMY GUTMANN, DEMocATic EDUCATION 198 (1987) (stating that "it is not clear
how either academic ability or social contribution can be measured"); Derrick A. Bell, Bakke,
Minority Admissions, and the Usual Price of Racial Remedies, 67 CAL. L. REV. 3, 8 (1979)
("Although the debate over the validity of traditional admissions criteria continues, there is im-
pressive evidence that grades and test scores cannot predict success in the practice of law or
medicine."); Foster, supra note 440, at 144 ("[P]rior grades and standardized test scores provide
only a moderate basis for predicting a student's grades in the first year of college, a weak basis
for predicting the progress students will make toward other subtler educational goals, and a very
weak basis for predicting a student's ability to make a contribution later in life."); Kennedy,
supra note 446, at 732-34 (arguing that distribution of scholarly opportunity in law schools is
grounded in power, not merit). But see Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 1707, 1770 (1993) (recognizing that merit should be comprised of factors other than test
scores, but that scores and GPA "are undoubtedly important factors").
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tinue to focus our attention, our efforts and resources on existing
strategies, it has been amply demonstrated that additional programs
to remedy past inequities will have little or no chance of success. In
an era of economic uncertainty, it is far too unlikely that additional
strategies will be explored so long as we are spending so much energy
on affirmative action.
Given the evidence that affirmative action has created such resent-
ments and tensions, and that it rarely reaches those who need it most,
it is time to try something new. What we have is not working, and
neither rhetoric nor wishful thinking can change that.
CONCLUSION
I know that we live in a racist society. All too often, individuals
who are identified as "Black" are the targets of hatred and hostility
based on nothing more than the color of their skin or the texture of
their hair. The question that this Article raises is whether institution-
alizing the concept of race is likely to contribute towards a solution to
this country's racial problems. As should be obvious from the tone of
this Article, I do not think that this is the correct approach to society's
problems with race.
In concluding, I would like to recite a discussion on racism between
two of my friends, one of whom is White and one of whom is Black.
My White friend is opposed to affirmative action, primarily on the
basis that such programs often benefit most those who have least been
affected by the exclusionary and discriminatory policies the affirma-
tive action was purportedly designed to remedy. The example he gave
was that of preferential admissions to institutions of higher learning.
He argued that a significant percentage of those admitted to such in-
stitutions under preferential admissions policies had been raised in a
middle-class family and had not been subject to the crushing burdens
of poverty imposed on the most disadvantaged members of the group.
Why then, he asked, should they be entitled to a preference over any
other applicant?
The very moving response by my Black friend was that her children
were indeed the product of a middle-class upbringing, but that she
doubted very much whether a non-minority child would ever be faced
with returning to his car only to find the hate-filled words, "Nigger, go
home," scrawled across the windshield. Her argument, in essence,
was that even Black children raised in a middle-class home must face
and deal with racism, and that they deserve special consideration in
admissions because they must deal with and overcome problems not
faced by Whites.
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It is a sad fact of life that Black children in America, even those
raised in middle-class homes, will have to face hostility not generally
directed at their White peers. The problem is that this fact does not
justify institutionalizing differential treatment of individuals by the
government based on race.
With regard to adoption policies, classifying children based on their
race and then erecting barriers to transracial adoptions which dispro-
portionately and tragically impact minority children is profoundly un-
fair. The unfortunate fact that in today's world the Black children are
likely to have to learn to deal with racism later does not justify making
their lives harder by denying them a stable home environment now.
Nor does the fact that Blacks have to live with racism mean that the
government should be free to use race as a basis for drawing congres-
sional districts. The very notion that race really does matter is anti-
thetical to the notion that, in an ideal world, we would be judged by
the content of our characters rather than the color of our skin. 459
Finally, the existence of racism is an insufficient justification for af-
firmative action. The racism experienced by my friend's college-aged
son is not generally the type of discrimination which affirmative action
seeks to or can remedy. Affirmative action programs seek to provide
a remedy to those who were systematically excluded from certain
types of opportunities because of their race, and in this objective it
fails. Affirmative action is not supposed to be the remedy for racist
behavior which, while hateful and hurtful, is not exclusionary in
nature.
This Article addresses only three specific types of government pro-
grams, but the principle announced herein is broader. We should not
allow our government to use race as a basis for differentiating be-
tween individuals, because treating people differently based on some-
thing as superficial as skin color is unfair and unjust. So long as race is
treated as being important, it will continue to be important. If we
continue to allow federal, state and local governments and govern-
ment agencies to adopt programs and policies which differentiate
among people based on nothing more than their race, we have no
hope of achieving a society where individual merit matters instead of
skin color-a society where we are each judged on the content of our
character.
459. MARTIN LUTHER KiNG, JR., I Have A Dream: Writings and Speeches that Changed the
World, in I HAVE A DREAM, 101, 105 (James M. Washington ed., 1986).
[Vol. 46:1
